xref: /xnu-12377.81.4/osfmk/arm64/locore.s (revision 043036a2b3718f7f0be807e2870f8f47d3fa0796)

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
 *
 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
 *
 * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
 * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
 * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
 * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
 * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
 * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
 * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
 * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
 *
 * Please obtain a copy of the License at
 * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
 *
 * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
 * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
 * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
 * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
 * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
 * limitations under the License.
 *
 * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
 */

#include <machine/asm.h>
#include <arm64/machine_machdep.h>
#include <arm64/machine_routines_asm.h>
#include <arm64/proc_reg.h>
#include <pexpert/arm64/board_config.h>
#include <mach/exception_types.h>
#include <mach_kdp.h>
#include <config_dtrace.h>
#include "assym.s"
#include <arm64/exception_asm.h>
#include "dwarf_unwind.h"

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
#include <arm/pmap.h>
#endif

// If __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__, eret is preceeded by an ISB before returning to userspace.
// Otherwise, use BIT_ISB_PENDING flag to track that we need to issue an isb before eret if needed.
#if defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING) && !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
#define ERET_NEEDS_ISB 1
#define BIT_ISB_PENDING 0
#endif /* defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING) && !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM
/*
 * CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
 *
 * Checks if an exception was taken from the PPL, and if so, trampolines back
 * into the PPL.
 *   x26 - 0 if the exception was taken while in the kernel, 1 if the
 *         exception was taken while in the PPL.
 */
.macro CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
	cmp		x26, xzr
	b.eq		1f

	/* Return to the PPL. */
	mov		x15, #0
	mov		w10, #PPL_STATE_EXCEPTION
#error "XPRR configuration error"
1:
.endmacro


#endif /* XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM */

#if CONFIG_SPTM
#include <sptm/sptm_xnu.h>
#include <sptm/sptm_common.h>
/*
 * Panic lockdown is a security enhancement which makes certain types of
 * exceptions (generally, PAC failures and sync exceptions taken with async
 * exceptions masked) and panics fatal against attackers with kernel R/W. It
 * does this through a trapdoor panic bit protected by the SPTM.
 * When this bit is set, TXM will refuse to authorize new code mappings which,
 * ideally, renders the system unusable even if the attacker gains control over
 * XNU. Additionally, when this bit is set XNU will refuse to handle any sync
 * exceptions originating from user space. This makes implementing further stages
 * of an exploit challenging as it prevents user space from driving the kernel.
 */

/*
 * Inform the SPTM that XNU has (or, rather, must) panic. This is provided as a
 * macro rather than a function since it's just one instruction on release and
 * it avoids the need to spill a return addresses unless the macro caller
 * explicitly needs to preserve LR.
 *
 * On CONFIG_XNUPOST, this functions returns a 1 in x0 if a simulated lockdown
 * was performed, 0 otherwise.
 *
 * This macro preserves callee saved registers but clobbers all others.
 */
.macro BEGIN_PANIC_LOCKDOWN unused
#if DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG
	/*
	 * Forcefully clobber all caller saved GPRs on DEBUG so we don't
	 * accidentally violate our contract with SPTM.
	 */
	mov		x0, #0
	mov		x1, #0
	mov		x2, #0
	mov		x3, #0
	mov		x4, #0
	mov		x5, #0
	mov		x6, #0
	mov		x7, #0
	mov		x8, #0
	mov		x9, #0
	mov		x10, #0
	mov		x11, #0
	mov		x12, #0
	mov		x13, #0
	mov		x14, #0
	mov		x15, #0
	mov		x16, #0
	mov		x17, #0
	mov		x18, #0

	/* Attempt to record the debug trace */
	bl		EXT(panic_lockdown_record_debug_data)

#endif /* DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG */
#if CONFIG_XNUPOST
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	/*
	 * If hitting this with a null TPIDR, it's likely that this was an unexpected
	 * exception in early boot rather than an expected one as a part of a test.
	 * Trigger lockdown.
	 */
	cbz		x0, Lbegin_panic_lockdown_real_\@
	ldr		x1, [x0, TH_EXPECTED_FAULT_HANDLER]
	/* Is a fault handler installed? */
	cbz 	x1, Lbegin_panic_lockdown_real_\@

	/* Do the VA bits of ELR match the expected fault PC? */
	ldr		x1, [x0, TH_EXPECTED_FAULT_PC]
	mrs		x2, ELR_EL1
	mov		x3, #((1 << (64 - T1SZ_BOOT - 1)) - 1)
	and		x4, x1, x3
	and		x5, x2, x3
	cmp		x4, x5
	b.eq	Lbegin_panic_lockdown_simulated_\@
	/* If we had an expected PC but didn't hit it, fail out */
	cbnz	x1, Lbegin_panic_lockdown_real_\@

	/* Alternatively, do the FAR VA bits match the expected fault address? */
	ldr		x1, [x0, TH_EXPECTED_FAULT_ADDR]
	mrs		x2, FAR_EL1
	and		x4, x1, x3
	and		x5, x2, x3
	cmp		x4, x5
	b.eq	Lbegin_panic_lockdown_simulated_\@

Lbegin_panic_lockdown_real_\@:
#endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
	/*
	 * The sptm_xnu_panic_begin routine is guaranteed to unavoidably lead to
	 * the panic bit being set.
	 */
	bl EXT(sptm_xnu_panic_begin)
#if CONFIG_XNUPOST
	mov		x0, #0 // not a simulated lockdown
	b		Lbegin_panic_lockdown_continue_\@
Lbegin_panic_lockdown_simulated_\@:
	/*
	 * We hit lockdown with a matching exception handler installed.
	 * Since this is an expected test exception, skip setting the panic bit
	 * (since this will kill the system) and instead set a bit in the test
	 * handler.
	 */
	mov		x0, #1 // this is a simulated lockdown!
	adrp	x1, EXT(xnu_post_panic_lockdown_did_fire)@page
	strb	w0, [x1, EXT(xnu_post_panic_lockdown_did_fire)@pageoff]
	mov		lr, xzr // trash LR to ensure callers don't rely on it
Lbegin_panic_lockdown_continue_\@:
#endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
.endmacro
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */

/*
 * MAP_KERNEL
 *
 * Restores the kernel EL1 mappings, if necessary.
 *
 * This may mutate x18.
 */
.macro MAP_KERNEL
#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/* Switch to the kernel ASID (low bit set) for the task. */
	mrs		x18, TTBR0_EL1
	orr		x18, x18, #(1 << TTBR_ASID_SHIFT)
	msr		TTBR0_EL1, x18

	/*
	 * We eschew some barriers on Apple CPUs, as relative ordering of writes
	 * to the TTBRs and writes to the TCR should be ensured by the
	 * microarchitecture.
	 */
#if !defined(APPLE_ARM64_ARCH_FAMILY)
	isb		sy
#endif

	/*
	 * Update the TCR to map the kernel now that we are using the kernel
	 * ASID.
	 */
	MOV64		x18, TCR_EL1_BOOT
	msr		TCR_EL1, x18
	isb		sy
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */
.endmacro

/*
 * BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR
 *
 * Branches to the requested long exception vector in the kernelcache.
 *   arg0 - The label to branch to
 *   arg1 - The index of the label in exc_vectors_tables
 *
 * This may mutate x18.
 */
.macro BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR
#if HAS_MTE
	/*
	 * PSTATE.TCO (Tag Check Override) is automatically set by the architecture
	 * whenever an exception is taken. TCO disables tag checking, so we want to
	 * restore it ahead of servicing the exception.
	 */
	msr		TCO, #0
#endif /* HAS_MTE */

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/*
	 * Find the kernelcache table for the exception vectors by accessing
	 * the per-CPU data.
	 */
	mrs		x18, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x18, [x18, ACT_CPUDATAP]
	ldr		x18, [x18, CPU_EXC_VECTORS]

	/*
	 * Get the handler for this exception and jump to it.
	 */
	ldr		x18, [x18, #($1 << 3)]
	br		x18
#else
	b		$0
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */
.endmacro

/*
 * CHECK_KERNEL_STACK
 *
 * Verifies that the kernel stack is aligned and mapped within an expected
 * stack address range. Note: happens before saving registers (in case we can't
 * save to kernel stack).
 *
 * Expects:
 *	{x0, x1} - saved
 *	x1 - Exception syndrome
 *	sp - Saved state
 *
 * Seems like we need an unused argument to the macro for the \@ syntax to work
 *
 */
.macro CHECK_KERNEL_STACK unused
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, #-16]!				// Save {x2-x3}
	and		x1, x1, #ESR_EC_MASK				// Mask the exception class
	mov		x2, #(ESR_EC_SP_ALIGN << ESR_EC_SHIFT)
	cmp		x1, x2								// If we have a stack alignment exception
	b.eq	Lcorrupt_stack_\@					// ...the stack is definitely corrupted
	mov		x2, #(ESR_EC_DABORT_EL1 << ESR_EC_SHIFT)
	cmp		x1, x2								// If we have a data abort, we need to
	b.ne	Lvalid_stack_\@						// ...validate the stack pointer
	mrs		x0, SP_EL0					// Get SP_EL0
	mrs		x1, TPIDR_EL1						// Get thread pointer
	/*
	 * Check for either a NULL TPIDR or a NULL kernel stack, both of which
	 * are expected in early boot, but will cause recursive faults if not
	 * handled specially,
	 */
	cbz		x1, Lcorrupt_stack_\@
	ldr		x2, [x1, TH_KSTACKPTR]
	cbz		x2, Lcorrupt_stack_\@
Ltest_kstack_\@:
	LOAD_KERN_STACK_TOP	dst=x2, src=x1, tmp=x3	// Get top of kernel stack
	sub		x3, x2, KERNEL_STACK_SIZE			// Find bottom of kernel stack
	cmp		x0, x2								// if (SP_EL0 >= kstack top)
	b.ge	Ltest_istack_\@						//    jump to istack test
	cmp		x0, x3								// if (SP_EL0 > kstack bottom)
	b.gt	Lvalid_stack_\@						//    stack pointer valid
Ltest_istack_\@:
	ldr		x1, [x1, ACT_CPUDATAP]				// Load the cpu data ptr
	ldr		x2, [x1, CPU_INTSTACK_TOP]			// Get top of istack
	sub		x3, x2, INTSTACK_SIZE_NUM			// Find bottom of istack
	cmp		x0, x2								// if (SP_EL0 >= istack top)
	b.ge	Lcorrupt_stack_\@					//    corrupt stack pointer
	cmp		x0, x3								// if (SP_EL0 > istack bottom)
	b.gt	Lvalid_stack_\@						//    stack pointer valid
Lcorrupt_stack_\@:
	ldp		x2, x3, [sp], #16
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp], #16
	sub		sp, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE			// Allocate exception frame
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]				// Save x0, x1 to the exception frame
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, SS64_X2]				// Save x2, x3 to the exception frame
	mrs		x0, SP_EL0					// Get SP_EL0
	str		x0, [sp, SS64_SP]				// Save sp to the exception frame
	INIT_SAVED_STATE_FLAVORS sp, w0, w1
	mov		x0, sp								// Copy exception frame pointer to x0
	adrp	x1, fleh_invalid_stack@page			// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, fleh_invalid_stack@pageoff	// fleh_dispatch64 will save register state before we get there
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_FATAL_SYNC_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64
Lvalid_stack_\@:
	ldp		x2, x3, [sp], #16			// Restore {x2-x3}
.endmacro

/*
 * CHECK_EXCEPTION_CRITICAL_REGION
 *
 * Checks if the exception occurred within range [VECTOR_BEGIN, VECTOR_END).
 * If so, jumps to \fail_label. Otherwise, continues.
 * This is useful for avoiding infinite exception loops.
 *
 * Clobbers x18, NZCV.
 */
.macro CHECK_EXCEPTION_CRITICAL_REGION vector_begin, vector_end, fail_label
	/*
	 * We need two registers to do a compare but only have x18 free without
	 * spilling. We can't safely spill to memory yet, however, because doing so
	 * may fault. It's evil, but since we're operating on ELR here we can
	 * temporarily spill into it to get another free register as long as we put
	 * everything back at the end.
	 */
	mrs		x18, ELR_EL1
	msr		ELR_EL1, x19

	adrp	x19, \vector_begin@PAGE
	add		x19, x19, \vector_begin@PAGEOFF
	cmp		x18, x19 /* HS if at or above (suspect), LO if below (safe) */
	adrp	x19, \vector_end@PAGE
	add		x19, x19, \vector_end@PAGEOFF
	/*
	 * If ELR >= \vector_begin (HS), set flags for ELR - \vector_end. LO here
	 * indicates we are in range.
	 * Otherwise, set HS (C)
	 */
	ccmp	x18, x19, #0b0010 /* C/HS */, HS
	/* Unspill x19/fixup ELR */
	mrs		x19, ELR_EL1
	msr		ELR_EL1, x18
	mov		x18, #0
	/* If we're in the range, fail out */
	b.lo	\fail_label
.endmacro

/*
 * CHECK_EXCEPTION_STACK
 *
 * Verifies that SP1 is within exception stack and continues if it is.
 * If not, jumps to \invalid_stack_label as we have nothing to fall back on.
 *
 * (out) x18: The unauthenticated CPU_EXCEPSTACK_TOP used for the comparison or
 *            zero if the check could not be performed (such as because the
 *            thread pointer was invalid).
 *
 * Clobbers NZCV.
 */
.macro CHECK_EXCEPTION_STACK invalid_stack_label
	mrs		x18, TPIDR_EL1					// Get thread pointer
	/*
	 * The thread pointer might be invalid during early boot.
	 * Return zero in x18 to indicate that we failed to execute the check.
	 */
	cbz		x18, Lskip_stack_check_\@
	ldr		x18, [x18, ACT_CPUDATAP]
	cbz		x18, \invalid_stack_label		// If thread context is set, cpu data should be too
	ldr		x18, [x18, CPU_EXCEPSTACK_TOP]
	cmp		sp, x18
	b.gt	\invalid_stack_label			// Fail if above exception stack top
	sub		x18, x18, EXCEPSTACK_SIZE_NUM	// Find bottom of exception stack
	cmp		sp, x18
	b.lt	\invalid_stack_label			// Fail if below exception stack bottom
	add		x18, x18, EXCEPSTACK_SIZE_NUM	// Return stack top in x18
Lskip_stack_check_\@:
	/* FALLTHROUGH */
.endmacro

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	.section __DATA_CONST,__const
	.align 3
	.globl EXT(exc_vectors_table)
LEXT(exc_vectors_table)
	/* Table of exception handlers.
         * These handlers sometimes contain deadloops.
         * It's nice to have symbols for them when debugging. */
	.quad el1_sp0_synchronous_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp0_irq_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp0_serror_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp1_irq_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp1_fiq_vector_long
	.quad el1_sp1_serror_vector_long
	.quad el0_synchronous_vector_64_long
	.quad el0_irq_vector_64_long
	.quad el0_fiq_vector_64_long
	.quad el0_serror_vector_64_long
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

	.text
#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/*
	 * We need this to be on a page boundary so that we may avoiding mapping
	 * other text along with it.  As this must be on the VM page boundary
	 * (due to how the coredumping code currently works), this will be a
	 * 16KB page boundary.
	 */
	.align 14
#else
	.align 12
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */
	.globl EXT(ExceptionVectorsBase)
LEXT(ExceptionVectorsBase)
Lel1_sp0_synchronous_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp0_synchronous_vector_long, 0

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp0_irq_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp0_irq_vector_long, 1

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp0_fiq_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long, 2

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp0_serror_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp0_serror_vector_long, 3

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp1_synchronous_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long, 4

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp1_irq_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp1_irq_vector_long, 5

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp1_fiq_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp1_fiq_vector_long, 6

	.text
	.align 7
Lel1_sp1_serror_vector:
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el1_sp1_serror_vector_long, 7

	.text
	.align 7
Lel0_synchronous_vector_64:
	MAP_KERNEL
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el0_synchronous_vector_64_long, 8

	.text
	.align 7
Lel0_irq_vector_64:
	MAP_KERNEL
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el0_irq_vector_64_long, 9

	.text
	.align 7
Lel0_fiq_vector_64:
	MAP_KERNEL
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el0_fiq_vector_64_long, 10

	.text
	.align 7
Lel0_serror_vector_64:
	MAP_KERNEL
	BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR el0_serror_vector_64_long, 11

	/* Fill out the rest of the page */
	.align 12

/*********************************
 * END OF EXCEPTION VECTORS PAGE *
 *********************************/



.macro EL1_SP0_VECTOR
	msr		SPSel, #0							// Switch to SP0
	sub		sp, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE			// Create exception frame
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]				// Save x0, x1 to exception frame
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, SS64_X2]				// Save x2, x3 to exception frame
	add		x0, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE			// Calculate the original stack pointer
	str		x0, [sp, SS64_SP]					// Save stack pointer to exception frame
	INIT_SAVED_STATE_FLAVORS sp, w0, w1
	mov		x0, sp								// Copy saved state pointer to x0
.endmacro

.macro EL1_SP0_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	// SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK requires a clobberable tmp register, but at this
	// point in the exception vector we can't spare the extra GPR.  Instead note
	// that EL1_SP0_VECTOR ends with x0 == sp and use this to unclobber x0.
	mrs		x1, TPIDR_EL1
	LOAD_INT_STACK_THREAD	dst=x1, src=x1, tmp=x0
	mov		x0, sp
	mov		sp, x1
.endmacro

el1_sp0_synchronous_vector_long:
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!				// Save x0 and x1 to the exception stack
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1							// Get the exception syndrome
	/* If the stack pointer is corrupt, it will manifest either as a data abort
	 * (syndrome 0x25) or a misaligned pointer (syndrome 0x26). We can check
	 * these quickly by testing bit 5 of the exception class.
	 */
	tbz		x1, #(5 + ESR_EC_SHIFT), Lkernel_stack_valid
	CHECK_KERNEL_STACK
Lkernel_stack_valid:
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp], #16				// Restore x0 and x1 from the exception stack
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_synchronous)@page			// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_synchronous)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_SYNC_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el1_sp0_irq_vector_long:
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_irq)@page					// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_irq)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el1_sp0_fiq_vector_long:
	// ARM64_TODO write optimized decrementer
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_fiq)@page					// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_fiq)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el1_sp0_serror_vector_long:
	EL1_SP0_VECTOR
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_serror)@page				// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_serror)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

.macro EL1_SP1_VECTOR set_x0_to_exception_frame_ptr=1
	sub		sp, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE			// Create exception frame
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]				// Save x0, x1 to exception frame
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, SS64_X2]				// Save x2, x3 to exception frame
	add		x0, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE			// Calculate the original stack pointer
	str		x0, [sp, SS64_SP]					// Save stack pointer to exception frame
	INIT_SAVED_STATE_FLAVORS sp, w0, w1
.if \set_x0_to_exception_frame_ptr
	mov		x0, sp								// Copy saved state pointer to x0
.endif
.endmacro

el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long:
	/*
	 * Before making our first (potentially faulting) memory access, check if we
	 * previously tried and failed to execute this vector. If we did, it's not
	 * going to work this time either so let's just spin.
	 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SPTM
	/*
	 * This check is doubly important for devices which support panic lockdown
	 * as we use this check to ensure that we can take only a bounded number of
	 * exceptions on SP1 while trying to spill before we give up on spilling and
	 * lockdown anyways.
	 *
	 * Note, however, that we only check if we took an exception inside this
	 * vector. Although an attacker could cause exceptions outside this routine,
	 * they can only do this a finite number of times before overflowing the
	 * exception stack (causing CHECK_EXCEPTION_STACK to fail) since we subtract
	 * from SP inside the checked region and do not reload SP from memory before
	 * we hit post-spill lockdown point in fleh_synchronous_sp1.
	 */
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_CRITICAL_REGION el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long, Lel1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_end, EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_STACK EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)
#ifdef KERNEL_INTEGRITY_KTRR
	b		check_ktrr_sctlr_trap
Lel1_sp1_synchronous_vector_continue:
#endif /* KERNEL_INTEGRITY_KTRR */
#if CONFIG_SPTM
	/* Don't bother setting up x0 since we need it as a temporary */
	EL1_SP1_VECTOR set_x0_to_exception_frame_ptr=0

	/*
	 * Did we fail to execute the stack check (x18=0)?
	 * On devices which support panic lockdown, we cannot allow this check to be
	 * skipped after early-boot as doing so many allow exception processing to
	 * be delayed indefinitely.
	 */
	adrp	x0, EXT(startup_phase)@page
	ldr		w0, [x0, EXT(startup_phase)@pageoff]
	/* Are we in early-boot? */
	cmp		w0, #-1 // STARTUP_SUB_LOCKDOWN
	/*
	 * If we're still in early-boot (LO), set flags for if we skipped the check
	 * If we're after early-boot (HS), pass NE
	 */
	ccmp	x18, xzr, #0b0000 /* !Z/NE */, LO
	/* Skip authentication if this was an early boot check fail */
	b.eq	1f
	/*
	 * If we're not in early boot but still couldn't execute the stack bounds
	 * check (x18=0), something is wrong (TPIDR is corrupted?).
	 * Trigger a lockdown.
	 */
	cbz		x18, EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)

	/*
	 * In CHECK_EXCEPTION_STACK, we didn't have enough registers to perform the
	 * signature verification on the exception stack top value and instead used
	 * the unauthenticated value (x18) for the stack pointer bounds check.
	 *
	 * Ensure that we actually performed the check on a legitmate value now.
	 */
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	LOAD_EXCEP_STACK_THREAD dst=x0, src=x0, tmp=x1
	cmp		x0, x18
	/* If we aren't equal, something is very wrong and we should lockdown. */
	b.ne	EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)

1:
	mov		x0, sp	/* Set x0 to saved state pointer */
#else
	EL1_SP1_VECTOR set_x0_to_exception_frame_ptr=1
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
	adrp	x1, fleh_synchronous_sp1@page
	add		x1, x1, fleh_synchronous_sp1@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_FATAL_SYNC_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

	/*
	 * Global symbol to make it easy to pick out in backtraces.
	 * Do not call externally.
	 */
	.global EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)
LEXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_spill_failed)
	TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
	TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	/*
	 * We couldn't process the exception due to either having an invalid
	 * exception stack or because we previously tried to process it and failed.
	 */
#if CONFIG_SPTM
	/*
	 * For SP1 exceptions, we usually delay initiating lockdown until after
	 * we've spilled in order to not lose register state. Since we have nowhere
	 * to safely spill, we have no choice but to initiate it now, clobbering
	 * some of our exception state in the process (RIP).
	 */
	BEGIN_PANIC_LOCKDOWN
#if CONFIG_XNUPOST
	/* Macro returns x0=1 if it performed a simulated lockdown */
	cbz		x0, 0f
	/* This was a test; return to fault handler so they can fixup the system. */
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x16, [x0, TH_EXPECTED_FAULT_HANDLER]
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
	movk	x17, #TH_EXPECTED_FAULT_HANDLER_DIVERSIFIER
	autia	x16, x17
#endif /* ptrauth_calls */
	msr		ELR_EL1, x16
	/* Pass a NULL saved state since we didn't actually save anything */
	mov		x0, #0
	ERET_NO_STRAIGHT_LINE_SPECULATION
#endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
0:
	wfe
	b		0b // Spin for watchdog
	UNWIND_EPILOGUE

#if CONFIG_SPTM
#if CONFIG_XNUPOST
	/**
	 * Test function which raises an exception from a location considered inside
	 * the vector. Does not return.
	 */
	.global EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_raise_exception_in_vector)
LEXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_raise_exception_in_vector)
	ARM64_PROLOG
	brk		#0
	/* Unreachable */
	b		.
#endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
Lel1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_end:

el1_sp1_irq_vector_long:
	EL1_SP1_VECTOR
	adrp	x1, fleh_irq_sp1@page
	add		x1, x1, fleh_irq_sp1@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_FATAL_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el1_sp1_fiq_vector_long:
	EL1_SP1_VECTOR
	adrp	x1, fleh_fiq_sp1@page
	add		x1, x1, fleh_fiq_sp1@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_FATAL_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el1_sp1_serror_vector_long:
	EL1_SP1_VECTOR
	adrp	x1, fleh_serror_sp1@page
	add		x1, x1, fleh_serror_sp1@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_FATAL_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64


.macro EL0_64_VECTOR guest_label
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!					// Save x0 and x1 to the exception stack
#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	mov		x18, #0 						// Zero x18 to avoid leaking data to user SS
#endif
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1						// Load the thread register
	LOAD_USER_PCB	dst=x0, src=x0, tmp=x1		// Load the user context pointer
	mrs		x1, SP_EL0							// Load the user stack pointer
	str		x1, [x0, SS64_SP]					// Store the user stack pointer in the user PCB
	msr		SP_EL0, x0							// Copy the user PCB pointer to SP0
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp], #16					// Restore x0 and x1 from the exception stack
	msr		SPSel, #0							// Switch to SP0
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]				// Save x0, x1 to the user PCB
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, SS64_X2]				// Save x2, x3 to the user PCB
	mrs		x1, TPIDR_EL1						// Load the thread register



#if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
	str		x2, [sp, SS64_X2]
	// current_thread()->machine.umatrix_hdr == NULL: this thread has never
	// executed a matrix instruction, so no matrix state to save
	add		x0, x1, ACT_UMATRIX_HDR
	ldr		x2, [x0]
	cbz		x2, 1f
	AUTDA_DIVERSIFIED x2, address=x0, diversifier=ACT_UMATRIX_HDR_DIVERSIFIER


	adrp	x0, EXT(sme_version)@page
	add		x0, x0, EXT(sme_version)@pageoff
	ldr		w0, [x0]
	cbz		w0, 1f

	adrp	x0, EXT(sme_state_hdr)@page
	add		x0, x0, EXT(sme_state_hdr)@pageoff
	ldr		x0, [x0]
	str		x0, [x2]
	rdsvl	x0, #1
	strh	w0, [x2, SME_SVL_B]
	mrs		x0, SVCR
	str		x0, [x2, SME_SVCR]
	// SVCR.SM == 0: save SVCR only (ZA is handled during context-switch)
	tbz		x0, #SVCR_SM_SHIFT, 1f

	// SVCR.SM == 1: save SVCR, Z, and P; and exit streaming SVE mode
	ldrh	w0, [x2, SME_SVL_B]
	add		x2, x2, SME_Z_P_ZA
	LOAD_OR_STORE_Z_P_REGISTERS	str, svl_b=x0, ss=x2
	mrs		x2, FPSR
	smstop	sm
	msr		FPSR, x2
1:
	ldr		x2, [sp, SS64_X2]
#endif /* HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME */

	mov		x0, sp								// Copy the user PCB pointer to x0
												// x1 contains thread register
.endmacro

.macro EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	// Similarly to EL1_SP0_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK, we need to take
	// advantage of EL0_64_VECTOR ending with x0 == sp.  EL0_64_VECTOR also
	// populates x1 with the thread state, so we can skip reloading it.
	LOAD_INT_STACK_THREAD	dst=x1, src=x1, tmp=x0
	mov		x0, sp
	mov		sp, x1
.endmacro

.macro EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_KERN_STACK
	LOAD_KERN_STACK_TOP	dst=x1, src=x1, tmp=x0
	mov		x0, sp
	mov		sp, x1
.endmacro

el0_synchronous_vector_64_long:
	EL0_64_VECTOR	sync
	EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_KERN_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_synchronous)@page			// Load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_synchronous)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_SYNC_EXCEPTION)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el0_irq_vector_64_long:
	EL0_64_VECTOR	irq
	EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_irq)@page					// load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_irq)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el0_fiq_vector_64_long:
	EL0_64_VECTOR	fiq
	EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_fiq)@page					// load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_fiq)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64

el0_serror_vector_64_long:
	EL0_64_VECTOR	serror
	EL0_64_VECTOR_SWITCH_TO_KERN_STACK
	adrp	x1, EXT(fleh_serror)@page				// load address for fleh
	add		x1, x1, EXT(fleh_serror)@pageoff
	mov		x2, #(FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_NONE)
	b		fleh_dispatch64


#if defined(KERNEL_INTEGRITY_KTRR)
	.text
	.align 2
check_ktrr_sctlr_trap:
/* We may abort on an instruction fetch on reset when enabling the MMU by
 * writing SCTLR_EL1 because the page containing the privileged instruction is
 * not executable at EL1 (due to KTRR). The abort happens only on SP1 which
 * would otherwise panic unconditionally. Check for the condition and return
 * safe execution to the caller on behalf of the faulting function.
 *
 * Expected register state:
 *  x22 - Kernel virtual base
 *  x23 - Kernel physical base
 */
	sub		sp, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE	// Make some space on the stack
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]		// Stash x0, x1
	mrs		x0, ESR_EL1					// Check ESR for instr. fetch abort
	and		x0, x0, #0xffffffffffffffc0	// Mask off ESR.ISS.IFSC
	movz	w1, #0x8600, lsl #16
	movk	w1, #0x0000
	cmp		x0, x1
	mrs		x0, ELR_EL1					// Check for expected abort address
	adrp	x1, _pinst_set_sctlr_trap_addr@page
	add		x1, x1, _pinst_set_sctlr_trap_addr@pageoff
	sub		x1, x1, x22					// Convert to physical address
	add		x1, x1, x23
	ccmp	x0, x1, #0, eq
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp, SS64_X0]		// Restore x0, x1
	add		sp, sp, ARM_CONTEXT_SIZE	// Clean up stack
	b.ne	Lel1_sp1_synchronous_vector_continue
	msr		ELR_EL1, lr					// Return to caller
	ERET_NO_STRAIGHT_LINE_SPECULATION
#endif /* defined(KERNEL_INTEGRITY_KTRR) || defined(KERNEL_INTEGRITY_CTRR) */

/* 64-bit first level exception handler dispatcher.
 * Completes register context saving and branches to FLEH.
 * Expects:
 *  {x0, x1, sp} - saved
 *  x0 - arm_context_t
 *  x1 - address of FLEH
 *  x2 - bitfield of type FLEH_DISPATCH64_OPTION_xxx, clobbered
 *  x3 - unused
 *  fp - previous stack frame if EL1
 *  lr - unused
 *  sp - kernel stack
 */
	.text
	.align 2
fleh_dispatch64:
#if HAS_APPLE_PAC
	pacia	x1, sp
#endif

	/* Save arm_saved_state64 */
	SPILL_REGISTERS KERNEL_MODE, options_register=x2

	/* If exception is from userspace, zero unused registers */
	and		x23, x23, #(PSR64_MODE_EL_MASK)
	cmp		x23, #(PSR64_MODE_EL0)
	bne		1f

	SANITIZE_FPCR x25, x2, 2 // x25 is set to current FPCR by SPILL_REGISTERS


2:
#if HAS_MTE
	/*
	 * Exception came from userspace, so there's some gatekeeping that we
	 * have to do for MTE. First of all, we need to generate a new seed value
	 * for RGSR_EL1.SEED. Hidra pseudo-random generator for tags is weak, which
	 * may allow an attacker observing a short sequence of tags to predict the
	 * rest of it. We therefore restore it as often as possible at context
	 * switch, reseeding it with another source of randomness.
	 */
#if NEEDS_MTE_IRG_RESEED
	PACGA_IRG_RESEED x2, x3, x4
#endif

	/*
	 * IRG default exclude mask. GCR_EL1 allows to exclude certain tags from
	 * the selection options for any IRG execution. We want to exclude
	 * 0 in userspace and F in the kernel as they match the canonical tags.
	 * GCR_EL1 modifications require a CSE, but we do not want to impact
	 * speculative performance wins here, so we simply set the register
	 * and let the operation go. IRG calls in the kernel force the F tag
	 * out with GMI, so this is mostly to recapture the ability to
	 * use tag 0. In the very vast majority of cases, this path will commit
	 * before we get to an IRG.
	 */
	eor		x4, x4, x4
	mov		x4, #(GCR_EL1_RRND_ASM)
	orr		x4, x4, #(GCR_EL1_EXCLUDE_TAGS_KERNEL)
	msr		GCR_EL1, x4
#endif /* HAS_MTE */

	mov		x2, #0
	mov		x3, #0
	mov		x4, #0
	mov		x5, #0
	mov		x6, #0
	mov		x7, #0
	mov		x8, #0
	mov		x9, #0
	mov		x10, #0
	mov		x11, #0
	mov		x12, #0
	mov		x13, #0
	mov		x14, #0
	mov		x15, #0
	mov		x16, #0
	mov		x17, #0
	mov		x18, #0
	mov		x19, #0
	mov		x20, #0
	/* x21, x22 cleared in common case below */
	mov		x23, #0
	mov		x24, #0
	mov		x25, #0
#if !XNU_MONITOR
	mov		x26, #0
#endif
	mov		x27, #0
	mov		x28, #0
	mov		fp, #0
	mov		lr, #0
1:

	mov		x21, x0								// Copy arm_context_t pointer to x21
	mov		x22, x1								// Copy handler routine to x22

#if XNU_MONITOR
	/* Zero x26 to indicate that this should not return to the PPL. */
	mov		x26, #0
#endif

#if PRECISE_USER_KERNEL_TIME
	cmp		x23, #PSR64_MODE_EL0			// If interrupting this kernel, skip
	b.gt	1f                                  // precise time update.
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(recount_leave_user)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	mov		x0, x21								// Reload arm_context_t pointer
1:
#endif /* PRECISE_USER_KERNEL_TIME */

	/* Dispatch to FLEH */

#if HAS_APPLE_PAC
	braa	x22,sp
#else
	br		x22
#endif


	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(fleh_synchronous)
LEXT(fleh_synchronous)
TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1							// Load exception syndrome
	mrs		x2, FAR_EL1							// Load fault address
	mrs		lr, ELR_EL1
	/* NB: lr might not be a valid address (e.g. instruction abort). */
	PUSH_FRAME

#if CONFIG_SPTM
	mrs		x25, ELR_EL1

	/*
	 * Sync exceptions in the kernel are rare, so check that first.
	 * This check should be trivially predicted NT. We also take
	 * the check out of line so, on the hot path, we don't add a
	 * frontend redirect.
	 */
	mov		x3, #0 // by default, do not signal panic lockdown to sleh
	mrs		x4, SPSR_EL1
	tst		x4, #(PSR64_MODE_EL_MASK)
	b.ne	Lfleh_synchronous_ool_check_exception_el1 /* Run ELn checks if we're EL!=0 (!Z) */
	/* EL0 -- check if we're blocking sync exceptions due to lockdown */
	adrp	x4, EXT(sptm_xnu_triggered_panic_ptr)@page
	ldr		x4, [x4, EXT(sptm_xnu_triggered_panic_ptr)@pageoff]
	ldrb	w4, [x4]
	cbnz	w4, Lblocked_user_sync_exception

Lfleh_synchronous_continue:
	/* We've had our chance to lockdown, release PC/FAR */
	str		x25, [x0, SS64_PC]
	str		x2,  [x0, SS64_FAR]
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */

	bl		EXT(sleh_synchronous)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
#endif

	mov		x28, xzr		// Don't need to check PFZ if there are ASTs
	b		exception_return_dispatch

#if CONFIG_SPTM
Lfleh_synchronous_ool_check_exception_el1:
	/* Save off arguments needed for sleh_sync as we may clobber */
	mov		x26, x0
	mov		x27, x1
	mov		x28, x2

	/*
	 * Evaluate the exception state to determine if we should initiate a
	 * lockdown. While this function is implemented in C, since it is guaranteed
	 * to not use the stack it should be immune from spill tampering and other
	 * attacks which may cause it to render the wrong ruling.
	 */
	mov		x0, x1  // ESR
	mov		x1, x25 // ELR
			        // FAR is already in x2
	mrs		x3, SPSR_EL1
	bl		EXT(sleh_panic_lockdown_should_initiate_el1_sp0_sync)

	/* sleh_synchronous needs the lockdown decision in x3 */
	mov		x3, x0
	/* Optimistically restore registers on the assumption we won't lockdown */
	mov		x0, x26
	mov		x1, x27
	mov		x2, x28

	cbz		x3, Lfleh_synchronous_continue

	BEGIN_PANIC_LOCKDOWN
	mov		x0, x26
	mov		x1, x27
	mov		x2, x28
	/*
	 * A captain goes down with her ship; system is sunk but for telemetry
	 * try to handle the crash normally.
	 */
	mov		x3, #1 // signal to sleh that we completed panic lockdown
	b		Lfleh_synchronous_continue
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
UNWIND_EPILOGUE

#if CONFIG_SPTM
	.text
	.align 2
	/* Make a global symbol so it's easier to pick out in backtraces */
	.global EXT(blocked_user_sync_exception)
LEXT(blocked_user_sync_exception)
Lblocked_user_sync_exception:
	TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
	TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	/*
	 * User space took a sync exception after panic lockdown had been initiated.
	 * The system is going to panic soon, so let's just re-enable interrupts and
	 * wait for debugger sync.
	 */
	msr		DAIFClr, #(DAIFSC_STANDARD_DISABLE)
0:
	wfe
	b		0b
	UNWIND_EPILOGUE
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */

/* Shared prologue code for fleh_irq and fleh_fiq.
 * Does any interrupt booking we may want to do
 * before invoking the handler proper.
 * Expects:
 *  x0 - arm_context_t
 * x23 - CPSR
 *  fp - Undefined live value (we may push a frame)
 *  lr - Undefined live value (we may push a frame)
 *  sp - Interrupt stack for the current CPU
 */
.macro BEGIN_INTERRUPT_HANDLER
	mrs		x22, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x23, [x22, ACT_CPUDATAP]			// Get current cpu
	/* Update IRQ count; CPU_STAT_IRQ.* is required to be accurate for the WFE idle sequence  */
	ldr		w1, [x23, CPU_STAT_IRQ]
	add		w1, w1, #1							// Increment count
	str		w1, [x23, CPU_STAT_IRQ]				// Update  IRQ count
	ldr		w1, [x23, CPU_STAT_IRQ_WAKE]
	add		w1, w1, #1					// Increment count
	str		w1, [x23, CPU_STAT_IRQ_WAKE]			// Update post-wake IRQ count
	/* Increment preempt count */
	ldr		w1, [x22, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	add		w1, w1, #1
	str		w1, [x22, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	/* Store context in int state */
	str		x0, [x23, CPU_INT_STATE] 			// Saved context in cpu_int_state
.endmacro

/* Shared epilogue code for fleh_irq and fleh_fiq.
 * Cleans up after the prologue, and may do a bit more
 * bookkeeping (kdebug related).
 * Expects:
 * x22 - Live TPIDR_EL1 value (thread address)
 * x23 - Address of the current CPU data structure
 * w24 - 0 if kdebug is disbled, nonzero otherwise
 *  fp - Undefined live value (we may push a frame)
 *  lr - Undefined live value (we may push a frame)
 *  sp - Interrupt stack for the current CPU
 */
.macro END_INTERRUPT_HANDLER
	/* Clear int context */
	str		xzr, [x23, CPU_INT_STATE]
	/* Decrement preempt count */
	ldr		w0, [x22, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	cbnz	w0, 1f								// Detect underflow
	b		preempt_underflow
1:
	sub		w0, w0, #1
	str		w0, [x22, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	/* Switch back to kernel stack */
	LOAD_KERN_STACK_TOP	dst=x0, src=x22, tmp=x28
	mov		sp, x0
	/* Generate a CPU-local event to terminate a post-IRQ WFE */
	sevl
.endmacro

	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(fleh_irq)
LEXT(fleh_irq)
TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	BEGIN_INTERRUPT_HANDLER
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(sleh_irq)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	END_INTERRUPT_HANDLER

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
#endif

	mov		x28, #1			// Set a bit to check PFZ if there are ASTs
	b		exception_return_dispatch
UNWIND_EPILOGUE

	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(fleh_fiq_generic)
LEXT(fleh_fiq_generic)
	/*
	 * This function is a placeholder which should never be invoked.
	 * We omit the landingpad here since there is no sensible choice.
	 */
	PANIC_UNIMPLEMENTED

	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(fleh_fiq)
LEXT(fleh_fiq)
TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	BEGIN_INTERRUPT_HANDLER
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(sleh_fiq)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	END_INTERRUPT_HANDLER

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
#endif

	mov		x28, #1			// Set a bit to check PFZ if there are ASTs
	b		exception_return_dispatch
UNWIND_EPILOGUE

	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(fleh_serror)
LEXT(fleh_serror)
TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1							// Load exception syndrome
	mrs		x2, FAR_EL1							// Load fault address

	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(sleh_serror)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM
	CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
#endif

	mov		x28, xzr		// Don't need to check PFZ If there are ASTs
	b		exception_return_dispatch
UNWIND_EPILOGUE

/*
 * Register state saved before we get here.
 */
	.text
	.align 2
fleh_invalid_stack:
	TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
	TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
#if CONFIG_SPTM
	/*
	 * Taking a data abort with an invalid kernel stack pointer is unrecoverable.
	 * Initiate lockdown.
	 */

	/* Save off temporaries (including exception SPRs) as SPTM can clobber */
	mov		x25, x0
	mrs		x26, ELR_EL1
	mrs		x27, ESR_EL1
	mrs		x28, FAR_EL1
	BEGIN_PANIC_LOCKDOWN
	mov		x0, x25
	mov		x1, x27
	mov		x2, x28
	/* We deferred storing PC/FAR until after lockdown, so do that now */
	str		x26, [x0, SS64_PC]
	str		x28, [x0, SS64_FAR]
#else
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1							// Load exception syndrome
	mrs		x2, FAR_EL1							// Load fault address
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(sleh_invalid_stack)				// Shouldn't return!
	b 		.
	UNWIND_EPILOGUE

	.text
	.align 2
fleh_synchronous_sp1:
	TRAP_UNWIND_PROLOGUE
	TRAP_UNWIND_DIRECTIVES
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
#if CONFIG_SPTM
	/*
	 * Without debugger intervention, all exceptions on SP1 (including debug
	 * trap instructions) are intended to be fatal. In order to not break
	 * self-hosted kernel debug, do not trigger lockdown for debug traps
	 * (unknown instructions/uncategorized exceptions). On release kernels, we
	 * don't support self-hosted kernel debug so unconditionally lockdown.
	 */
#if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
	tst		w1, #(ESR_EC_MASK)
	b.eq	Lfleh_synchronous_sp1_skip_panic_lockdown // ESR_EC_UNCATEGORIZED is 0, so skip lockdown if Z
#endif /* DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG */
	/* Save off temporaries (including exception SPRs) as SPTM can clobber */
	mov		x25, x0
	mrs		x26, ELR_EL1
	mrs		x27, ESR_EL1
	mrs		x28, FAR_EL1
	BEGIN_PANIC_LOCKDOWN
	mov		x0, x25
	mov		x1, x27
	mov		x2, x28
	/* We deferred storing PC/FAR until after lockdown, so do that now */
	str		x26, [x0, SS64_PC]
	str		x28, [x0, SS64_FAR]
Lfleh_synchronous_sp1_skip_panic_lockdown:
#else
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1
	mrs		x2, FAR_EL1
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
	/*
	 * If we got here before we have a kernel thread or kernel stack (e.g.
	 * still on init_thread) and we try to panic(), we'll end up in an infinite
	 * nested exception, so just stop here instead to preserve the call stack.
	 */
	mrs		x9, TPIDR_EL1
	cbz		x9, 0f
	ldr		x9, [x9, TH_KSTACKPTR]
	cbz		x9, 0f
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(sleh_synchronous_sp1)
	b 		.
0:
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_invalid_kstack)
	b 		.
	UNWIND_EPILOGUE

LEXT(el1_sp1_synchronous_vector_long_invalid_kstack)
0:
	wfe
	b		0b // Spin for watchdog

	.text
	.align 2
fleh_irq_sp1:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	mov		x1, x0
	adr		x0, Lsp1_irq_str
	b		EXT(panic_with_thread_kernel_state)
Lsp1_irq_str:
	.asciz "IRQ exception taken while SP1 selected"

	.text
	.align 2
fleh_fiq_sp1:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	mov		x1, x0
	adr		x0, Lsp1_fiq_str
	b		EXT(panic_with_thread_kernel_state)
Lsp1_fiq_str:
	.asciz "FIQ exception taken while SP1 selected"

	.text
	.align 2
fleh_serror_sp1:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	mov		x1, x0
	adr		x0, Lsp1_serror_str
	b		EXT(panic_with_thread_kernel_state)
Lsp1_serror_str:
	.asciz "Asynchronous exception taken while SP1 selected"

	.text
	.align 2
exception_return_dispatch:
	ldr		w0, [x21, SS64_CPSR]
	tst		w0, PSR64_MODE_EL_MASK
	b.ne		EXT(return_to_kernel) // return to kernel if M[3:2] > 0
	b		return_to_user

#if CONFIG_SPTM
/**
 * XNU returns to this symbol whenever handling an interrupt that occurred
 * during SPTM, TXM or SK runtime. This code determines which domain the
 * XNU thread was executing in when the interrupt occurred and tells SPTM
 * which domain to resume.
 */
	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(xnu_return_to_gl2)
LEXT(xnu_return_to_gl2)
	/**
	 * If thread->txm_thread_stack is set, we need to tell SPTM dispatch to
	 * resume the TXM thread in x0.
	 */
	mrs		x8, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x8, [x8, TH_TXM_THREAD_STACK]
	cbz		x8, 1f
	mov		x0, x8
	b		EXT(txm_resume)
	/* Unreachable */
	b .

#if CONFIG_EXCLAVES
	/**
	 * If thread->th_exclaves_intstate flag TH_EXCLAVES_EXECUTION is set
	 * we need to tell SPTM dispatch to resume the SK thread.
	 */
1:
	mrs		x8, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x9, [x8, TH_EXCLAVES_INTSTATE]
	and		x9, x9, TH_EXCLAVES_EXECUTION
	cbz		x9, 1f
	b		EXT(sk_resume)
	/* Unreachable */
	b .
#endif /* CONFIG_EXCLAVES */

	/**
	 * If neither the above checks succeeded, this must be a thread
	 * that was interrupted while running in SPTM. Tell SPTM to resume
	 * the interrupted SPTM call.
	 */
1:
	b		EXT(sptm_resume_from_exception)
	/* Unreachable */
	b .
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */

	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(return_to_kernel)
LEXT(return_to_kernel)
	UNWIND_PROLOGUE
	RETURN_TO_KERNEL_UNWIND
	tbnz	w0, #DAIF_IRQF_SHIFT, exception_return  // Skip AST check if IRQ disabled
	mrs		x3, TPIDR_EL1                           // Load thread pointer
	ldr		w1, [x3, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]               // Load preemption count
	msr		DAIFSet, #DAIFSC_ALL                    // Disable exceptions
	cbnz	x1, exception_return_unint_tpidr_x3     // If preemption disabled, skip AST check
	ldr		x1, [x3, ACT_CPUDATAP]                  // Get current CPU data pointer
	ldr		w2, [x1, CPU_PENDING_AST]               // Get ASTs
	tst		w2, AST_URGENT                          // If no urgent ASTs, skip ast_taken
	b.eq	exception_return_unint_tpidr_x3
	mov		sp, x21                                 // Switch to thread stack for preemption
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(ast_taken_kernel)                   // Handle AST_URGENT
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	b		exception_return
	UNWIND_EPILOGUE

	.text
	.globl EXT(thread_bootstrap_return)
LEXT(thread_bootstrap_return)
	ARM64_PROLOG
#if CONFIG_DTRACE
	bl		EXT(dtrace_thread_bootstrap)
#endif
#if KASAN_TBI
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(__asan_handle_no_return)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
#endif /* KASAN_TBI */
	b		EXT(arm64_thread_exception_return)

	.text
	.globl EXT(arm64_thread_exception_return)
LEXT(arm64_thread_exception_return)
	ARM64_PROLOG
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	LOAD_USER_PCB	dst=x21, src=x0, tmp=x28
	mov		x28, xzr

	//
	// Fall Through to return_to_user from arm64_thread_exception_return.
	// Note that if we move return_to_user or insert a new routine
	// below arm64_thread_exception_return, the latter will need to change.
	//
	.text
/* x21 is always the machine context pointer when we get here
 * x28 is a bit indicating whether or not we should check if pc is in pfz */
return_to_user:
check_user_asts:
#if KASAN_TBI
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(__asan_handle_no_return)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
#endif /* KASAN_TBI */
	mrs		x3, TPIDR_EL1					// Load thread pointer

	movn		w2, #0
	str		w2, [x3, TH_IOTIER_OVERRIDE]			// Reset IO tier override to -1 before returning to user

#if MACH_ASSERT
	ldr		w0, [x3, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	cbnz		w0, preempt_count_notzero			// Detect unbalanced enable/disable preemption
#endif

	msr		DAIFSet, #DAIFSC_ALL				// Disable exceptions
	ldr		x4, [x3, ACT_CPUDATAP]				// Get current CPU data pointer
	ldr		w0, [x4, CPU_PENDING_AST]			// Get ASTs
	cbz		w0, no_asts							// If no asts, skip ahead

	cbz		x28, user_take_ast					// If we don't need to check PFZ, just handle asts

	/* At this point, we have ASTs and we need to check whether we are running in the
	 * preemption free zone (PFZ) or not. No ASTs are handled if we are running in
	 * the PFZ since we don't want to handle getting a signal or getting suspended
	 * while holding a spinlock in userspace.
	 *
	 * If userspace was in the PFZ, we know (via coordination with the PFZ code
	 * in commpage_asm.s) that it will not be using x15 and it is therefore safe
	 * to use it to indicate to userspace to come back to take a delayed
	 * preemption, at which point the ASTs will be handled. */
	mov		x28, xzr							// Clear the "check PFZ" bit so that we don't do this again
	mov		x19, x0								// Save x0 since it will be clobbered by commpage_is_in_pfz64

	ldr		x0, [x21, SS64_PC]					// Load pc from machine state
	bl		EXT(commpage_is_in_pfz64)			// pc in pfz?
	cbz		x0, restore_and_check_ast			// No, deal with other asts

	mov		x0, #1
	str		x0, [x21, SS64_X15]					// Mark x15 for userspace to take delayed preemption
	mov		x0, x19								// restore x0 to asts
	b		no_asts								// pretend we have no asts

restore_and_check_ast:
	mov		x0, x19								// restore x0
	b	user_take_ast							// Service pending asts
no_asts:


#if PRECISE_USER_KERNEL_TIME
	mov		x19, x3						// Preserve thread pointer across function call
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(recount_enter_user)
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	mov		x3, x19
#endif /* PRECISE_USER_KERNEL_TIME */

#if (CONFIG_KERNEL_INTEGRITY && KERNEL_INTEGRITY_WT)
	/* Watchtower
	 *
	 * Here we attempt to enable NEON access for EL0. If the last entry into the
	 * kernel from user-space was due to an IRQ, the monitor will have disabled
	 * NEON for EL0 _and_ access to CPACR_EL1 from EL1 (1). This forces xnu to
	 * check in with the monitor in order to reenable NEON for EL0 in exchange
	 * for routing IRQs through the monitor (2). This way the monitor will
	 * always 'own' either IRQs or EL0 NEON.
	 *
	 * If Watchtower is disabled or we did not enter the kernel through an IRQ
	 * (e.g. FIQ or syscall) this is a no-op, otherwise we will trap to EL3
	 * here.
	 *
	 * EL0 user ________ IRQ                                            ______
	 * EL1 xnu              \   ______________________ CPACR_EL1     __/
	 * EL3 monitor           \_/                                \___/
	 *
	 *                       (1)                                 (2)
	 */

	mov		x0, #(CPACR_FPEN_ENABLE)
	msr		CPACR_EL1, x0
#endif

	/* Establish this thread's debug state as the live state on the selected CPU. */
	ldr		x4, [x3, ACT_CPUDATAP]				// Get current CPU data pointer
	ldr		x1, [x4, CPU_USER_DEBUG]			// Get Debug context
	ldr		x0, [x3, ACT_DEBUGDATA]
	cmp		x0, x1
	beq		L_skip_user_set_debug_state			// If active CPU debug state does not match thread debug state, apply thread state


	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(arm_debug_set)					// Establish thread debug state in live regs
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	mrs		x3, TPIDR_EL1						// Reload thread pointer
	ldr		x4, [x3, ACT_CPUDATAP]				// Reload CPU data pointer
L_skip_user_set_debug_state:


	ldrsh	x0, [x4, CPU_TPIDR_EL0]
	msr		TPIDR_EL0, x0


	b		exception_return_unint_tpidr_x3

exception_return:
	msr		DAIFSet, #DAIFSC_ALL				// Disable exceptions
exception_return_unint:
	mrs		x3, TPIDR_EL1					// Load thread pointer
exception_return_unint_tpidr_x3:
	mov		sp, x21						// Reload the pcb pointer

#if !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/*
	 * Restore x18 only if the task has the entitlement that allows
	 * usage. Those are very few, and can move to something else
	 * once we use x18 for something more global.
	 *
	 * This is not done here on devices with __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__, as
	 * that uses x18 as one of the global use cases (and will reset
	 * x18 later down below).
	 *
	 * It's also unconditionally skipped for translated threads,
	 * as those are another use case, one where x18 must be preserved.
	 */
	ldr		w0, [x3, TH_ARM_MACHINE_FLAGS]
	mov		x18, #0
	tbz		w0, ARM_MACHINE_THREAD_PRESERVE_X18_SHIFT, Lexception_return_restore_registers

exception_return_unint_tpidr_x3_restore_x18:
	ldr		x18, [sp, SS64_X18]

#else /* !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */
	/*
	 * If we are going to eret to userspace, we must return through the EL0
	 * eret mapping.
	 */
	ldr		w1, [sp, SS64_CPSR]									// Load CPSR
	tbnz		w1, PSR64_MODE_EL_SHIFT, Lskip_el0_eret_mapping	// Skip if returning to EL1

	/* We need to switch to the EL0 mapping of this code to eret to EL0. */
	adrp		x0, EXT(ExceptionVectorsBase)@page				// Load vector base
	adrp		x1, Lexception_return_restore_registers@page	// Load target PC
	add		x1, x1, Lexception_return_restore_registers@pageoff
	MOV64		x2, ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT_EXCEPTION_START			// Load EL0 vector address
	sub		x1, x1, x0											// Calculate delta
	add		x0, x2, x1											// Convert KVA to EL0 vector address
	br		x0

Lskip_el0_eret_mapping:
#endif /* !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

Lexception_return_restore_registers:
	mov 	x0, sp								// x0 = &pcb
	// Loads authed $x0->ss_64.pc into x1 and $x0->ss_64.cpsr into w2
	AUTH_THREAD_STATE_IN_X0	x20, x21, x22, x23, x24, x25, el0_state_allowed=1

	msr		ELR_EL1, x1							// Load the return address into ELR
	msr		SPSR_EL1, x2						// Load the return CPSR into SPSR

/* Restore special register state */
	ldr		w3, [sp, NS64_FPSR]
	ldr		w4, [sp, NS64_FPCR]

	msr		FPSR, x3
	mrs		x5, FPCR
	CMSR FPCR, x5, x4, 1
1:
	mov		x5, #0

#if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
	and		x2, x2, #(PSR64_MODE_EL_MASK)
	cmp		x2, #(PSR64_MODE_EL0)
	// SPSR_EL1.M != EL0: no SME state to restore
	bne		Lno_sme_saved_state

	mrs		x3, TPIDR_EL1
	add		x3, x3, ACT_UMATRIX_HDR
	ldr		x2, [x3]
	cbz		x2, Lno_sme_saved_state
	AUTDA_DIVERSIFIED x2, address=x3, diversifier=ACT_UMATRIX_HDR_DIVERSIFIER

	ldr		x3, [x2, SME_SVCR]
	msr		SVCR, x3
	// SVCR.SM == 0: restore SVCR only (ZA is handled during context-switch)
	tbz		x3, #SVCR_SM_SHIFT, Lno_sme_saved_state

	// SVCR.SM == 1: restore SVCR, Z, and P
	ldrh	w3, [x2, SME_SVL_B]
	add		x2, x2, SME_Z_P_ZA
	LOAD_OR_STORE_Z_P_REGISTERS	ldr, svl_b=x3, ss=x2

	// The FPSIMD register file acts like a view into the lower 128 bits of
	// Z0-Z31.  While there's no harm reading it out during exception entry,
	// writing it back would truncate the Z0-Z31 values we just restored.
	b		Lskip_restore_neon_saved_state
Lno_sme_saved_state:
#endif /* HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME */

	/* Restore arm_neon_saved_state64 */
	ldp		q0, q1, [x0, NS64_Q0]
	ldp		q2, q3, [x0, NS64_Q2]
	ldp		q4, q5, [x0, NS64_Q4]
	ldp		q6, q7, [x0, NS64_Q6]
	ldp		q8, q9, [x0, NS64_Q8]
	ldp		q10, q11, [x0, NS64_Q10]
	ldp		q12, q13, [x0, NS64_Q12]
	ldp		q14, q15, [x0, NS64_Q14]
	ldp		q16, q17, [x0, NS64_Q16]
	ldp		q18, q19, [x0, NS64_Q18]
	ldp		q20, q21, [x0, NS64_Q20]
	ldp		q22, q23, [x0, NS64_Q22]
	ldp		q24, q25, [x0, NS64_Q24]
	ldp		q26, q27, [x0, NS64_Q26]
	ldp		q28, q29, [x0, NS64_Q28]
	ldp		q30, q31, [x0, NS64_Q30]
#if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
Lskip_restore_neon_saved_state:
#endif


#if HAS_MTE
#if NEEDS_MTE_IRG_RESEED
	PACGA_IRG_RESEED x2, x3, x4
#endif
	// Switch GCR_EL1 Exclude Tag Mask to the userland one.
	mrs             x2, SPSR_EL1
	and             x2, x2, #(PSR64_MODE_EL_MASK)
	cmp             x2, #(PSR64_MODE_EL0)
	bne             Lno_gcr_mask_el0_reset
	eor		x2, x2, x2
	mov		x2, #(GCR_EL1_RRND_ASM)
	orr		x2, x2, #(GCR_EL1_EXCLUDE_TAGS_USER)
	msr		GCR_EL1, x2
#if ERET_NEEDS_ISB
	orr		x5, x5, #(1 << BIT_ISB_PENDING)
#endif /* ERET_NEEDS_ISB */
Lno_gcr_mask_el0_reset:
#endif /* HAS_MTE */
	// If sync_on_cswitch and ERET is not a CSE, issue an ISB now. Unconditionally clear the
	// sync_on_cswitch flag.
	mrs		x1, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		x1, [x1, ACT_CPUDATAP]

	// Redefined for backporting.
#if defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING) && !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	ldrb	w2, [x1, CPU_SYNC_ON_CSWITCH]
#if ERET_NEEDS_ISB
	// Set the bit, but don't sync, it will be synced shortly after this.
	orr		x5, x5, x2, lsl #(BIT_ISB_PENDING)
#else
	cbz		w2, 1f
	// Last chance, sync now.
	isb		sy
1:
#endif  /* ERET_NEEDS_ISB */
#endif  /* defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING) && !__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */
	strb	wzr, [x1, CPU_SYNC_ON_CSWITCH]


#if ERET_NEEDS_ISB
	// Apply any pending isb from earlier.
	tbz		x5, #(BIT_ISB_PENDING), Lskip_eret_isb
	isb		sy
Lskip_eret_isb:
#endif /* ERET_NEEDS_ISB */

	/* Restore arm_saved_state64 */

	// Skip x0, x1 - we're using them
	ldp		x2, x3, [x0, SS64_X2]
	ldp		x4, x5, [x0, SS64_X4]
	ldp		x6, x7, [x0, SS64_X6]
	ldp		x8, x9, [x0, SS64_X8]
	ldp		x10, x11, [x0, SS64_X10]
	ldp		x12, x13, [x0, SS64_X12]
	ldp		x14, x15, [x0, SS64_X14]
	// Skip x16, x17 - already loaded + authed by AUTH_THREAD_STATE_IN_X0
	// Skip x18 - already restored or trashed above (below with __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__)
	ldr		x19, [x0, SS64_X19]
	ldp		x20, x21, [x0, SS64_X20]
	ldp		x22, x23, [x0, SS64_X22]
	ldp		x24, x25, [x0, SS64_X24]
	ldp		x26, x27, [x0, SS64_X26]
	ldr		x28, [x0, SS64_X28]
	ldr		fp, [x0, SS64_FP]
	// Skip lr - already loaded + authed by AUTH_THREAD_STATE_IN_X0

	// Restore stack pointer and our last two GPRs
	ldr		x1, [x0, SS64_SP]
	mov		sp, x1

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	ldr		w18, [x0, SS64_CPSR]				// Stash CPSR
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

	ldp		x0, x1, [x0, SS64_X0]				// Restore the GPRs

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/* If we are going to eret to userspace, we must unmap the kernel. */
	tbnz		w18, PSR64_MODE_EL_SHIFT, Lskip_ttbr1_switch

	/* Update TCR to unmap the kernel. */
	MOV64		x18, TCR_EL1_USER
	msr		TCR_EL1, x18

	/*
	 * On Apple CPUs, TCR writes and TTBR writes should be ordered relative to
	 * each other due to the microarchitecture.
	 */
#if !defined(APPLE_ARM64_ARCH_FAMILY)
	isb		sy
#endif

	/* Switch to the user ASID (low bit clear) for the task. */
	mrs		x18, TTBR0_EL1
	bic		x18, x18, #(1 << TTBR_ASID_SHIFT)
	msr		TTBR0_EL1, x18
	mov		x18, #0

#if defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING)
	isb		sy
#endif /* defined(ERET_IS_NOT_CONTEXT_SYNCHRONIZING) */

Lskip_ttbr1_switch:
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

	ERET_NO_STRAIGHT_LINE_SPECULATION

user_take_ast:
	PUSH_FRAME
	bl		EXT(ast_taken_user)							// Handle all ASTs, may return via continuation
	POP_FRAME_WITHOUT_LR
	b		check_user_asts								// Now try again

	.text
	.align 2
preempt_underflow:
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	str		x0, [sp, #-16]!						// We'll print thread pointer
	adr		x0, L_underflow_str					// Format string
	CALL_EXTERN panic							// Game over

L_underflow_str:
	.asciz "Preemption count negative on thread %p"
.align 2

#if MACH_ASSERT
	.text
	.align 2
preempt_count_notzero:
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	str		x0, [sp, #-16]!						// We'll print thread pointer
	ldr		w0, [x0, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	str		w0, [sp, #8]
	adr		x0, L_preempt_count_notzero_str				// Format string
	CALL_EXTERN panic							// Game over

L_preempt_count_notzero_str:
	.asciz "preemption count not 0 on thread %p (%u)"
#endif /* MACH_ASSERT */

#if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__
	/*
	 * This symbol denotes the end of the exception vector/eret range; we page
	 * align it so that we can avoid mapping other text in the EL0 exception
	 * vector mapping.
	 */
	.text
	.align 14
	.globl EXT(ExceptionVectorsEnd)
LEXT(ExceptionVectorsEnd)
#endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */

#if XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM

/*
 * Functions to preflight the fleh handlers when the PPL has taken an exception;
 * mostly concerned with setting up state for the normal fleh code.
 */
	.text
	.align 2
fleh_synchronous_from_ppl:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	/* Save x0. */
	mov		x15, x0

	/* Grab the ESR. */
	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1							// Get the exception syndrome

	/* If the stack pointer is corrupt, it will manifest either as a data abort
	 * (syndrome 0x25) or a misaligned pointer (syndrome 0x26). We can check
	 * these quickly by testing bit 5 of the exception class.
	 */
	tbz		x1, #(5 + ESR_EC_SHIFT), Lvalid_ppl_stack
	mrs		x0, SP_EL0							// Get SP_EL0

	/* Perform high level checks for stack corruption. */
	and		x1, x1, #ESR_EC_MASK				// Mask the exception class
	mov		x2, #(ESR_EC_SP_ALIGN << ESR_EC_SHIFT)
	cmp		x1, x2								// If we have a stack alignment exception
	b.eq	Lcorrupt_ppl_stack						// ...the stack is definitely corrupted
	mov		x2, #(ESR_EC_DABORT_EL1 << ESR_EC_SHIFT)
	cmp		x1, x2								// If we have a data abort, we need to
	b.ne	Lvalid_ppl_stack						// ...validate the stack pointer

Ltest_pstack:
	/* Bounds check the PPL stack. */
	adrp	x10, EXT(pmap_stacks_start)@page
	ldr		x10, [x10, #EXT(pmap_stacks_start)@pageoff]
	adrp	x11, EXT(pmap_stacks_end)@page
	ldr		x11, [x11, #EXT(pmap_stacks_end)@pageoff]
	cmp		x0, x10
	b.lo	Lcorrupt_ppl_stack
	cmp		x0, x11
	b.hi	Lcorrupt_ppl_stack

Lvalid_ppl_stack:
	/* Restore x0. */
	mov		x0, x15

	/* Switch back to the kernel stack. */
	msr		SPSel, #0
	GET_PMAP_CPU_DATA x5, x6, x7
	ldr		x6, [x5, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]
	mov		sp, x6

	/* Hand off to the synch handler. */
	b		EXT(fleh_synchronous)

Lcorrupt_ppl_stack:
	/* Restore x0. */
	mov		x0, x15

	/* Hand off to the invalid stack handler. */
	b		fleh_invalid_stack

fleh_fiq_from_ppl:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK	tmp=x25
	b		EXT(fleh_fiq)

fleh_irq_from_ppl:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	SWITCH_TO_INT_STACK	tmp=x25
	b		EXT(fleh_irq)

fleh_serror_from_ppl:
	ARM64_JUMP_TARGET
	GET_PMAP_CPU_DATA x5, x6, x7
	ldr		x6, [x5, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]
	mov		sp, x6
	b		EXT(fleh_serror)




	// x15: ppl call number
	// w10: ppl_state
	// x20: gxf_enter caller's DAIF
	.globl EXT(ppl_trampoline_start)
LEXT(ppl_trampoline_start)


#error "XPRR configuration error"
	cmp		x14, x21
	b.ne	Lppl_fail_dispatch

	/* Verify the request ID. */
	cmp		x15, PMAP_COUNT
	b.hs	Lppl_fail_dispatch

	GET_PMAP_CPU_DATA	x12, x13, x14

	/* Mark this CPU as being in the PPL. */
	ldr		w9, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]

	cmp		w9, #PPL_STATE_KERNEL
	b.eq		Lppl_mark_cpu_as_dispatching

	/* Check to see if we are trying to trap from within the PPL. */
	cmp		w9, #PPL_STATE_DISPATCH
	b.eq		Lppl_fail_dispatch_ppl


	/* Ensure that we are returning from an exception. */
	cmp		w9, #PPL_STATE_EXCEPTION
	b.ne		Lppl_fail_dispatch

	// where is w10 set?
	// in CHECK_EXCEPTION_RETURN_DISPATCH_PPL
	cmp		w10, #PPL_STATE_EXCEPTION
	b.ne		Lppl_fail_dispatch

	/* This is an exception return; set the CPU to the dispatching state. */
	mov		w9, #PPL_STATE_DISPATCH
	str		w9, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]

	/* Find the save area, and return to the saved PPL context. */
	ldr		x0, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_SAVE_AREA]
	mov		sp, x0
	b		EXT(return_to_ppl)

Lppl_mark_cpu_as_dispatching:
	cmp		w10, #PPL_STATE_KERNEL
	b.ne		Lppl_fail_dispatch

	/* Mark the CPU as dispatching. */
	mov		w13, #PPL_STATE_DISPATCH
	str		w13, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]

	/* Switch to the regular PPL stack. */
	// TODO: switch to PPL_STACK earlier in gxf_ppl_entry_handler
	ldr		x9, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STACK]

	// SP0 is thread stack here
	mov		x21, sp
	// SP0 is now PPL stack
	mov		sp, x9

	/* Save the old stack pointer off in case we need it. */
	str		x21, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]

	/* Get the handler for the request */
	adrp	x9, EXT(ppl_handler_table)@page
	add		x9, x9, EXT(ppl_handler_table)@pageoff
	add		x9, x9, x15, lsl #3
	ldr		x10, [x9]

	/* Branch to the code that will invoke the PPL request. */
	b		EXT(ppl_dispatch)

Lppl_fail_dispatch_ppl:
	/* Switch back to the kernel stack. */
	ldr		x10, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]
	mov		sp, x10

Lppl_fail_dispatch:
	/* Indicate that we failed. */
	mov		x15, #PPL_EXIT_BAD_CALL

	/* Move the DAIF bits into the expected register. */
	mov		x10, x20

	/* Return to kernel mode. */
	b		ppl_return_to_kernel_mode

Lppl_dispatch_exit:

	/* Indicate that we are cleanly exiting the PPL. */
	mov		x15, #PPL_EXIT_DISPATCH

	/* Switch back to the original (kernel thread) stack. */
	mov		sp, x21

	/* Move the saved DAIF bits. */
	mov		x10, x20

	/* Clear the in-flight pmap pointer */
	add		x13, x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_INFLIGHT_PMAP
	stlr		xzr, [x13]

	/* Clear the old stack pointer. */
	str		xzr, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]

	/*
	 * Mark the CPU as no longer being in the PPL.  We spin if our state
	 * machine is broken.
	 */
	ldr		w9, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]
	cmp		w9, #PPL_STATE_DISPATCH
	b.ne		.
	mov		w9, #PPL_STATE_KERNEL
	str		w9, [x12, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]

	/* Return to the kernel. */
	b ppl_return_to_kernel_mode



	.text
ppl_exit:
	ARM64_PROLOG
	/*
	 * If we are dealing with an exception, hand off to the first level
	 * exception handler.
	 */
	cmp		x15, #PPL_EXIT_EXCEPTION
	b.eq	Ljump_to_fleh_handler

	/* If this was a panic call from the PPL, reinvoke panic. */
	cmp		x15, #PPL_EXIT_PANIC_CALL
	b.eq	Ljump_to_panic_trap_to_debugger

	/*
	 * Stash off the original DAIF in the high bits of the exit code register.
	 * We could keep this in a dedicated register, but that would require us to copy it to
	 * an additional callee-save register below (e.g. x22), which in turn would require that
	 * register to be saved/restored at PPL entry/exit.
	 */
	add		x15, x15, x10, lsl #32

	/* Load the preemption count. */
	mrs		x10, TPIDR_EL1
	ldr		w12, [x10, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]

	/* Detect underflow */
	cbnz	w12, Lno_preempt_underflow
	b		preempt_underflow
Lno_preempt_underflow:

	/* Lower the preemption count. */
	sub		w12, w12, #1

#if SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG
	/* Collect preemption disable measurement if necessary. */

	/*
	 * Only collect measurement if this reenabled preemption,
	 * and SCHED_HYGIENE_MARKER is set.
	 */
	mov		x20, #SCHED_HYGIENE_MARKER
	cmp		w12, w20
	b.ne	Lskip_collect_measurement

	/* Stash our return value and return reason. */
	mov		x20, x0
	mov		x21, x15

	/* Collect measurement. */
	bl		EXT(_collect_preemption_disable_measurement)

	/* Restore the return value and the return reason. */
	mov		x0, x20
	mov		x15, x21
	/* ... and w12, which is now 0. */
	mov		w12, #0

	/* Restore the thread pointer into x10. */
	mrs		x10, TPIDR_EL1

Lskip_collect_measurement:
#endif /* SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG */

	/* Save the lowered preemption count. */
	str		w12, [x10, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]

	/* Skip ASTs if the peemption count is not zero. */
	cbnz	x12, Lppl_skip_ast_taken

	/*
	 * Skip the AST check if interrupts were originally disabled.
	 * The original DAIF state prior to PPL entry is stored in the upper
	 * 32 bits of x15.
	 */
	tbnz		x15, #(DAIF_IRQF_SHIFT + 32), Lppl_skip_ast_taken

	/* IF there is no urgent AST, skip the AST. */
	ldr		x12, [x10, ACT_CPUDATAP]
	ldr		w14, [x12, CPU_PENDING_AST]
	tst		w14, AST_URGENT
	b.eq	Lppl_skip_ast_taken

	/* Stash our return value and return reason. */
	mov		x20, x0
	mov		x21, x15

	/* Handle the AST. */
	bl		EXT(ast_taken_kernel)

	/* Restore the return value and the return reason. */
	mov		x15, x21
	mov		x0, x20

Lppl_skip_ast_taken:

	/* Extract caller DAIF from high-order bits of exit code */
	ubfx	x10, x15, #32, #32
	bfc		x15, #32, #32
	msr		DAIF, x10

	/* Pop the stack frame. */
	ldp		x29, x30, [sp, #0x10]
	ldp		x20, x21, [sp], #0x20

	/* Check to see if this was a bad request. */
	cmp		x15, #PPL_EXIT_BAD_CALL
	b.eq	Lppl_bad_call

	/* Return. */
	ARM64_STACK_EPILOG

	.align 2
Ljump_to_fleh_handler:
	br	x25

	.align 2
Ljump_to_panic_trap_to_debugger:
	b		EXT(panic_trap_to_debugger)

Lppl_bad_call:
	/* Panic. */
	adrp	x0, Lppl_bad_call_panic_str@page
	add		x0, x0, Lppl_bad_call_panic_str@pageoff
	b		EXT(panic)

	.text
	.align 2
	.globl EXT(ppl_dispatch)
LEXT(ppl_dispatch)
	/*
	 * Save a couple of important registers (implementation detail; x12 has
	 * the PPL per-CPU data address; x13 is not actually interesting).
	 */
	stp		x12, x13, [sp, #-0x10]!

	/*
	 * Restore the original AIF state, force D set to mask debug exceptions
	 * while PPL code runs.
	 */
	orr		x8, x20, DAIF_DEBUGF
	msr		DAIF, x8

	/*
	 * Note that if the method is NULL, we'll blow up with a prefetch abort,
	 * but the exception vectors will deal with this properly.
	 */

	/* Invoke the PPL method. */
#ifdef HAS_APPLE_PAC
	blraa		x10, x9
#else
	blr		x10
#endif

	/* Disable DAIF. */
	msr		DAIFSet, #(DAIFSC_ALL)

	/* Restore those important registers. */
	ldp		x12, x13, [sp], #0x10

	/* Mark this as a regular return, and hand off to the return path. */
	b		Lppl_dispatch_exit

	.text
	.align 2
	.globl EXT(ppl_bootstrap_dispatch)
LEXT(ppl_bootstrap_dispatch)
	/* Verify the PPL request. */
	cmp		x15, PMAP_COUNT
	b.hs	Lppl_fail_bootstrap_dispatch

	/* Get the requested PPL routine. */
	adrp	x9, EXT(ppl_handler_table)@page
	add		x9, x9, EXT(ppl_handler_table)@pageoff
	add		x9, x9, x15, lsl #3
	ldr		x10, [x9]

	/* Invoke the requested PPL routine. */
#ifdef HAS_APPLE_PAC
	blraa		x10, x9
#else
	blr		x10
#endif
	LOAD_PMAP_CPU_DATA	x9, x10, x11

	/* Clear the in-flight pmap pointer */
	add		x9, x9, PMAP_CPU_DATA_INFLIGHT_PMAP
	stlr		xzr, [x9]

	/* Stash off the return value */
	mov		x20, x0
	/* Drop the preemption count */
	bl		EXT(_enable_preemption)
	mov		x0, x20

	/* Pop the stack frame. */
	ldp		x29, x30, [sp, #0x10]
	ldp		x20, x21, [sp], #0x20
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_returns)
	retab
#else
	ret
#endif

Lppl_fail_bootstrap_dispatch:
	/* Pop our stack frame and panic. */
	ldp		x29, x30, [sp, #0x10]
	ldp		x20, x21, [sp], #0x20
#if __has_feature(ptrauth_returns)
	autibsp
#endif
	adrp	x0, Lppl_bad_call_panic_str@page
	add		x0, x0, Lppl_bad_call_panic_str@pageoff
	b		EXT(panic)

	.text
	.align 2
	.globl EXT(ml_panic_trap_to_debugger)
LEXT(ml_panic_trap_to_debugger)
	ARM64_PROLOG
	mrs		x10, DAIF
	msr		DAIFSet, #(DAIFSC_STANDARD_DISABLE)

	adrp		x12, EXT(pmap_ppl_locked_down)@page
	ldr		w12, [x12, #EXT(pmap_ppl_locked_down)@pageoff]
	cbz		w12, Lnot_in_ppl_dispatch

	LOAD_PMAP_CPU_DATA	x11, x12, x13

	ldr		w12, [x11, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]
	cmp		w12, #PPL_STATE_DISPATCH
	b.ne		Lnot_in_ppl_dispatch

	/* Indicate (for the PPL->kernel transition) that we are panicking. */
	mov		x15, #PPL_EXIT_PANIC_CALL

	/* Restore the old stack pointer as we can't push onto PPL stack after we exit PPL */
	ldr		x12, [x11, PMAP_CPU_DATA_KERN_SAVED_SP]
	mov		sp, x12

	mrs		x10, DAIF
	mov		w13, #PPL_STATE_PANIC
	str		w13, [x11, PMAP_CPU_DATA_PPL_STATE]

	/**
	 * When we panic in PPL, we might have un-synced PTE updates. Shoot down
	 * all the TLB entries.
	 *
	 * A check must be done here against CurrentEL because the alle1is flavor
	 * of tlbi is not available to EL1, but the vmalle1is flavor is. When PPL
	 * runs at GL2, we can issue an alle2is and an alle1is tlbi to kill all
	 * the TLB entries. When PPL runs at GL1, as a guest or on an pre-H13
	 * platform, we issue a vmalle1is tlbi instead.
	 *
	 * Note that we only do this after passing the `PPL_STATE_DISPATCH` check
	 * because if we did this for every panic, including the ones triggered
	 * by fabric problems we may be stuck at the DSB below and trigger an AP
	 * watchdog.
	 */
	mrs		x12, CurrentEL
	cmp		x12, PSR64_MODE_EL2
	bne		Lnot_in_gl2
	tlbi		alle2is
	tlbi		alle1is
	b		Ltlb_invalidate_all_done
Lnot_in_gl2:
	tlbi		vmalle1is
Ltlb_invalidate_all_done:
	dsb		ish
	isb

	/* Now we are ready to exit the PPL. */
	b		ppl_return_to_kernel_mode
Lnot_in_ppl_dispatch:
	msr		DAIF, x10
	ret

	.data
Lppl_bad_call_panic_str:
	.asciz "ppl_dispatch: failed due to bad arguments/state"
#else /* XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM */
	.text
	.align 2
	.globl EXT(ml_panic_trap_to_debugger)
LEXT(ml_panic_trap_to_debugger)
	ARM64_PROLOG
	ret
#endif /* XNU_MONITOR && !CONFIG_SPTM */

#if CONFIG_SPTM
	.text
	.align 2

	.globl EXT(_sptm_pre_entry_hook)
LEXT(_sptm_pre_entry_hook)
	/* Push a frame. */
	ARM64_STACK_PROLOG
	PUSH_FRAME
	stp		x20, x21, [sp, #-0x10]!

	/* Save arguments to SPTM function and SPTM function id. */
	mov		x20, x16
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, #-0x40]!
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
	stp		x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
	stp		x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]

	/* Increase the preemption count. */
	mrs		x9, TPIDR_EL1
	cbz		x9, Lskip_preemption_check_sptmhook
	ldr		w10, [x9, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]
	add		w10, w10, #1
	str		w10, [x9, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]

	/* Update SPTM trace state to see if trace entries were generated post-exit */

#if SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG
	/* Prepare preemption disable measurement, if necessary. */

	/* Only prepare if we actually disabled preemption. */
	cmp		w10, #1
	b.ne	Lskip_prepare_measurement_sptmhook

	/* Don't prepare if measuring is off completely. */
	adrp	x10, _sched_preemption_disable_debug_mode@page
	add		x10, x10, _sched_preemption_disable_debug_mode@pageoff
	ldr		w10, [x10]
	cmp		w10, #0
	b.eq	Lskip_prepare_measurement_sptmhook

	/* Call prepare function with thread pointer as first arg. */
	bl		EXT(_prepare_preemption_disable_measurement)

Lskip_prepare_measurement_sptmhook:
#endif /* SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG */
Lskip_preemption_check_sptmhook:
	/* assert we're not calling from guarded mode */
	mrs		x14, CurrentG
	cmp		x14, #0
	b.ne	.

	/* Restore arguments to SPTM function and SPTM function id. */
	ldp		x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
	ldp		x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
	ldp		x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp]
	add		sp, sp, #0x40
	mov		x16, x20

	ldp		x20, x21, [sp], #0x10
	POP_FRAME
	ARM64_STACK_EPILOG EXT(_sptm_pre_entry_hook)

	.align 2
	.globl EXT(_sptm_post_exit_hook)
LEXT(_sptm_post_exit_hook)
	ARM64_STACK_PROLOG
	PUSH_FRAME
	stp		x20, x21, [sp, #-0x10]!

	/* Save SPTM return value(s) */
	stp		x0, x1, [sp, #-0x40]!
	stp		x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
	stp		x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
	stp		x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]


	/* Load the preemption count. */
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1
	cbz		x0, Lsptm_skip_ast_taken_sptmhook
	ldr		w12, [x0, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]

	/* Detect underflow */
	cbnz	w12, Lno_preempt_underflow_sptmhook
	/* No need to clean up the stack, as preempt_underflow calls panic */
	b		preempt_underflow
Lno_preempt_underflow_sptmhook:

	/* Lower the preemption count. */
	sub		w12, w12, #1

#if SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG
	/* Collect preemption disable measurement if necessary. */

	/*
	 * Only collect measurement if this reenabled preemption,
	 * and SCHED_HYGIENE_MARKER is set.
	 */
	mov		x20, #SCHED_HYGIENE_MARKER
	cmp		w12, w20
	b.ne	Lskip_collect_measurement_sptmhook

	/* Collect measurement. */
	bl		EXT(_collect_preemption_disable_measurement)

	/* Restore w12, which is now 0. */
	mov		w12, #0

	/* Restore x0 as the thread pointer */
	mrs		x0, TPIDR_EL1

Lskip_collect_measurement_sptmhook:
#endif /* SCHED_HYGIENE_DEBUG */

	/* Save the lowered preemption count. */
	str		w12, [x0, ACT_PREEMPT_CNT]

	/* Skip ASTs if the preemption count is not zero. */
	cbnz	w12, Lsptm_skip_ast_taken_sptmhook

	/**
	 * Skip the AST check if interrupts were originally disabled. The original
	 * DAIF value needs to be placed into a callee-saved register so that the
	 * value is preserved across the ast_taken_kernel() call.
	 */
	mrs		x20, DAIF
	tbnz	x20, #(DAIF_IRQF_SHIFT), Lsptm_skip_ast_taken_sptmhook

	/* IF there is no urgent AST, skip the AST. */
	ldr		x12, [x0, ACT_CPUDATAP]
	ldr		x14, [x12, CPU_PENDING_AST]
	tst		x14, AST_URGENT
	b.eq	Lsptm_skip_ast_taken_sptmhook

	/* Handle the AST. This call requires interrupts to be disabled. */
	msr		DAIFSet, #(DAIFSC_ALL)
	bl		EXT(ast_taken_kernel)
	msr		DAIF, x20

Lsptm_skip_ast_taken_sptmhook:

	/* Restore SPTM return value(s) */
	ldp		x6, x7, [sp, #0x30]
	ldp		x4, x5, [sp, #0x20]
	ldp		x2, x3, [sp, #0x10]
	ldp		x0, x1, [sp]
	add		sp, sp, #0x40

	/* Return. */
	ldp		x20, x21, [sp], 0x10
	POP_FRAME
	ARM64_STACK_EPILOG EXT(_sptm_post_exit_hook)
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */

#if CONFIG_SPTM && (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
/**
 * Record debug data for a panic lockdown event
 * Clobbers x0, x1, x2
 */
	.text
	.align 2
	.global EXT(panic_lockdown_record_debug_data)
LEXT(panic_lockdown_record_debug_data)
	adrp	x0, EXT(debug_panic_lockdown_initiator_state)@page
	add		x0, x0, EXT(debug_panic_lockdown_initiator_state)@pageoff

	/*
	 * To synchronize accesses to the debug state, we use the initiator PC as a
	 * "lock". It starts out at zero and we try to swap in our initiator's PC
	 * (which is trivially non-zero) to acquire the debug state and become the
	 * initiator of record.
	 *
	 * Note that other CPUs which are not the initiator of record may still
	 * initiate panic lockdown (potentially before the initiator of record does
	 * so) and so this debug data should only be used as a hint for the
	 * initiating CPU rather than a guarantee of which CPU initiated lockdown
	 * first.
	 */
	mov		x1, #0
	add		x2, x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_INITIATOR_PC
	cas		x1, lr, [x2]
	/* If there's a non-zero value there already, we aren't the first. Skip. */
	cbnz	x1, Lpanic_lockdown_record_debug_data_done

	/*
	 * We're the first and have exclusive access to the debug structure!
	 * Record all our data.
	 */
	mov		x1, sp
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_INITIATOR_SP]

	mrs		x1, TPIDR_EL1
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_INITIATOR_TPIDR]

	mrs		x1, MPIDR_EL1
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_INITIATOR_MPIDR]

	mrs		x1, ESR_EL1
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_ESR]

	mrs		x1, ELR_EL1
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_ELR]

	mrs		x1, FAR_EL1
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_FAR]

	/* Sync and then read the timer */
	dsb		sy
	isb
	mrs		x1, CNTVCT_EL0
	str		x1, [x0, #PANIC_LOCKDOWN_INITIATOR_STATE_TIMESTAMP]

Lpanic_lockdown_record_debug_data_done:
	ret
#endif /* CONFIG_SPTM && (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG) */

/* ARM64_TODO Is globals_asm.h needed? */
//#include	"globals_asm.h"

/* vim: set ts=4: */