1 /*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2019 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
3 *
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
6 * are met:
7 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
8 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
9 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
11 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
12 * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
13 * its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
14 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
15 *
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
17 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
18 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
19 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
20 * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
21 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
24 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
25 * IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
26 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
27 */
28 /*
29 * NOTICE: This file was modified by McAfee Research in 2004 to introduce
30 * support for mandatory and extensible security protections. This notice
31 * is included in support of clause 2.2 (b) of the Apple Public License,
32 * Version 2.0.
33 */
34
35 #include <sys/param.h>
36 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
37 #include <sys/kernel.h>
38 #include <sys/lock.h>
39 #include <sys/namei.h>
40 #include <sys/proc_internal.h>
41 #include <sys/kauth.h>
42 #include <sys/queue.h>
43 #include <sys/systm.h>
44 #include <sys/time.h>
45 #include <sys/ucred.h>
46 #include <sys/uio.h>
47 #include <sys/unistd.h>
48 #include <sys/file_internal.h>
49 #include <sys/vnode_internal.h>
50 #include <sys/user.h>
51 #include <sys/syscall.h>
52 #include <sys/un.h>
53 #include <sys/sysent.h>
54 #include <sys/sysproto.h>
55 #include <sys/vfs_context.h>
56 #include <sys/domain.h>
57 #include <sys/protosw.h>
58 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
59
60 #include <bsm/audit.h>
61 #include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
62 #include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
63
64 #include <security/audit/audit.h>
65 #include <security/audit/audit_bsd.h>
66 #include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
67
68 #include <mach/host_priv.h>
69 #include <mach/host_special_ports.h>
70 #include <mach/audit_triggers_server.h>
71
72 #include <kern/host.h>
73 #include <kern/sched_prim.h>
74
75 #if CONFIG_MACF
76 #include <bsm/audit_record.h>
77 #include <security/mac.h>
78 #include <security/mac_framework.h>
79 #include <security/mac_policy.h>
80 #endif
81
82 #include <net/route.h>
83
84 #include <netinet/in.h>
85 #include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
86
87 #include <IOKit/IOBSD.h>
88
89 #if CONFIG_AUDIT
90
91 #define IS_NOT_VALID_PID(p) ((p) < 1 || (p) > PID_MAX)
92
93 #ifdef AUDIT_API_WARNINGS
94 /*
95 * Macro to warn about auditinfo_addr_t/auditpinfo_addr_t changing sizes
96 * to encourage the userland code to be recompiled and updated.
97 */
98 #define WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(sz1, sz2, scall, tp) do { \
99 if ((size_t)(sz1) != (size_t)(sz2)) { \
100 char pn[MAXCOMLEN + 1]; \
101 \
102 proc_selfname(pn, MAXCOMLEN + 1); \
103 printf("Size of %s used by %s in %s is different from " \
104 "kernel's. Please recompile %s.\n", (tp), \
105 (scall), pn, pn); \
106 } \
107 } while (0)
108
109 /*
110 * Macro to warn about using ASID's outside the range [1 to PID_MAX] to
111 * encourage userland code changes.
112 */
113 #define WARN_IF_BAD_ASID(asid, scall) do { \
114 if (((asid) < 1 || (asid) > PID_MAX) && \
115 (asid) != AU_ASSIGN_ASID) { \
116 char pn[MAXCOMLEN + 1]; \
117 \
118 proc_selfname(pn, MAXCOMLEN + 1); \
119 printf("%s in %s is using an ASID (%u) outside the " \
120 "range [1 to %d]. Please change %s to use an ASID "\
121 "within this range or use AU_ASSIGN_ASID.\n", \
122 (scall), pn, (uint32_t)(asid), PID_MAX, pn); \
123 } \
124 } while (0)
125
126 #else /* ! AUDIT_API_WARNINGS */
127
128 #define WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(sz1, sz2, scall, tp) do { \
129 } while (0)
130
131 #define WARN_IF_BAD_ASID(asid, scall) do { \
132 } while (0)
133
134 #endif /* AUDIT_API_WARNINGS */
135
136 /*
137 * System call to allow a user space application to submit a BSM audit record
138 * to the kernel for inclusion in the audit log. This function does little
139 * verification on the audit record that is submitted.
140 *
141 * XXXAUDIT: Audit preselection for user records does not currently work,
142 * since we pre-select only based on the AUE_audit event type, not the event
143 * type submitted as part of the user audit data.
144 */
145 /* ARGSUSED */
146 int
audit(proc_t p,struct audit_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)147 audit(proc_t p, struct audit_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
148 {
149 int error = 0;
150 void * rec = NULL;
151 void * full_rec = NULL;
152 struct kaudit_record *ar = NULL;
153 struct uthread *uthr = NULL;
154 int add_identity_token = 1;
155 int max_record_length = MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE;
156 void *udata = NULL;
157 u_int ulen = 0;
158 struct au_identity_info id_info = {
159 .signer_type = 0,
160 .signing_id = NULL,
161 .signing_id_trunc = 0,
162 .team_id = NULL,
163 .team_id_trunc = 0,
164 .cdhash = NULL,
165 .cdhash_len = 0
166 };
167 token_t *id_tok = NULL;
168 boolean_t kern_events_allowed = FALSE;
169 char *signing_id = NULL;
170 char process_name[MAXCOMLEN + 1] = {};
171 int signer_type = 0;
172
173 error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
174 if (error) {
175 /*
176 * If a process is not running as root but is properly
177 * entitled, allow it to audit non-kernel events only.
178 */
179 if (!IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(AU_AUDIT_USER_ENTITLEMENT)) {
180 goto free_out;
181 }
182 } else {
183 kern_events_allowed = TRUE;
184 }
185
186 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
187 max_record_length = MIN(audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz, MAX_AUDIT_RECORD_SIZE);
188 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
189
190 if (IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(AU_CLASS_RESERVED_ENTITLEMENT)) {
191 /* Entitled tasks are trusted to add appropriate identity info */
192 add_identity_token = 0;
193 } else {
194 /*
195 * If the caller is unentitled, an identity token will be added and
196 * the space must be accounted for
197 */
198 max_record_length -= MAX_AUDIT_IDENTITY_SIZE;
199 }
200
201 if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length > max_record_length)) {
202 error = EINVAL;
203 goto free_out;
204 }
205
206 ar = currecord();
207
208 /*
209 * If there's no current audit record (audit() itself not audited)
210 * commit the user audit record.
211 */
212 if (ar == NULL) {
213 uthr = curthread();
214 if (uthr == NULL) {
215 /* can this happen? */
216 error = ENOTSUP;
217 goto free_out;
218 }
219
220 /*
221 * This is not very efficient; we're required to allocate a
222 * complete kernel audit record just so the user record can
223 * tag along.
224 */
225 uthr->uu_ar = audit_new(AUE_NULL, p, uthr);
226 if (uthr->uu_ar == NULL) {
227 error = ENOTSUP;
228 goto free_out;
229 }
230 ar = uthr->uu_ar;
231 }
232
233 rec = kalloc_data(uap->length, Z_WAITOK);
234 if (!rec) {
235 error = ENOMEM;
236 goto free_out;
237 }
238
239 error = copyin(uap->record, rec, uap->length);
240 if (error) {
241 goto free_out;
242 }
243
244 #if CONFIG_MACF
245 error = mac_system_check_audit(kauth_cred_get(), rec, uap->length);
246 if (error) {
247 goto free_out;
248 }
249 #endif
250
251 /* Verify the record. */
252 if (bsm_rec_verify(rec, uap->length, kern_events_allowed) == 0) {
253 error = EINVAL;
254 goto free_out;
255 }
256
257 if (add_identity_token) {
258 struct hdr_tok_partial *hdr;
259 struct trl_tok_partial *trl;
260 int bytes_copied = 0;
261
262 /* Create a new identity token for this buffer */
263 audit_identity_info_construct(&id_info);
264 id_tok = au_to_identity(id_info.signer_type, id_info.signing_id,
265 id_info.signing_id_trunc, id_info.team_id, id_info.team_id_trunc,
266 id_info.cdhash, id_info.cdhash_len);
267 if (!id_tok) {
268 error = ENOMEM;
269 goto free_out;
270 }
271
272 /* Splice the record together using a new buffer */
273 full_rec = kalloc_data(uap->length + id_tok->len, Z_WAITOK);
274 if (!full_rec) {
275 error = ENOMEM;
276 goto free_out;
277 }
278
279 signing_id = id_info.signing_id;
280 signer_type = id_info.signer_type;
281
282 /* Copy the original buffer up to but not including the trailer */
283 memcpy(full_rec, rec, uap->length - AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE);
284 bytes_copied = uap->length - AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE;
285
286 /* Copy the identity token */
287 memcpy((void *)((uintptr_t)full_rec + bytes_copied), id_tok->t_data, id_tok->len);
288 bytes_copied += id_tok->len;
289
290 /* Copy the old trailer */
291 memcpy((void *)((uintptr_t)full_rec + bytes_copied),
292 (const void *)((uintptr_t)rec + (uap->length - AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE)),
293 AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE);
294 bytes_copied += AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE;
295
296 /* Fix the record size stored in the header token */
297 hdr = (struct hdr_tok_partial*)full_rec;
298 hdr->len = htonl(bytes_copied);
299
300 /* Fix the record size stored in the trailer token */
301 trl = (struct trl_tok_partial*)
302 ((uintptr_t)full_rec + bytes_copied - AUDIT_TRAILER_SIZE);
303 trl->len = htonl(bytes_copied);
304
305 udata = full_rec;
306 ulen = bytes_copied;
307 } else {
308 udata = rec;
309 ulen = uap->length;
310 }
311
312 /*
313 * Attach the user audit record to the kernel audit record. Because
314 * this system call is an auditable event, we will write the user
315 * record along with the record for this audit event.
316 *
317 * XXXAUDIT: KASSERT appropriate starting values of k_udata, k_ulen,
318 * k_ar_commit & AR_COMMIT_USER?
319 */
320 ar->k_udata = udata;
321 ar->k_ulen = ulen;
322 ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_USER;
323
324 /*
325 * Currently we assume that all preselection has been performed in
326 * userspace. We unconditionally set these masks so that the records
327 * get committed both to the trail and pipe. In the future we will
328 * want to setup kernel based preselection.
329 */
330 ar->k_ar_commit |= (AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE);
331
332 // Send data for analytics for non-platform binaries only
333 if (signer_type == 0 && add_identity_token) {
334 proc_name(proc_pid(p), process_name, sizeof(process_name));
335 (void)audit_send_analytics(signing_id, process_name);
336 }
337
338 free_out:
339 /*
340 * If rec was allocated, it must be freed if an identity token was added
341 * (since full_rec will be used) OR there was an error (since nothing
342 * will be attached to the kernel structure).
343 */
344 if (rec && (add_identity_token || error)) {
345 kfree_data_addr(rec);
346 }
347
348 /* Only free full_rec if an error occurred */
349 if (full_rec && error) {
350 kfree_data_addr(full_rec);
351 }
352
353 audit_identity_info_destruct(&id_info);
354 if (id_tok) {
355 kfree_data(id_tok->t_data, id_tok->len);
356 kfree_type(struct au_token, id_tok);
357 }
358
359 return error;
360 }
361
362 /*
363 * System call to manipulate auditing.
364 */
365 /* ARGSUSED */
366 int
auditon(proc_t p,struct auditon_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)367 auditon(proc_t p, struct auditon_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
368 {
369 kauth_cred_t scred;
370 int error = 0;
371 union auditon_udata udata;
372 proc_t tp = PROC_NULL;
373 struct auditinfo_addr aia;
374
375 AUDIT_ARG(cmd, uap->cmd);
376
377 #if CONFIG_MACF
378 error = mac_system_check_auditon(kauth_cred_get(), uap->cmd);
379 if (error) {
380 return error;
381 }
382 #endif
383
384 if ((uap->length <= 0) || (uap->length >
385 (int)sizeof(union auditon_udata))) {
386 return EINVAL;
387 }
388
389 memset((void *)&udata, 0, sizeof(udata));
390
391 /*
392 * Some of the GET commands use the arguments too.
393 */
394 switch (uap->cmd) {
395 case A_SETPOLICY:
396 case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
397 case A_SETKMASK:
398 case A_SETQCTRL:
399 case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
400 case A_SETSTAT:
401 case A_SETUMASK:
402 case A_SETSMASK:
403 case A_SETCOND:
404 case A_OLDSETCOND:
405 case A_SETCLASS:
406 case A_SETPMASK:
407 case A_SETFSIZE:
408 case A_SETKAUDIT:
409 case A_GETCLASS:
410 case A_GETPINFO:
411 case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
412 case A_SENDTRIGGER:
413 case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
414 case A_GETSFLAGS:
415 case A_SETSFLAGS:
416 case A_SETCTLMODE:
417 case A_SETEXPAFTER:
418 error = copyin(uap->data, (void *)&udata, uap->length);
419 if (error) {
420 return error;
421 }
422 AUDIT_ARG(auditon, &udata);
423 AUDIT_ARG(len, uap->length);
424 break;
425 }
426
427 /* Check appropriate privilege. */
428 switch (uap->cmd) {
429 /*
430 * A_GETSINFO doesn't require priviledge but only superuser
431 * gets to see the audit masks.
432 */
433 case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
434 if ((sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length) ||
435 (audit_session_lookup(udata.au_kau_info.ai_asid,
436 &udata.au_kau_info) != 0)) {
437 error = EINVAL;
438 } else if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) {
439 udata.au_kau_info.ai_mask.am_success = ~0;
440 udata.au_kau_info.ai_mask.am_failure = ~0;
441 }
442 break;
443 case A_GETSFLAGS:
444 case A_SETSFLAGS:
445 /* Getting one's own audit session flags requires no
446 * privilege. Setting the flags is subject to access
447 * control implemented in audit_session_setaia().
448 */
449 break;
450 case A_SETCTLMODE:
451 case A_SETEXPAFTER:
452 if (!IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(AU_CLASS_RESERVED_ENTITLEMENT)) {
453 error = EPERM;
454 }
455 break;
456 default:
457 error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
458 break;
459 }
460 if (error) {
461 return error;
462 }
463
464 /*
465 * If the audit subsytem is in external control mode, additional
466 * privilege checks are required for a subset of auditon commands
467 */
468 if (audit_ctl_mode == AUDIT_CTLMODE_EXTERNAL) {
469 switch (uap->cmd) {
470 case A_SETCOND:
471 case A_SETFSIZE:
472 case A_SETPOLICY:
473 case A_SETQCTRL:
474 if (!IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(AU_CLASS_RESERVED_ENTITLEMENT)) {
475 error = EPERM;
476 }
477 break;
478 }
479 if (error) {
480 return error;
481 }
482 }
483
484 /*
485 * XXX Need to implement these commands by accessing the global
486 * values associated with the commands.
487 */
488 switch (uap->cmd) {
489 case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
490 case A_GETPOLICY:
491 if (sizeof(udata.au_policy64) == uap->length) {
492 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
493 if (!audit_fail_stop) {
494 udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_CNT;
495 }
496 if (audit_panic_on_write_fail) {
497 udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_AHLT;
498 }
499 if (audit_argv) {
500 udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGV;
501 }
502 if (audit_arge) {
503 udata.au_policy64 |= AUDIT_ARGE;
504 }
505 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
506 break;
507 }
508 if (sizeof(udata.au_policy) != uap->length) {
509 return EINVAL;
510 }
511 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
512 if (!audit_fail_stop) {
513 udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_CNT;
514 }
515 if (audit_panic_on_write_fail) {
516 udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_AHLT;
517 }
518 if (audit_argv) {
519 udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGV;
520 }
521 if (audit_arge) {
522 udata.au_policy |= AUDIT_ARGE;
523 }
524 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
525 break;
526
527 case A_OLDSETPOLICY:
528 case A_SETPOLICY:
529 if (sizeof(udata.au_policy64) == uap->length) {
530 if (udata.au_policy64 & ~(AUDIT_CNT | AUDIT_AHLT |
531 AUDIT_ARGV | AUDIT_ARGE)) {
532 return EINVAL;
533 }
534 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
535 audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_CNT) ==
536 0);
537 audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy64 &
538 AUDIT_AHLT);
539 audit_argv = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGV);
540 audit_arge = (udata.au_policy64 & AUDIT_ARGE);
541 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
542 break;
543 }
544 if ((sizeof(udata.au_policy) != uap->length) ||
545 (udata.au_policy & ~(AUDIT_CNT | AUDIT_AHLT | AUDIT_ARGV |
546 AUDIT_ARGE))) {
547 return EINVAL;
548 }
549 /*
550 * XXX - Need to wake up waiters if the policy relaxes?
551 */
552 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
553 audit_fail_stop = ((udata.au_policy & AUDIT_CNT) == 0);
554 audit_panic_on_write_fail = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_AHLT);
555 audit_argv = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGV);
556 audit_arge = (udata.au_policy & AUDIT_ARGE);
557 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
558 break;
559
560 case A_GETKMASK:
561 if (sizeof(udata.au_mask) != uap->length) {
562 return EINVAL;
563 }
564 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
565 udata.au_mask = audit_nae_mask;
566 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
567 break;
568
569 case A_SETKMASK:
570 if (sizeof(udata.au_mask) != uap->length) {
571 return EINVAL;
572 }
573 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
574 audit_nae_mask = udata.au_mask;
575 AUDIT_CHECK_IF_KEVENTS_MASK(audit_nae_mask);
576 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
577 break;
578
579 case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
580 case A_GETQCTRL:
581 if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64) == uap->length) {
582 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
583 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater =
584 (u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater;
585 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater =
586 (u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_lowater;
587 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz =
588 (u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz;
589 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_delay =
590 (u_int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_delay;
591 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree =
592 (int64_t)audit_qctrl.aq_minfree;
593 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
594 break;
595 }
596 if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl) != uap->length) {
597 return EINVAL;
598 }
599 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
600 udata.au_qctrl = audit_qctrl;
601 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
602 break;
603
604 case A_OLDSETQCTRL:
605 case A_SETQCTRL:
606 if (sizeof(udata.au_qctrl64) == uap->length) {
607 if ((udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
608 (udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater >=
609 udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater) ||
610 (udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
611 (udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree < 0) ||
612 (udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree > 100)) {
613 return EINVAL;
614 }
615 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
616 audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater =
617 (int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_hiwater;
618 audit_qctrl.aq_lowater =
619 (int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_lowater;
620 audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz =
621 (int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_bufsz;
622 audit_qctrl.aq_minfree =
623 (int)udata.au_qctrl64.aq64_minfree;
624 audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1; /* Not used. */
625 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
626 break;
627 }
628 if ((sizeof(udata.au_qctrl) != uap->length) ||
629 (udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater > AQ_MAXHIGH) ||
630 (udata.au_qctrl.aq_lowater >= udata.au_qctrl.aq_hiwater) ||
631 (udata.au_qctrl.aq_bufsz > AQ_MAXBUFSZ) ||
632 (udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree < 0) ||
633 (udata.au_qctrl.aq_minfree > 100)) {
634 return EINVAL;
635 }
636
637 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
638 audit_qctrl = udata.au_qctrl;
639 /* XXX The queue delay value isn't used with the kernel. */
640 audit_qctrl.aq_delay = -1;
641 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
642 break;
643
644 case A_GETCWD:
645 return ENOSYS;
646
647 case A_GETCAR:
648 return ENOSYS;
649
650 case A_GETSTAT:
651 return ENOSYS;
652
653 case A_SETSTAT:
654 return ENOSYS;
655
656 case A_SETUMASK:
657 return ENOSYS;
658
659 case A_SETSMASK:
660 return ENOSYS;
661
662 case A_OLDGETCOND:
663 case A_GETCOND:
664 if (sizeof(udata.au_cond64) == uap->length) {
665 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
666 if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended) {
667 udata.au_cond64 = AUC_AUDITING;
668 } else {
669 udata.au_cond64 = AUC_NOAUDIT;
670 }
671 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
672 break;
673 }
674 if (sizeof(udata.au_cond) != uap->length) {
675 return EINVAL;
676 }
677 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
678 if (audit_enabled && !audit_suspended) {
679 udata.au_cond = AUC_AUDITING;
680 } else {
681 udata.au_cond = AUC_NOAUDIT;
682 }
683 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
684 break;
685
686 case A_OLDSETCOND:
687 case A_SETCOND:
688 if (sizeof(udata.au_cond64) == uap->length) {
689 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
690 if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_NOAUDIT) {
691 audit_suspended = 1;
692 }
693 if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_AUDITING) {
694 audit_suspended = 0;
695 }
696 if (udata.au_cond64 == AUC_DISABLED) {
697 audit_suspended = 1;
698 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
699 audit_shutdown();
700 break;
701 }
702 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
703 break;
704 }
705 if (sizeof(udata.au_cond) != uap->length) {
706 return EINVAL;
707 }
708 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
709 if (udata.au_cond == AUC_NOAUDIT) {
710 audit_suspended = 1;
711 }
712 if (udata.au_cond == AUC_AUDITING) {
713 audit_suspended = 0;
714 }
715 if (udata.au_cond == AUC_DISABLED) {
716 audit_suspended = 1;
717 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
718 audit_shutdown();
719 break;
720 }
721 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
722 break;
723
724 case A_GETCLASS:
725 if (sizeof(udata.au_evclass) != uap->length) {
726 return EINVAL;
727 }
728 udata.au_evclass.ec_class = au_event_class(
729 udata.au_evclass.ec_number);
730 break;
731
732 case A_SETCLASS:
733 if (sizeof(udata.au_evclass) != uap->length) {
734 return EINVAL;
735 }
736 au_evclassmap_insert(udata.au_evclass.ec_number,
737 udata.au_evclass.ec_class);
738 break;
739
740 case A_GETPINFO:
741 if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo) != uap->length) ||
742 IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) {
743 return EINVAL;
744 }
745
746 scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref_for_pid(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid);
747 if (scred == NOCRED) {
748 return ESRCH;
749 }
750
751 if (scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6) {
752 kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
753 return EINVAL;
754 }
755
756 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_auid =
757 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
758 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success =
759 scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_success;
760 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure =
761 scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_failure;
762 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.machine =
763 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_addr[0];
764 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_termid.port =
765 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid.at_port;
766 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_asid =
767 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
768
769 kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
770 break;
771
772 case A_SETPMASK:
773 if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo) != uap->length) ||
774 IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) {
775 return EINVAL;
776 }
777 if ((tp = proc_find(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid)) == NULL) {
778 return ESRCH;
779 }
780
781 smr_proc_task_enter();
782 scred = proc_ucred_smr(tp);
783 bcopy(scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(aia));
784 scred = NOCRED;
785 smr_proc_task_leave();
786
787 aia.ai_mask.am_success =
788 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_success;
789 aia.ai_mask.am_failure =
790 udata.au_aupinfo.ap_mask.am_failure;
791 AUDIT_CHECK_IF_KEVENTS_MASK(aia.ai_mask);
792 error = audit_session_setaia(tp, &aia);
793 proc_rele(tp);
794 tp = PROC_NULL;
795 if (error) {
796 return error;
797 }
798 break;
799
800 case A_SETFSIZE:
801 if ((sizeof(udata.au_fstat) != uap->length) ||
802 ((udata.au_fstat.af_filesz != 0) &&
803 (udata.au_fstat.af_filesz < MIN_AUDIT_FILE_SIZE))) {
804 return EINVAL;
805 }
806 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
807 audit_fstat.af_filesz = udata.au_fstat.af_filesz;
808 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
809 break;
810
811 case A_GETFSIZE:
812 if (sizeof(udata.au_fstat) != uap->length) {
813 return EINVAL;
814 }
815 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
816 udata.au_fstat.af_filesz = audit_fstat.af_filesz;
817 udata.au_fstat.af_currsz = audit_fstat.af_currsz;
818 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
819 break;
820
821 case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
822 if ((sizeof(udata.au_aupinfo_addr) != uap->length) ||
823 IS_NOT_VALID_PID(udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_pid)) {
824 return EINVAL;
825 }
826 scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref_for_pid(udata.au_aupinfo.ap_pid);
827 if (scred == NOCRED) {
828 return ESRCH;
829 }
830
831 WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(uap->length,
832 sizeof(auditpinfo_addr_t), "auditon(A_GETPINFO_ADDR,...)",
833 "auditpinfo_addr_t");
834
835 udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_auid =
836 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
837 udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_asid =
838 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_asid;
839 udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_success =
840 scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_success;
841 udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_mask.am_failure =
842 scred->cr_audit.as_mask.am_failure;
843 bcopy(&scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_termid,
844 &udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_termid,
845 sizeof(au_tid_addr_t));
846 udata.au_aupinfo_addr.ap_flags =
847 scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_flags;
848
849 kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
850 break;
851
852 case A_GETKAUDIT:
853 if (sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length) {
854 return EINVAL;
855 }
856 audit_get_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
857 break;
858
859 case A_SETKAUDIT:
860 if ((sizeof(udata.au_kau_info) != uap->length) ||
861 (udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4 &&
862 udata.au_kau_info.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6)) {
863 return EINVAL;
864 }
865 audit_set_kinfo(&udata.au_kau_info);
866 break;
867
868 case A_SENDTRIGGER:
869 if ((sizeof(udata.au_trigger) != uap->length) ||
870 (udata.au_trigger < AUDIT_TRIGGER_MIN) ||
871 (udata.au_trigger > AUDIT_TRIGGER_MAX)) {
872 return EINVAL;
873 }
874 return audit_send_trigger(udata.au_trigger);
875
876 case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
877 /* Handled above before switch(). */
878 break;
879
880 case A_GETSFLAGS:
881 if (sizeof(udata.au_flags) != uap->length) {
882 return EINVAL;
883 }
884 bcopy(&(kauth_cred_get()->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_flags),
885 &udata.au_flags, sizeof(udata.au_flags));
886 break;
887
888 case A_SETSFLAGS:
889 if (sizeof(udata.au_flags) != uap->length) {
890 return EINVAL;
891 }
892 scred = kauth_cred_get();
893 bcopy(scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(aia));
894 bcopy(&scred->cr_audit.as_mask, &aia.ai_mask, sizeof(au_mask_t));
895 aia.ai_flags = udata.au_flags;
896 error = audit_session_setaia(p, &aia);
897 if (error) {
898 return error;
899 }
900 break;
901
902 case A_GETCTLMODE:
903 if (sizeof(udata.au_ctl_mode) != uap->length) {
904 return EINVAL;
905 }
906 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
907 udata.au_ctl_mode = audit_ctl_mode;
908 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
909 break;
910
911 case A_SETCTLMODE:
912 if (sizeof(udata.au_ctl_mode) != uap->length) {
913 return EINVAL;
914 }
915
916 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
917
918 if (udata.au_ctl_mode == AUDIT_CTLMODE_NORMAL) {
919 audit_ctl_mode = AUDIT_CTLMODE_NORMAL;
920 } else if (udata.au_ctl_mode == AUDIT_CTLMODE_EXTERNAL) {
921 audit_ctl_mode = AUDIT_CTLMODE_EXTERNAL;
922 } else {
923 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
924 return EINVAL;
925 }
926
927 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
928 break;
929
930 case A_GETEXPAFTER:
931 if (sizeof(udata.au_expire_after) != uap->length) {
932 return EINVAL;
933 }
934 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
935 udata.au_expire_after.age = audit_expire_after.age;
936 udata.au_expire_after.size = audit_expire_after.size;
937 udata.au_expire_after.op_type = audit_expire_after.op_type;
938 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
939 break;
940
941 case A_SETEXPAFTER:
942 if (sizeof(udata.au_expire_after) != uap->length) {
943 return EINVAL;
944 }
945 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
946 audit_expire_after.age = udata.au_expire_after.age;
947 audit_expire_after.size = udata.au_expire_after.size;
948 audit_expire_after.op_type = udata.au_expire_after.op_type;
949 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
950 break;
951
952 default:
953 return EINVAL;
954 }
955
956 /*
957 * Copy data back to userspace for the GET comands.
958 */
959 switch (uap->cmd) {
960 case A_GETPOLICY:
961 case A_OLDGETPOLICY:
962 case A_GETKMASK:
963 case A_GETQCTRL:
964 case A_OLDGETQCTRL:
965 case A_GETCWD:
966 case A_GETCAR:
967 case A_GETSTAT:
968 case A_GETCOND:
969 case A_OLDGETCOND:
970 case A_GETCLASS:
971 case A_GETPINFO:
972 case A_GETFSIZE:
973 case A_GETPINFO_ADDR:
974 case A_GETKAUDIT:
975 case A_GETSINFO_ADDR:
976 case A_GETSFLAGS:
977 case A_GETCTLMODE:
978 case A_GETEXPAFTER:
979 error = copyout((void *)&udata, uap->data, uap->length);
980 if (error) {
981 return ENOSYS;
982 }
983 break;
984 }
985
986 return 0;
987 }
988
989 /*
990 * System calls to manage the user audit information.
991 */
992 /* ARGSUSED */
993 int
getauid(proc_t p,struct getauid_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)994 getauid(proc_t p, struct getauid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
995 {
996 au_id_t id;
997 int error;
998
999 #if CONFIG_MACF
1000 error = mac_proc_check_getauid(p);
1001 if (error) {
1002 return error;
1003 }
1004 #endif
1005 id = current_cached_proc_cred(p)->cr_audit.as_aia_p->ai_auid;
1006
1007 error = copyout((void *)&id, uap->auid, sizeof(id));
1008 if (error) {
1009 return error;
1010 }
1011
1012 return 0;
1013 }
1014
1015 /* ARGSUSED */
1016 int
setauid(proc_t p,struct setauid_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)1017 setauid(proc_t p, struct setauid_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
1018 {
1019 int error;
1020 au_id_t id;
1021 kauth_cred_t scred;
1022 struct auditinfo_addr aia;
1023
1024 error = copyin(uap->auid, &id, sizeof(id));
1025 if (error) {
1026 return error;
1027 }
1028 AUDIT_ARG(auid, id);
1029
1030 #if CONFIG_MACF
1031 error = mac_proc_check_setauid(p, id);
1032 if (error) {
1033 return error;
1034 }
1035 #endif
1036
1037 scred = current_cached_proc_cred(p);
1038 error = suser(scred, &p->p_acflag);
1039 if (error) {
1040 return error;
1041 }
1042
1043 bcopy(scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(aia));
1044 if (aia.ai_asid == AU_DEFAUDITSID) {
1045 aia.ai_asid = AU_ASSIGN_ASID;
1046 }
1047 bcopy(&scred->cr_audit.as_mask, &aia.ai_mask, sizeof(au_mask_t));
1048
1049 aia.ai_auid = id;
1050 error = audit_session_setaia(p, &aia);
1051
1052 return error;
1053 }
1054
1055 static int
getaudit_addr_internal(proc_t p,kauth_cred_t scred,user_addr_t user_addr,size_t length)1056 getaudit_addr_internal(proc_t p, kauth_cred_t scred, user_addr_t user_addr, size_t length)
1057 {
1058 auditinfo_addr_t aia;
1059
1060 bcopy(scred->cr_audit.as_aia_p, &aia, sizeof(auditinfo_addr_t));
1061
1062 /*
1063 * Only superuser gets to see the real mask.
1064 */
1065 if (suser(scred, &p->p_acflag)) {
1066 aia.ai_mask.am_success = ~0;
1067 aia.ai_mask.am_failure = ~0;
1068 } else {
1069 bcopy(&scred->cr_audit.as_mask, &aia.ai_mask, sizeof(au_mask_t));
1070 }
1071
1072 return copyout(&aia, user_addr, min(sizeof(aia), length));
1073 }
1074
1075 /* ARGSUSED */
1076 int
getaudit_addr(proc_t p,struct getaudit_addr_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)1077 getaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap,
1078 __unused int32_t *retval)
1079 {
1080 kauth_cred_t scred;
1081 #if CONFIG_MACF
1082 int error = mac_proc_check_getaudit(p);
1083
1084 if (error) {
1085 return error;
1086 }
1087 #endif /* CONFIG_MACF */
1088 WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(uap->length, sizeof(auditinfo_addr_t),
1089 "getaudit_addr(2)", "auditinfo_addr_t");
1090
1091 scred = current_cached_proc_cred(p);
1092 return getaudit_addr_internal(p, scred, uap->auditinfo_addr, uap->length);
1093 }
1094
1095 /* ARGSUSED */
1096 int
setaudit_addr(proc_t p,struct setaudit_addr_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)1097 setaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap,
1098 __unused int32_t *retval)
1099 {
1100 struct auditinfo_addr aia;
1101 int error;
1102
1103 bzero(&aia, sizeof(auditinfo_addr_t));
1104 error = copyin(uap->auditinfo_addr, &aia,
1105 min(sizeof(aia), uap->length));
1106 if (error) {
1107 return error;
1108 }
1109 AUDIT_ARG(auditinfo_addr, &aia);
1110 if (aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv6 &&
1111 aia.ai_termid.at_type != AU_IPv4) {
1112 return EINVAL;
1113 }
1114 if (aia.ai_asid != AU_ASSIGN_ASID &&
1115 (uint32_t)aia.ai_asid > ASSIGNED_ASID_MAX) {
1116 return EINVAL;
1117 }
1118
1119 #if CONFIG_MACF
1120 error = mac_proc_check_setaudit(p, &aia);
1121 if (error) {
1122 return error;
1123 }
1124 #endif
1125
1126 error = suser(current_cached_proc_cred(p), &p->p_acflag);
1127 if (error) {
1128 return error;
1129 }
1130
1131 WARN_IF_AINFO_ADDR_CHANGED(uap->length, sizeof(auditinfo_addr_t),
1132 "setaudit_addr(2)", "auditinfo_addr_t");
1133 WARN_IF_BAD_ASID(aia.ai_asid, "setaudit_addr(2)");
1134
1135 AUDIT_CHECK_IF_KEVENTS_MASK(aia.ai_mask);
1136 if (aia.ai_asid == AU_DEFAUDITSID) {
1137 aia.ai_asid = AU_ASSIGN_ASID;
1138 }
1139
1140 error = audit_session_setaia(p, &aia);
1141 if (error) {
1142 return error;
1143 }
1144
1145 /*
1146 * If asked to assign an ASID then let the user know what the ASID is
1147 * by copying the auditinfo_addr struct back out.
1148 *
1149 * Note: because we just updated the proc cred, we can't use
1150 * current_cached_proc_cred_ref() here.
1151 */
1152 if (aia.ai_asid == AU_ASSIGN_ASID) {
1153 kauth_cred_t scred;
1154
1155 scred = kauth_cred_proc_ref(p);
1156 error = getaudit_addr_internal(p, scred, uap->auditinfo_addr,
1157 uap->length);
1158 kauth_cred_unref(&scred);
1159 }
1160
1161 return error;
1162 }
1163
1164 /*
1165 * Syscall to manage audit files.
1166 *
1167 */
1168 /* ARGSUSED */
1169 int
auditctl(proc_t p,struct auditctl_args * uap,__unused int32_t * retval)1170 auditctl(proc_t p, struct auditctl_args *uap, __unused int32_t *retval)
1171 {
1172 struct nameidata nd;
1173 kauth_cred_t cred;
1174 struct vnode *vp;
1175 int error = 0;
1176 au_ctlmode_t ctlmode;
1177
1178 error = suser(kauth_cred_get(), &p->p_acflag);
1179 if (error) {
1180 return error;
1181 }
1182
1183 ctlmode = audit_ctl_mode;
1184
1185 /*
1186 * Do not allow setting of a path when auditing is in reserved mode
1187 */
1188 if (ctlmode == AUDIT_CTLMODE_EXTERNAL &&
1189 !IOCurrentTaskHasEntitlement(AU_AUDITCTL_RESERVED_ENTITLEMENT)) {
1190 return EPERM;
1191 }
1192
1193 vp = NULL;
1194 cred = NULL;
1195
1196 /*
1197 * If a path is specified, open the replacement vnode, perform
1198 * validity checks, and grab another reference to the current
1199 * credential.
1200 *
1201 * XXX Changes API slightly. NULL path no longer disables audit but
1202 * returns EINVAL.
1203 */
1204 if (uap->path == USER_ADDR_NULL) {
1205 return EINVAL;
1206 }
1207
1208 NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, OP_OPEN, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNPATH1,
1209 (IS_64BIT_PROCESS(p) ? UIO_USERSPACE64 :
1210 UIO_USERSPACE32), uap->path, vfs_context_current());
1211 error = vn_open(&nd, AUDIT_OPEN_FLAGS, 0);
1212 if (error) {
1213 return error;
1214 }
1215 vp = nd.ni_vp;
1216 #if CONFIG_MACF
1217 /*
1218 * Accessibility of the vnode was determined in vn_open; the
1219 * mac_system_check_auditctl should only determine whether that vnode
1220 * is appropriate for storing audit data, or that the caller was
1221 * permitted to control the auditing system at all. For example, a
1222 * confidentiality policy may want to ensure that audit files are
1223 * always high sensitivity.
1224 */
1225 error = mac_system_check_auditctl(kauth_cred_get(), vp);
1226 if (error) {
1227 vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, vfs_context_current());
1228 vnode_put(vp);
1229 return error;
1230 }
1231 #endif
1232 if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
1233 vn_close(vp, AUDIT_CLOSE_FLAGS, vfs_context_current());
1234 vnode_put(vp);
1235 return EINVAL;
1236 }
1237 mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
1238 /*
1239 * XXXAUDIT: Should audit_suspended actually be cleared by
1240 * audit_worker?
1241 */
1242 audit_suspended = 0;
1243 mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
1244
1245 /*
1246 * The following gets unreferenced in audit_rotate_vnode()
1247 * after the rotation and it is no longer needed.
1248 */
1249 cred = kauth_cred_get_with_ref();
1250 audit_rotate_vnode(cred, vp);
1251 vnode_put(vp);
1252
1253 return error;
1254 }
1255
1256 #else /* !CONFIG_AUDIT */
1257
1258 int
audit(proc_t p,struct audit_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1259 audit(proc_t p, struct audit_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1260 {
1261 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1262
1263 return ENOSYS;
1264 }
1265
1266 int
auditon(proc_t p,struct auditon_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1267 auditon(proc_t p, struct auditon_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1268 {
1269 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1270
1271 return ENOSYS;
1272 }
1273
1274 int
getauid(proc_t p,struct getauid_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1275 getauid(proc_t p, struct getauid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1276 {
1277 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1278
1279 return ENOSYS;
1280 }
1281
1282 int
setauid(proc_t p,struct setauid_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1283 setauid(proc_t p, struct setauid_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1284 {
1285 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1286
1287 return ENOSYS;
1288 }
1289
1290 int
getaudit_addr(proc_t p,struct getaudit_addr_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1291 getaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct getaudit_addr_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1292 {
1293 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1294
1295 return ENOSYS;
1296 }
1297
1298 int
setaudit_addr(proc_t p,struct setaudit_addr_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1299 setaudit_addr(proc_t p, struct setaudit_addr_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1300 {
1301 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1302
1303 return ENOSYS;
1304 }
1305
1306 int
auditctl(proc_t p,struct auditctl_args * uap,int32_t * retval)1307 auditctl(proc_t p, struct auditctl_args *uap, int32_t *retval)
1308 {
1309 #pragma unused(p, uap, retval)
1310
1311 return ENOSYS;
1312 }
1313
1314 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
1315