Searched refs:mitigation (Results 1 – 4 of 4) sorted by relevance
| /xnu-12377.41.6/doc/allocators/ |
| H A D | xnu-kernel-restricted.md | 16 … the problem space, the security boundaries we defend, and the technical details of the mitigation.
87 ### Deterministic runtime mitigation
89 This mitigation stops **any** exploitation technique that involves mapping kernel-private memory ou…
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| H A D | guard-objects.md | 197 mitigation against use-after-free or non-linear buffer overflows, forcing
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| /xnu-12377.41.6/doc/arm/ |
| H A D | apple_speculative_hardening.md | 18 indeed, the focus of this particular mitigation—is [Spectre Variant
52 The mitigation we implement to achieve this is called Apple Speculative
56 Our fundamental mitigation strategy with Apple Speculative Hardening (“ASH”) is
112 The core idea of the mitigation, similar to VUSec’s TDI [^3], is to limit
351 path. While ASH is primarily intended as a Spectre mitigation, this design
352 feature means ASH also serves as a quite powerful mitigation against
371 To lay the foundation for this mitigation, we make a few significant changes to
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| /xnu-12377.41.6/bsd/skywalk/channel/ |
| H A D | channel.c | 227 csi_init(struct ch_selinfo *csi, boolean_t mitigation, uint64_t mit_ival) in csi_init() argument
231 if (mitigation) { in csi_init()
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