xref: /xnu-11215.81.4/osfmk/arm64/sleh.c (revision d4514f0bc1d3f944c22d92e68b646ac3fb40d452)
1 /*
2  * Copyright (c) 2012-2023 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
3  *
4  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
5  *
6  * This file contains Original Code and/or Modifications of Original Code
7  * as defined in and that are subject to the Apple Public Source License
8  * Version 2.0 (the 'License'). You may not use this file except in
9  * compliance with the License. The rights granted to you under the License
10  * may not be used to create, or enable the creation or redistribution of,
11  * unlawful or unlicensed copies of an Apple operating system, or to
12  * circumvent, violate, or enable the circumvention or violation of, any
13  * terms of an Apple operating system software license agreement.
14  *
15  * Please obtain a copy of the License at
16  * http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/ and read it before using this file.
17  *
18  * The Original Code and all software distributed under the License are
19  * distributed on an 'AS IS' basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER
20  * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AND APPLE HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL SUCH WARRANTIES,
21  * INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
22  * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.
23  * Please see the License for the specific language governing rights and
24  * limitations under the License.
25  *
26  * @APPLE_OSREFERENCE_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
27  */
28 
29 #include <arm/caches_internal.h>
30 #include <arm/cpu_data.h>
31 #include <arm/cpu_data_internal.h>
32 #include <arm/misc_protos.h>
33 #include <arm/thread.h>
34 #include <arm/rtclock.h>
35 #include <arm/trap_internal.h> /* for IS_ARM_GDB_TRAP() et al */
36 #include <arm64/proc_reg.h>
37 #include <arm64/machine_machdep.h>
38 #include <arm64/monotonic.h>
39 #include <arm64/instructions.h>
40 
41 #include <kern/debug.h>
42 #include <kern/restartable.h>
43 #include <kern/socd_client.h>
44 #include <kern/task.h>
45 #include <kern/thread.h>
46 #include <kern/zalloc_internal.h>
47 #include <mach/exception.h>
48 #include <mach/arm/traps.h>
49 #include <mach/vm_types.h>
50 #include <mach/machine/thread_status.h>
51 
52 #include <machine/atomic.h>
53 #include <machine/limits.h>
54 
55 #include <pexpert/arm/protos.h>
56 #include <pexpert/arm64/apple_arm64_cpu.h>
57 #include <pexpert/arm64/apple_arm64_regs.h>
58 #include <pexpert/arm64/board_config.h>
59 
60 #include <vm/vm_page.h>
61 #include <vm/pmap.h>
62 #include <vm/vm_fault.h>
63 #include <vm/vm_kern.h>
64 #include <vm/vm_map_xnu.h>
65 
66 #include <sys/errno.h>
67 #include <sys/kdebug.h>
68 #include <sys/code_signing.h>
69 #include <sys/reason.h>
70 #include <kperf/kperf.h>
71 
72 #include <kern/policy_internal.h>
73 #if CONFIG_TELEMETRY
74 #include <kern/telemetry.h>
75 #endif
76 
77 #include <prng/entropy.h>
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 #include <arm64/platform_error_handler.h>
83 
84 #if KASAN_TBI
85 #include <san/kasan.h>
86 #endif /* KASAN_TBI */
87 
88 #if CONFIG_UBSAN_MINIMAL
89 #include <san/ubsan_minimal.h>
90 #endif
91 
92 
93 #ifdef CONFIG_BTI_TELEMETRY
94 #include <arm64/bti_telemetry.h>
95 #endif /* CONFIG_BTI_TELEMETRY */
96 
97 #ifndef __arm64__
98 #error Should only be compiling for arm64.
99 #endif
100 
101 #if DEBUG || DEVELOPMENT
102 #define HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK 1
103 #endif
104 
105 
106 #define TEST_CONTEXT32_SANITY(context) \
107 	(context->ss.ash.flavor == ARM_SAVED_STATE32 && context->ss.ash.count == ARM_SAVED_STATE32_COUNT && \
108 	 context->ns.nsh.flavor == ARM_NEON_SAVED_STATE32 && context->ns.nsh.count == ARM_NEON_SAVED_STATE32_COUNT)
109 
110 #define TEST_CONTEXT64_SANITY(context) \
111 	(context->ss.ash.flavor == ARM_SAVED_STATE64 && context->ss.ash.count == ARM_SAVED_STATE64_COUNT && \
112 	 context->ns.nsh.flavor == ARM_NEON_SAVED_STATE64 && context->ns.nsh.count == ARM_NEON_SAVED_STATE64_COUNT)
113 
114 #define ASSERT_CONTEXT_SANITY(context) \
115 	assert(TEST_CONTEXT32_SANITY(context) || TEST_CONTEXT64_SANITY(context))
116 
117 
118 #define COPYIN(src, dst, size)                           \
119 	(PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) ? \
120 	copyin_kern(src, dst, size) :                    \
121 	copyin(src, dst, size)
122 
123 #define COPYOUT(src, dst, size)                          \
124 	(PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) ? \
125 	copyout_kern(src, dst, size)                   : \
126 	copyout(src, dst, size)
127 
128 // Below is for concatenating a string param to a string literal
129 #define STR1(x) #x
130 #define STR(x) STR1(x)
131 
132 #define ARM64_KDBG_CODE_KERNEL (0 << 8)
133 #define ARM64_KDBG_CODE_USER   (1 << 8)
134 #define ARM64_KDBG_CODE_GUEST  (2 << 8)
135 
136 _Static_assert(ARM64_KDBG_CODE_GUEST <= KDBG_CODE_MAX, "arm64 KDBG trace codes out of range");
137 _Static_assert(ARM64_KDBG_CODE_GUEST <= UINT16_MAX, "arm64 KDBG trace codes out of range");
138 
139 void panic_with_thread_kernel_state(const char *msg, arm_saved_state_t *ss) __abortlike;
140 
141 void sleh_synchronous_sp1(arm_context_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t) __abortlike;
142 void sleh_synchronous(arm_context_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t, bool);
143 
144 
145 
146 void sleh_irq(arm_saved_state_t *);
147 void sleh_fiq(arm_saved_state_t *);
148 void sleh_serror(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far);
149 void sleh_invalid_stack(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far) __dead2;
150 
151 static void sleh_interrupt_handler_prologue(arm_saved_state_t *, unsigned int type);
152 static void sleh_interrupt_handler_epilogue(void);
153 
154 static void handle_svc(arm_saved_state_t *);
155 static void handle_mach_absolute_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t *);
156 static void handle_mach_continuous_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t *);
157 
158 static void handle_msr_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr);
159 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
160 static void handle_pac_fail(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr) __dead2;
161 static inline uint64_t fault_addr_bitmask(unsigned int bit_from, unsigned int bit_to);
162 #endif
163 static void handle_bti_fail(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr);
164 extern kern_return_t arm_fast_fault(pmap_t, vm_map_address_t, vm_prot_t, bool, bool);
165 
166 static void handle_uncategorized(arm_saved_state_t *);
167 
168 static void handle_kernel_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t);
169 
170 static void handle_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t) __dead2;
171 
172 typedef void (*abort_inspector_t)(uint32_t, fault_status_t *, vm_prot_t *);
173 static void inspect_instruction_abort(uint32_t, fault_status_t *, vm_prot_t *);
174 static void inspect_data_abort(uint32_t, fault_status_t *, vm_prot_t *);
175 
176 static int is_vm_fault(fault_status_t);
177 static int is_translation_fault(fault_status_t);
178 static int is_alignment_fault(fault_status_t);
179 
180 typedef void (*abort_handler_t)(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t, fault_status_t, vm_prot_t, expected_fault_handler_t);
181 static void handle_user_abort(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t, fault_status_t, vm_prot_t, expected_fault_handler_t);
182 static void handle_kernel_abort(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t, fault_status_t, vm_prot_t, expected_fault_handler_t);
183 
184 static void handle_pc_align(arm_saved_state_t *ss) __dead2;
185 static void handle_sp_align(arm_saved_state_t *ss) __dead2;
186 static void handle_sw_step_debug(arm_saved_state_t *ss) __dead2;
187 static void handle_wf_trap(arm_saved_state_t *ss) __dead2;
188 static void handle_fp_trap(arm_saved_state_t *ss, uint64_t esr) __dead2;
189 #if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
190 static void handle_sme_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr);
191 #endif /* HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME */
192 
193 static void handle_watchpoint(vm_offset_t fault_addr) __dead2;
194 
195 static void handle_abort(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t, vm_offset_t, abort_inspector_t, abort_handler_t, expected_fault_handler_t);
196 
197 static void handle_user_trapped_instruction32(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t esr) __dead2;
198 
199 static void handle_simd_trap(arm_saved_state_t *, uint64_t esr) __dead2;
200 
201 extern void current_cached_proc_cred_update(void);
202 void   mach_syscall_trace_exit(unsigned int retval, unsigned int call_number);
203 
204 struct proc;
205 
206 typedef uint32_t arm64_instr_t;
207 
208 extern void
209 unix_syscall(struct arm_saved_state * regs, thread_t thread_act, struct proc * proc);
210 
211 extern void
212 mach_syscall(struct arm_saved_state*);
213 
214 #if CONFIG_DTRACE
215 extern kern_return_t dtrace_user_probe(arm_saved_state_t* regs);
216 extern boolean_t dtrace_tally_fault(user_addr_t);
217 
218 /*
219  * Traps for userland processing. Can't include bsd/sys/fasttrap_isa.h, so copy
220  * and paste the trap instructions
221  * over from that file. Need to keep these in sync!
222  */
223 #define FASTTRAP_ARM32_INSTR 0xe7ffdefc
224 #define FASTTRAP_THUMB32_INSTR 0xdefc
225 #define FASTTRAP_ARM64_INSTR 0xe7eeee7e
226 
227 #define FASTTRAP_ARM32_RET_INSTR 0xe7ffdefb
228 #define FASTTRAP_THUMB32_RET_INSTR 0xdefb
229 #define FASTTRAP_ARM64_RET_INSTR 0xe7eeee7d
230 
231 /* See <rdar://problem/4613924> */
232 perfCallback tempDTraceTrapHook = NULL; /* Pointer to DTrace fbt trap hook routine */
233 #endif
234 
235 
236 
237 extern void arm64_thread_exception_return(void) __dead2;
238 
239 #if defined(APPLETYPHOON)
240 #define CPU_NAME "Typhoon"
241 #elif defined(APPLETWISTER)
242 #define CPU_NAME "Twister"
243 #elif defined(APPLEHURRICANE)
244 #define CPU_NAME "Hurricane"
245 #elif defined(APPLELIGHTNING)
246 #define CPU_NAME "Lightning"
247 #elif defined(APPLEEVEREST)
248 #define CPU_NAME "Everest"
249 #elif defined(APPLEH16)
250 #define CPU_NAME "AppleH16"
251 #else
252 #define CPU_NAME "Unknown"
253 #endif
254 
255 #if (CONFIG_KERNEL_INTEGRITY && defined(KERNEL_INTEGRITY_WT))
256 #define ESR_WT_SERROR(esr) (((esr) & 0xffffff00) == 0xbf575400)
257 #define ESR_WT_REASON(esr) ((esr) & 0xff)
258 
259 #define WT_REASON_NONE           0
260 #define WT_REASON_INTEGRITY_FAIL 1
261 #define WT_REASON_BAD_SYSCALL    2
262 #define WT_REASON_NOT_LOCKED     3
263 #define WT_REASON_ALREADY_LOCKED 4
264 #define WT_REASON_SW_REQ         5
265 #define WT_REASON_PT_INVALID     6
266 #define WT_REASON_PT_VIOLATION   7
267 #define WT_REASON_REG_VIOLATION  8
268 #endif
269 
270 #if defined(HAS_IPI)
271 void cpu_signal_handler(void);
272 extern unsigned int gFastIPI;
273 #endif /* defined(HAS_IPI) */
274 
275 static arm_saved_state64_t *original_faulting_state = NULL;
276 
277 
278 TUNABLE(bool, fp_exceptions_enabled, "-fp_exceptions", false);
279 
280 extern vm_offset_t static_memory_end;
281 
282 /*
283  * Fault copyio_recovery_entry in copyin/copyout routines.
284  *
285  * Offets are expressed in bytes from &copy_recovery_table
286  */
287 struct copyio_recovery_entry {
288 	ptrdiff_t cre_start;
289 	ptrdiff_t cre_end;
290 	ptrdiff_t cre_recovery;
291 };
292 
293 extern struct copyio_recovery_entry copyio_recover_table[];
294 extern struct copyio_recovery_entry copyio_recover_table_end[];
295 
296 static inline ptrdiff_t
copyio_recovery_offset(uintptr_t addr)297 copyio_recovery_offset(uintptr_t addr)
298 {
299 	return (ptrdiff_t)(addr - (uintptr_t)copyio_recover_table);
300 }
301 
302 #if !HAS_APPLE_PAC
303 static inline uintptr_t
copyio_recovery_addr(ptrdiff_t offset)304 copyio_recovery_addr(ptrdiff_t offset)
305 {
306 	return (uintptr_t)copyio_recover_table + (uintptr_t)offset;
307 }
308 #endif
309 
310 static inline struct copyio_recovery_entry *
find_copyio_recovery_entry(arm_saved_state_t * state)311 find_copyio_recovery_entry(arm_saved_state_t *state)
312 {
313 	ptrdiff_t offset = copyio_recovery_offset(get_saved_state_pc(state));
314 	struct copyio_recovery_entry *e;
315 
316 	for (e = copyio_recover_table; e < copyio_recover_table_end; e++) {
317 		if (offset >= e->cre_start && offset < e->cre_end) {
318 			return e;
319 		}
320 	}
321 
322 	return NULL;
323 }
324 
325 static inline int
is_vm_fault(fault_status_t status)326 is_vm_fault(fault_status_t status)
327 {
328 	switch (status) {
329 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L0:
330 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L1:
331 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L2:
332 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L3:
333 	case FSC_ACCESS_FLAG_FAULT_L1:
334 	case FSC_ACCESS_FLAG_FAULT_L2:
335 	case FSC_ACCESS_FLAG_FAULT_L3:
336 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L1:
337 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L2:
338 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L3:
339 		return TRUE;
340 	default:
341 		return FALSE;
342 	}
343 }
344 
345 static inline int
is_translation_fault(fault_status_t status)346 is_translation_fault(fault_status_t status)
347 {
348 	switch (status) {
349 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L0:
350 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L1:
351 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L2:
352 	case FSC_TRANSLATION_FAULT_L3:
353 		return TRUE;
354 	default:
355 		return FALSE;
356 	}
357 }
358 
359 static inline int
is_permission_fault(fault_status_t status)360 is_permission_fault(fault_status_t status)
361 {
362 	switch (status) {
363 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L1:
364 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L2:
365 	case FSC_PERMISSION_FAULT_L3:
366 		return TRUE;
367 	default:
368 		return FALSE;
369 	}
370 }
371 
372 static inline int
is_alignment_fault(fault_status_t status)373 is_alignment_fault(fault_status_t status)
374 {
375 	return status == FSC_ALIGNMENT_FAULT;
376 }
377 
378 static inline int
is_parity_error(fault_status_t status)379 is_parity_error(fault_status_t status)
380 {
381 	switch (status) {
382 #if defined(ARM64_BOARD_CONFIG_T6020)
383 		/*
384 		 * H14 Erratum (rdar://61553243): Despite having FEAT_RAS implemented,
385 		 * FSC_SYNC_PARITY_X can be reported for data and instruction aborts
386 		 * and should be interpreted as FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_x
387 		 */
388 #else
389 	/*
390 	 * TODO: According to ARM ARM, Async Parity (0b011001) is a DFSC that is
391 	 * only applicable to AArch32 HSR register. Can this be removed?
392 	 */
393 	case FSC_ASYNC_PARITY:
394 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY:
395 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L1:
396 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L2:
397 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L3:
398 		return TRUE;
399 #endif
400 	default:
401 		return FALSE;
402 	}
403 }
404 
405 static inline int
is_sync_external_abort(fault_status_t status)406 is_sync_external_abort(fault_status_t status)
407 {
408 	switch (status) {
409 #if defined(ARM64_BOARD_CONFIG_T6020)
410 	/*
411 	 * H14 Erratum (rdar://61553243): Despite having FEAT_RAS implemented,
412 	 * FSC_SYNC_PARITY_x can be reported for data and instruction aborts
413 	 * and should be interpreted as FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_x
414 	 */
415 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY:
416 #endif /* defined(ARM64_BOARD_CONFIG_T6020) */
417 	case FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT:
418 		return TRUE;
419 	default:
420 		return FALSE;
421 	}
422 }
423 
424 static inline int
is_table_walk_error(fault_status_t status)425 is_table_walk_error(fault_status_t status)
426 {
427 	switch (status) {
428 	case FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_TT_L1:
429 	case FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_TT_L2:
430 	case FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_TT_L3:
431 #if defined(ARM64_BOARD_CONFIG_T6020)
432 	/*
433 	 * H14 Erratum(rdar://61553243): Despite having FEAT_RAS implemented,
434 	 * FSC_SYNC_PARITY_x can be reported for data and instruction aborts
435 	 * and should be interpreted as FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT_x
436 	 */
437 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L1:
438 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L2:
439 	case FSC_SYNC_PARITY_TT_L3:
440 #endif /* defined(ARM64_BOARD_CONFIG_T6020) */
441 		return TRUE;
442 	default:
443 		return FALSE;
444 	}
445 }
446 
447 
448 
449 static inline int
is_servicible_fault(fault_status_t status,uint64_t esr)450 is_servicible_fault(fault_status_t status, uint64_t esr)
451 {
452 #pragma unused(esr)
453 	return is_vm_fault(status);
454 }
455 
456 __dead2 __unused
457 static void
arm64_implementation_specific_error(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far)458 arm64_implementation_specific_error(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far)
459 {
460 #pragma unused (state, esr, far)
461 	panic_plain("Unhandled implementation specific error\n");
462 }
463 
464 #if CONFIG_KERNEL_INTEGRITY
465 #pragma clang diagnostic push
466 #pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-parameter"
467 static void
kernel_integrity_error_handler(uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far)468 kernel_integrity_error_handler(uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far)
469 {
470 #if defined(KERNEL_INTEGRITY_WT)
471 #if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
472 	if (ESR_WT_SERROR(esr)) {
473 		switch (ESR_WT_REASON(esr)) {
474 		case WT_REASON_INTEGRITY_FAIL:
475 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, violation in frame 0x%016lx.", far);
476 		case WT_REASON_BAD_SYSCALL:
477 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, bad syscall.");
478 		case WT_REASON_NOT_LOCKED:
479 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, not locked.");
480 		case WT_REASON_ALREADY_LOCKED:
481 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, already locked.");
482 		case WT_REASON_SW_REQ:
483 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, software request.");
484 		case WT_REASON_PT_INVALID:
485 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, encountered invalid TTE/PTE while "
486 			    "walking 0x%016lx.", far);
487 		case WT_REASON_PT_VIOLATION:
488 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, violation in mapping 0x%016lx.",
489 			    far);
490 		case WT_REASON_REG_VIOLATION:
491 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, violation in system register %d.",
492 			    (unsigned) far);
493 		default:
494 			panic_plain("Kernel integrity, unknown (esr=0x%08llx).", esr);
495 		}
496 	}
497 #else
498 	if (ESR_WT_SERROR(esr)) {
499 		panic_plain("SError esr: 0x%08llx far: 0x%016lx.", esr, far);
500 	}
501 #endif
502 #endif
503 }
504 #pragma clang diagnostic pop
505 #endif
506 
507 static void
arm64_platform_error(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far,platform_error_source_t source)508 arm64_platform_error(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far, platform_error_source_t source)
509 {
510 #if CONFIG_KERNEL_INTEGRITY
511 	kernel_integrity_error_handler(esr, far);
512 #endif
513 
514 	(void)source;
515 	cpu_data_t *cdp = getCpuDatap();
516 
517 	if (PE_handle_platform_error(far)) {
518 		return;
519 	} else if (cdp->platform_error_handler != NULL) {
520 		cdp->platform_error_handler(cdp->cpu_id, far);
521 	} else {
522 		arm64_implementation_specific_error(state, esr, far);
523 	}
524 }
525 
526 void
panic_with_thread_kernel_state(const char * msg,arm_saved_state_t * ss)527 panic_with_thread_kernel_state(const char *msg, arm_saved_state_t *ss)
528 {
529 	boolean_t ss_valid;
530 
531 	ss_valid = is_saved_state64(ss);
532 	arm_saved_state64_t *state = saved_state64(ss);
533 
534 	os_atomic_cmpxchg(&original_faulting_state, NULL, state, seq_cst);
535 
536 	// rdar://80659177
537 	// Read SoCD tracepoints up to twice — once the first time we call panic and
538 	// another time if we encounter a nested panic after that.
539 	static int twice = 2;
540 	if (twice > 0) {
541 		twice--;
542 		SOCD_TRACE_XNU(KERNEL_STATE_PANIC, ADDR(state->pc),
543 		    PACK_LSB(VALUE(state->lr), VALUE(ss_valid)),
544 		    PACK_2X32(VALUE(state->esr), VALUE(state->cpsr)),
545 		    VALUE(state->far));
546 	}
547 
548 
549 	panic_plain("%s at pc 0x%016llx, lr 0x%016llx (saved state: %p%s)\n"
550 	    "\t  x0:  0x%016llx x1:  0x%016llx  x2:  0x%016llx  x3:  0x%016llx\n"
551 	    "\t  x4:  0x%016llx x5:  0x%016llx  x6:  0x%016llx  x7:  0x%016llx\n"
552 	    "\t  x8:  0x%016llx x9:  0x%016llx  x10: 0x%016llx  x11: 0x%016llx\n"
553 	    "\t  x12: 0x%016llx x13: 0x%016llx  x14: 0x%016llx  x15: 0x%016llx\n"
554 	    "\t  x16: 0x%016llx x17: 0x%016llx  x18: 0x%016llx  x19: 0x%016llx\n"
555 	    "\t  x20: 0x%016llx x21: 0x%016llx  x22: 0x%016llx  x23: 0x%016llx\n"
556 	    "\t  x24: 0x%016llx x25: 0x%016llx  x26: 0x%016llx  x27: 0x%016llx\n"
557 	    "\t  x28: 0x%016llx fp:  0x%016llx  lr:  0x%016llx  sp:  0x%016llx\n"
558 	    "\t  pc:  0x%016llx cpsr: 0x%08x         esr: 0x%016llx  far: 0x%016llx\n",
559 	    msg, state->pc, state->lr, ss, (ss_valid ? "" : " INVALID"),
560 	    state->x[0], state->x[1], state->x[2], state->x[3],
561 	    state->x[4], state->x[5], state->x[6], state->x[7],
562 	    state->x[8], state->x[9], state->x[10], state->x[11],
563 	    state->x[12], state->x[13], state->x[14], state->x[15],
564 	    state->x[16], state->x[17], state->x[18], state->x[19],
565 	    state->x[20], state->x[21], state->x[22], state->x[23],
566 	    state->x[24], state->x[25], state->x[26], state->x[27],
567 	    state->x[28], state->fp, state->lr, state->sp,
568 	    state->pc, state->cpsr, state->esr, state->far);
569 }
570 
571 void
sleh_synchronous_sp1(arm_context_t * context,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far __unused)572 sleh_synchronous_sp1(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far __unused)
573 {
574 	esr_exception_class_t  class = ESR_EC(esr);
575 	arm_saved_state_t    * state = &context->ss;
576 
577 	switch (class) {
578 	case ESR_EC_UNCATEGORIZED:
579 	{
580 #if (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG)
581 		uint32_t instr = *((uint32_t*)get_saved_state_pc(state));
582 		if (IS_ARM_GDB_TRAP(instr)) {
583 			DebuggerCall(EXC_BREAKPOINT, state);
584 		}
585 		OS_FALLTHROUGH; // panic if we return from the debugger
586 #else
587 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Unexpected debugger trap while SP1 selected", state);
588 #endif /* (DEVELOPMENT || DEBUG) */
589 	}
590 	default:
591 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Synchronous exception taken while SP1 selected", state);
592 	}
593 }
594 
595 
596 __attribute__((noreturn))
597 void
thread_exception_return()598 thread_exception_return()
599 {
600 	thread_t thread = current_thread();
601 	if (thread->machine.exception_trace_code != 0) {
602 		KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
603 		    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SYNC_ARM, thread->machine.exception_trace_code) | DBG_FUNC_END, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
604 		thread->machine.exception_trace_code = 0;
605 	}
606 
607 #if KASAN_TBI
608 	kasan_unpoison_curstack(true);
609 #endif /* KASAN_TBI */
610 	arm64_thread_exception_return();
611 	__builtin_unreachable();
612 }
613 
614 /*
615  * check whether task vtimers are running and set thread and CPU BSD AST
616  *
617  * must be called with interrupts masked so updates of fields are atomic
618  * must be emitted inline to avoid generating an FBT probe on the exception path
619  *
620  */
621 __attribute__((__always_inline__))
622 static inline void
task_vtimer_check(thread_t thread)623 task_vtimer_check(thread_t thread)
624 {
625 	task_t task = get_threadtask_early(thread);
626 
627 	if (__improbable(task != NULL && task->vtimers)) {
628 		thread_ast_set(thread, AST_BSD);
629 		thread->machine.CpuDatap->cpu_pending_ast |= AST_BSD;
630 	}
631 }
632 
633 #if MACH_ASSERT
634 /**
635  * A version of get_preemption_level() that works in early boot.
636  *
637  * If an exception is raised in early boot before the initial thread has been
638  * set up, then calling get_preemption_level() in the SLEH will trigger an
639  * infinitely-recursing exception. This function handles this edge case.
640  */
641 static inline int
sleh_get_preemption_level(void)642 sleh_get_preemption_level(void)
643 {
644 	if (__improbable(current_thread() == NULL)) {
645 		return 0;
646 	}
647 	return get_preemption_level();
648 }
649 #endif // MACH_ASSERT
650 
651 static inline bool
is_platform_error(uint64_t esr)652 is_platform_error(uint64_t esr)
653 {
654 	esr_exception_class_t class = ESR_EC(esr);
655 	uint32_t iss = ESR_ISS(esr);
656 	fault_status_t fault_code;
657 
658 	if (class == ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0 || class == ESR_EC_DABORT_EL1) {
659 		fault_code = ISS_DA_FSC(iss);
660 	} else if (class == ESR_EC_IABORT_EL0 || class == ESR_EC_IABORT_EL1) {
661 		fault_code = ISS_IA_FSC(iss);
662 	} else {
663 		return false;
664 	}
665 
666 	return is_parity_error(fault_code) || is_sync_external_abort(fault_code) ||
667 	       is_table_walk_error(fault_code);
668 }
669 
670 void
sleh_synchronous(arm_context_t * context,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far,__unused bool did_initiate_panic_lockdown)671 sleh_synchronous(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far, __unused bool did_initiate_panic_lockdown)
672 {
673 	esr_exception_class_t  class   = ESR_EC(esr);
674 	arm_saved_state_t    * state   = &context->ss;
675 	thread_t               thread  = current_thread();
676 #if MACH_ASSERT
677 	int                    preemption_level = sleh_get_preemption_level();
678 #endif
679 	expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler = NULL;
680 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
681 	expected_fault_handler_t saved_expected_fault_handler = NULL;
682 	uintptr_t saved_expected_fault_addr = 0;
683 	uintptr_t saved_expected_fault_pc = 0;
684 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
685 
686 	ASSERT_CONTEXT_SANITY(context);
687 
688 	task_vtimer_check(thread);
689 
690 #if CONFIG_DTRACE
691 	/*
692 	 * Handle kernel DTrace probes as early as possible to minimize the likelihood
693 	 * that this path will itself trigger a DTrace probe, which would lead to infinite
694 	 * probe recursion.
695 	 */
696 	if (__improbable((class == ESR_EC_UNCATEGORIZED) && tempDTraceTrapHook &&
697 	    (tempDTraceTrapHook(EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION, state, 0, 0) == KERN_SUCCESS))) {
698 #if CONFIG_SPTM
699 		if (__improbable(did_initiate_panic_lockdown)) {
700 			panic("Unexpectedly initiated lockdown for DTrace probe?");
701 		}
702 #endif
703 		return;
704 	}
705 #endif
706 	bool is_user = PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(state));
707 
708 #if CONFIG_SPTM
709 	// Lockdown should only be initiated for kernel exceptions
710 	assert(!(is_user && did_initiate_panic_lockdown));
711 #endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
712 
713 	/*
714 	 * Use KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST here to avoid producing tracepoints
715 	 * that would disclose the behavior of PT_DENY_ATTACH processes.
716 	 */
717 	if (is_user) {
718 		/* Sanitize FAR (but only if the exception was taken from userspace) */
719 		switch (class) {
720 		case ESR_EC_IABORT_EL1:
721 		case ESR_EC_IABORT_EL0:
722 			/* If this is a SEA, since we can't trust FnV, just clear FAR from the save area. */
723 			if (ISS_IA_FSC(ESR_ISS(esr)) == FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT) {
724 				saved_state64(state)->far = 0;
725 			}
726 			break;
727 		case ESR_EC_DABORT_EL1:
728 		case ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0:
729 			/* If this is a SEA, since we can't trust FnV, just clear FAR from the save area. */
730 			if (ISS_DA_FSC(ESR_ISS(esr)) == FSC_SYNC_EXT_ABORT) {
731 				saved_state64(state)->far = 0;
732 			}
733 			break;
734 		case ESR_EC_WATCHPT_MATCH_EL1:
735 		case ESR_EC_WATCHPT_MATCH_EL0:
736 		case ESR_EC_PC_ALIGN:
737 			break;  /* FAR_ELx is valid */
738 		default:
739 			saved_state64(state)->far = 0;
740 			break;
741 		}
742 
743 		thread->machine.exception_trace_code = (uint16_t)(ARM64_KDBG_CODE_USER | class);
744 		KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
745 		    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SYNC_ARM, thread->machine.exception_trace_code) | DBG_FUNC_START,
746 		    esr, far, get_saved_state_pc(state), 0, 0);
747 	} else {
748 		KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
749 		    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SYNC_ARM, ARM64_KDBG_CODE_KERNEL | class) | DBG_FUNC_START,
750 		    esr, VM_KERNEL_ADDRHIDE(far), VM_KERNEL_UNSLIDE(get_saved_state_pc(state)), 0, 0);
751 	}
752 
753 	if (__improbable(ESR_INSTR_IS_2BYTES(esr))) {
754 		/*
755 		 * We no longer support 32-bit, which means no 2-byte
756 		 * instructions.
757 		 */
758 		if (is_user) {
759 			panic("Exception on 2-byte instruction, "
760 			    "context=%p, esr=%#llx, far=%p",
761 			    context, esr, (void *)far);
762 		} else {
763 			panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Exception on 2-byte instruction", state);
764 		}
765 	}
766 
767 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
768 	if (thread->machine.expected_fault_handler != NULL) {
769 		bool matching_fault_pc = false;
770 		saved_expected_fault_handler = thread->machine.expected_fault_handler;
771 		saved_expected_fault_addr = thread->machine.expected_fault_addr;
772 		saved_expected_fault_pc = thread->machine.expected_fault_pc;
773 
774 		thread->machine.expected_fault_handler = NULL;
775 		thread->machine.expected_fault_addr = 0;
776 		thread->machine.expected_fault_pc = 0;
777 
778 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
779 		/*
780 		 * Compare only the bits of PC which make up the virtual address.
781 		 * This ignores the upper bits, which may have been corrupted by HW in
782 		 * platform dependent ways to signal pointer authentication fault.
783 		 */
784 		uint64_t fault_addr_mask = fault_addr_bitmask(0, 64 - T1SZ_BOOT - 1);
785 		uint64_t masked_expected_pc = saved_expected_fault_pc & fault_addr_mask;
786 		uint64_t masked_saved_pc = get_saved_state_pc(state) & fault_addr_mask;
787 		matching_fault_pc = masked_expected_pc == masked_saved_pc;
788 #else
789 		matching_fault_pc =
790 		    (saved_expected_fault_pc == get_saved_state_pc(state));
791 #endif /* ptrauth_call */
792 		if (saved_expected_fault_addr == far ||
793 		    matching_fault_pc) {
794 			expected_fault_handler = saved_expected_fault_handler;
795 		}
796 	}
797 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
798 
799 	if (__improbable(is_platform_error(esr))) {
800 		/*
801 		 * Must gather error info in platform error handler before
802 		 * thread is preempted to another core/cluster to guarantee
803 		 * accurate error details
804 		 */
805 
806 		arm64_platform_error(state, esr, far, PLAT_ERR_SRC_SYNC);
807 #if CONFIG_SPTM
808 		if (__improbable(did_initiate_panic_lockdown)) {
809 			panic("Panic lockdown initiated for platform error");
810 		}
811 #endif
812 		return;
813 	}
814 
815 	if (is_user && class == ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0) {
816 		thread_reset_pcs_will_fault(thread);
817 	}
818 
819 #if CONFIG_SPTM
820 	if (__improbable(did_initiate_panic_lockdown && current_thread() != NULL)) {
821 		/*
822 		 * If we initiated panic lockdown, we must disable preemption before
823 		 * enabling interrupts. While unlikely, preempting the panicked thread
824 		 * after lockdown has occurred may hang the system if all cores end up
825 		 * blocked while attempting to return to user space.
826 		 */
827 		disable_preemption();
828 	}
829 #endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
830 
831 	/* Inherit the interrupt masks from previous context */
832 	if (SPSR_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
833 		ml_set_interrupts_enabled(TRUE);
834 	}
835 
836 	switch (class) {
837 	case ESR_EC_SVC_64:
838 		if (!is_saved_state64(state) || !is_user) {
839 			panic("Invalid SVC_64 context");
840 		}
841 
842 		handle_svc(state);
843 		break;
844 
845 	case ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0:
846 		handle_abort(state, esr, far, inspect_data_abort, handle_user_abort, expected_fault_handler);
847 		break;
848 
849 	case ESR_EC_MSR_TRAP:
850 		handle_msr_trap(state, esr);
851 		break;
852 /**
853  * Some APPLEVIRTUALPLATFORM targets do not specify armv8.6, but it's still possible for
854  * them to be hosted by a host that implements ARM_FPAC. There's no way for such a host
855  * to disable it or trap it without substantial performance penalty. Therefore, the FPAC
856  * handler here needs to be built into the guest kernels to prevent the exception to fall
857  * through.
858  */
859 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
860 	case ESR_EC_PAC_FAIL:
861 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
862 		if (expected_fault_handler != NULL && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
863 			break;
864 		}
865 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
866 		handle_pac_fail(state, esr);
867 		__builtin_unreachable();
868 
869 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
870 
871 #if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
872 	case ESR_EC_SME:
873 		handle_sme_trap(state, esr);
874 		break;
875 #endif /* HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME */
876 
877 	case ESR_EC_IABORT_EL0:
878 		handle_abort(state, esr, far, inspect_instruction_abort, handle_user_abort, expected_fault_handler);
879 		break;
880 
881 	case ESR_EC_IABORT_EL1:
882 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
883 		if ((expected_fault_handler != NULL) && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
884 			break;
885 		}
886 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
887 
888 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Kernel instruction fetch abort", state);
889 
890 	case ESR_EC_PC_ALIGN:
891 		handle_pc_align(state);
892 		__builtin_unreachable();
893 
894 	case ESR_EC_DABORT_EL1:
895 		handle_abort(state, esr, far, inspect_data_abort, handle_kernel_abort, expected_fault_handler);
896 		break;
897 
898 	case ESR_EC_UNCATEGORIZED:
899 		assert(!ESR_ISS(esr));
900 
901 #if CONFIG_XNUPOST
902 		if (!is_user && (expected_fault_handler != NULL) && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
903 			/*
904 			 * The fault handler accepted the exception and handled it on its
905 			 * own. Don't trap to the debugger/panic.
906 			 */
907 			break;
908 		}
909 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
910 		handle_uncategorized(&context->ss);
911 		break;
912 
913 	case ESR_EC_SP_ALIGN:
914 		handle_sp_align(state);
915 		__builtin_unreachable();
916 
917 	case ESR_EC_BKPT_AARCH32:
918 		handle_breakpoint(state, esr);
919 		__builtin_unreachable();
920 
921 	case ESR_EC_BRK_AARCH64:
922 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
923 		if ((expected_fault_handler != NULL) && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
924 			break;
925 		}
926 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
927 		if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
928 			handle_kernel_breakpoint(state, esr);
929 			break;
930 		} else {
931 			handle_breakpoint(state, esr);
932 			__builtin_unreachable();
933 		}
934 
935 	case ESR_EC_BKPT_REG_MATCH_EL0:
936 		if (FSC_DEBUG_FAULT == ISS_SSDE_FSC(esr)) {
937 			handle_breakpoint(state, esr);
938 		}
939 		panic("Unsupported Class %u event code. state=%p class=%u esr=%llu far=%p",
940 		    class, state, class, esr, (void *)far);
941 		__builtin_unreachable();
942 
943 	case ESR_EC_BKPT_REG_MATCH_EL1:
944 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Hardware Breakpoint Debug exception from kernel. Panic (by design)", state);
945 		__builtin_unreachable();
946 
947 	case ESR_EC_SW_STEP_DEBUG_EL0:
948 		if (FSC_DEBUG_FAULT == ISS_SSDE_FSC(esr)) {
949 			handle_sw_step_debug(state);
950 		}
951 		panic("Unsupported Class %u event code. state=%p class=%u esr=%llu far=%p",
952 		    class, state, class, esr, (void *)far);
953 		__builtin_unreachable();
954 
955 	case ESR_EC_SW_STEP_DEBUG_EL1:
956 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Software Step Debug exception from kernel. Panic (by design)", state);
957 		__builtin_unreachable();
958 
959 	case ESR_EC_WATCHPT_MATCH_EL0:
960 		if (FSC_DEBUG_FAULT == ISS_SSDE_FSC(esr)) {
961 			handle_watchpoint(far);
962 		}
963 		panic("Unsupported Class %u event code. state=%p class=%u esr=%llu far=%p",
964 		    class, state, class, esr, (void *)far);
965 		__builtin_unreachable();
966 
967 	case ESR_EC_WATCHPT_MATCH_EL1:
968 		/*
969 		 * If we hit a watchpoint in kernel mode, probably in a copyin/copyout which we don't want to
970 		 * abort.  Turn off watchpoints and keep going; we'll turn them back on in return_from_exception..
971 		 */
972 		if (FSC_DEBUG_FAULT == ISS_SSDE_FSC(esr)) {
973 			arm_debug_set(NULL);
974 			break; /* return to first level handler */
975 		}
976 		panic("Unsupported Class %u event code. state=%p class=%u esr=%llu far=%p",
977 		    class, state, class, esr, (void *)far);
978 		__builtin_unreachable();
979 
980 	case ESR_EC_TRAP_SIMD_FP:
981 		handle_simd_trap(state, esr);
982 		__builtin_unreachable();
983 
984 	case ESR_EC_ILLEGAL_INSTR_SET:
985 		panic("Illegal instruction set exception. state=%p class=%u esr=%llu far=%p spsr=0x%x",
986 		    state, class, esr, (void *)far, get_saved_state_cpsr(state));
987 		__builtin_unreachable();
988 
989 	case ESR_EC_MCR_MRC_CP15_TRAP:
990 	case ESR_EC_MCRR_MRRC_CP15_TRAP:
991 	case ESR_EC_MCR_MRC_CP14_TRAP:
992 	case ESR_EC_LDC_STC_CP14_TRAP:
993 	case ESR_EC_MCRR_MRRC_CP14_TRAP:
994 		handle_user_trapped_instruction32(state, esr);
995 		__builtin_unreachable();
996 
997 	case ESR_EC_WFI_WFE:
998 		// Use of WFI or WFE instruction when they have been disabled for EL0
999 		handle_wf_trap(state);
1000 		__builtin_unreachable();
1001 
1002 	case ESR_EC_FLOATING_POINT_64:
1003 		handle_fp_trap(state, esr);
1004 		__builtin_unreachable();
1005 	case ESR_EC_BTI_FAIL:
1006 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
1007 		if ((expected_fault_handler != NULL) && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
1008 			break;
1009 		}
1010 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
1011 #ifdef CONFIG_BTI_TELEMETRY
1012 		if (bti_telemetry_handle_exception(state)) {
1013 			/* Telemetry has accepted and corrected the exception, continue */
1014 			break;
1015 		}
1016 #endif /* CONFIG_BTI_TELEMETRY */
1017 		handle_bti_fail(state, esr);
1018 		__builtin_unreachable();
1019 
1020 	default:
1021 		handle_uncategorized(state);
1022 	}
1023 
1024 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
1025 	if (saved_expected_fault_handler != NULL) {
1026 		thread->machine.expected_fault_handler = saved_expected_fault_handler;
1027 		thread->machine.expected_fault_addr = saved_expected_fault_addr;
1028 		thread->machine.expected_fault_pc = saved_expected_fault_pc;
1029 	}
1030 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
1031 
1032 	if (is_user) {
1033 		KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
1034 		    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SYNC_ARM, thread->machine.exception_trace_code) | DBG_FUNC_END,
1035 		    esr, far, get_saved_state_pc(state), 0, 0);
1036 		thread->machine.exception_trace_code = 0;
1037 	} else {
1038 		KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
1039 		    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SYNC_ARM, ARM64_KDBG_CODE_KERNEL | class) | DBG_FUNC_END,
1040 		    esr, VM_KERNEL_ADDRHIDE(far), VM_KERNEL_UNSLIDE(get_saved_state_pc(state)), 0, 0);
1041 	}
1042 
1043 #if CONFIG_SPTM
1044 	if (__improbable(did_initiate_panic_lockdown)) {
1045 #if CONFIG_XNUPOST
1046 		bool can_recover = !!(expected_fault_handler);
1047 #else
1048 		bool can_recover = false;
1049 #endif /* CONFIG_XNU_POST */
1050 
1051 		if (can_recover) {
1052 			/*
1053 			 * If we matched an exception handler, this was a simulated lockdown
1054 			 * and so we can recover. Re-enable preemption if we disabled it.
1055 			 */
1056 			if (current_thread() != NULL) {
1057 				enable_preemption();
1058 			}
1059 		} else {
1060 			/*
1061 			 * fleh already triggered a lockdown but we, for whatever reason,
1062 			 * didn't end up finding a reason to panic. Catch all panic in this
1063 			 * case.
1064 			 * Note that the panic here has no security benefit as the system is
1065 			 * already hosed, this is merely for telemetry.
1066 			 */
1067 			panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Panic lockdown initiated", state);
1068 		}
1069 	}
1070 #endif /* CONFIG_SPTM */
1071 
1072 #if MACH_ASSERT
1073 	if (preemption_level != sleh_get_preemption_level()) {
1074 		panic("synchronous exception changed preemption level from %d to %d", preemption_level, sleh_get_preemption_level());
1075 	}
1076 #endif
1077 }
1078 
1079 /*
1080  * Uncategorized exceptions are a catch-all for general execution errors.
1081  * ARM64_TODO: For now, we assume this is for undefined instruction exceptions.
1082  */
1083 static void
handle_uncategorized(arm_saved_state_t * state)1084 handle_uncategorized(arm_saved_state_t *state)
1085 {
1086 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
1087 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED};
1088 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
1089 	uint32_t                   instr     = 0;
1090 
1091 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
1092 
1093 #if CONFIG_DTRACE
1094 
1095 	if (PSR64_IS_USER64(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1096 		/*
1097 		 * For a 64bit user process, we care about all 4 bytes of the
1098 		 * instr.
1099 		 */
1100 		if (instr == FASTTRAP_ARM64_INSTR || instr == FASTTRAP_ARM64_RET_INSTR) {
1101 			if (dtrace_user_probe(state) == KERN_SUCCESS) {
1102 				return;
1103 			}
1104 		}
1105 	} else if (PSR64_IS_USER32(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1106 		/*
1107 		 * For a 32bit user process, we check for thumb mode, in
1108 		 * which case we only care about a 2 byte instruction length.
1109 		 * For non-thumb mode, we care about all 4 bytes of the instructin.
1110 		 */
1111 		if (get_saved_state_cpsr(state) & PSR64_MODE_USER32_THUMB) {
1112 			if (((uint16_t)instr == FASTTRAP_THUMB32_INSTR) ||
1113 			    ((uint16_t)instr == FASTTRAP_THUMB32_RET_INSTR)) {
1114 				if (dtrace_user_probe(state) == KERN_SUCCESS) {
1115 					return;
1116 				}
1117 			}
1118 		} else {
1119 			if ((instr == FASTTRAP_ARM32_INSTR) ||
1120 			    (instr == FASTTRAP_ARM32_RET_INSTR)) {
1121 				if (dtrace_user_probe(state) == KERN_SUCCESS) {
1122 					return;
1123 				}
1124 			}
1125 		}
1126 	}
1127 
1128 #endif /* CONFIG_DTRACE */
1129 
1130 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1131 		if (IS_ARM_GDB_TRAP(instr)) {
1132 			boolean_t interrupt_state;
1133 			exception = EXC_BREAKPOINT;
1134 
1135 			interrupt_state = ml_set_interrupts_enabled(FALSE);
1136 
1137 			/* Save off the context here (so that the debug logic
1138 			 * can see the original state of this thread).
1139 			 */
1140 			current_thread()->machine.kpcb = state;
1141 
1142 			/* Hop into the debugger (typically either due to a
1143 			 * fatal exception, an explicit panic, or a stackshot
1144 			 * request.
1145 			 */
1146 			DebuggerCall(exception, state);
1147 
1148 			current_thread()->machine.kpcb = NULL;
1149 			(void) ml_set_interrupts_enabled(interrupt_state);
1150 			return;
1151 		} else {
1152 			panic("Undefined kernel instruction: pc=%p instr=%x", (void*)get_saved_state_pc(state), instr);
1153 		}
1154 	}
1155 
1156 	/*
1157 	 * Check for GDB breakpoint via illegal opcode.
1158 	 */
1159 	if (IS_ARM_GDB_TRAP(instr)) {
1160 		exception = EXC_BREAKPOINT;
1161 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_BREAKPOINT;
1162 		codes[1] = instr;
1163 	} else {
1164 		codes[1] = instr;
1165 	}
1166 
1167 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
1168 	__builtin_unreachable();
1169 }
1170 
1171 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1172 static const uint16_t PTRAUTH_TRAP_START = 0xC470;
1173 static inline bool
brk_comment_is_ptrauth(uint16_t comment)1174 brk_comment_is_ptrauth(uint16_t comment)
1175 {
1176 	return comment >= PTRAUTH_TRAP_START &&
1177 	       comment <= PTRAUTH_TRAP_START + ptrauth_key_asdb;
1178 }
1179 
1180 static inline const char *
ptrauth_key_to_string(ptrauth_key key)1181 ptrauth_key_to_string(ptrauth_key key)
1182 {
1183 	switch (key) {
1184 	case ptrauth_key_asia:
1185 		return "IA";
1186 	case ptrauth_key_asib:
1187 		return "IB";
1188 	case ptrauth_key_asda:
1189 		return "DA";
1190 	case ptrauth_key_asdb:
1191 		return "DB";
1192 	default:
1193 		__builtin_unreachable();
1194 	}
1195 }
1196 
1197 static void __attribute__((noreturn))
ptrauth_handle_brk_trap(void * tstate,uint16_t comment)1198 ptrauth_handle_brk_trap(void *tstate, uint16_t comment)
1199 {
1200 	arm_saved_state_t *state = (arm_saved_state_t *)tstate;
1201 #define MSG_FMT "Break 0x%04X instruction exception from kernel. Ptrauth failure with %s key resulted in 0x%016llx"
1202 	char msg[strlen(MSG_FMT)
1203 	- strlen("0x%04X") + strlen("0xFFFF")
1204 	- strlen("%s") + strlen("IA")
1205 	- strlen("0x%016llx") + strlen("0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF")
1206 	+ 1];
1207 	ptrauth_key key = (ptrauth_key)(comment - PTRAUTH_TRAP_START);
1208 	const char *key_str = ptrauth_key_to_string(key);
1209 	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_FMT, comment, key_str, saved_state64(state)->x[16]);
1210 #undef MSG_FMT
1211 
1212 	panic_with_thread_kernel_state(msg, state);
1213 	__builtin_unreachable();
1214 }
1215 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1216 
1217 #if HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK
1218 static uint32_t bound_chk_violations_event;
1219 
1220 static void
xnu_soft_trap_handle_breakpoint(void * tstate,uint16_t comment)1221 xnu_soft_trap_handle_breakpoint(
1222 	void              *tstate,
1223 	uint16_t          comment)
1224 {
1225 #if CONFIG_UBSAN_MINIMAL
1226 	if (comment == UBSAN_SOFT_TRAP_SIGNED_OF) {
1227 		ubsan_handle_brk_trap(tstate, comment);
1228 	}
1229 #else
1230 	(void)tstate;
1231 #endif
1232 
1233 	if (comment == CLANG_SOFT_TRAP_BOUND_CHK) {
1234 		os_atomic_inc(&bound_chk_violations_event, relaxed);
1235 	}
1236 }
1237 #endif /* HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK */
1238 
1239 static void
xnu_hard_trap_handle_breakpoint(void * tstate,uint16_t comment)1240 xnu_hard_trap_handle_breakpoint(void *tstate, uint16_t comment)
1241 {
1242 	switch (comment) {
1243 	case XNU_HARD_TRAP_SAFE_UNLINK: {
1244 #define MSG_FMT "panic: corrupt list around element %p"
1245 		char msg[strlen(MSG_FMT) - strlen("%p") + 18 + 1];
1246 		arm_saved_state64_t *state = saved_state64(tstate);
1247 
1248 		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_FMT, (void *)state->x[8]);
1249 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state(msg, tstate);
1250 #undef MSG_FMT
1251 	}
1252 	case XNU_HARD_TRAP_STRING_CHK:
1253 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("panic: string operation caused an overflow", tstate);
1254 	default:
1255 		break;
1256 	}
1257 }
1258 
1259 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1260 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(ptrauth_desc,
1261     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_PTRAUTH,
1262     .base                = PTRAUTH_TRAP_START,
1263     .max                 = PTRAUTH_TRAP_START + ptrauth_key_asdb,
1264     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_UNRECOVERABLE,
1265     .handle_breakpoint   = ptrauth_handle_brk_trap);
1266 #endif
1267 
1268 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(clang_desc,
1269     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_CLANG,
1270     .base                = CLANG_ARM_TRAP_START,
1271     .max                 = CLANG_ARM_TRAP_END,
1272     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_UNRECOVERABLE,
1273     .handle_breakpoint   = NULL);
1274 
1275 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(libcxx_desc,
1276     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_LIBCXX,
1277     .base                = LIBCXX_TRAP_START,
1278     .max                 = LIBCXX_TRAP_END,
1279     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_UNRECOVERABLE,
1280     .handle_breakpoint   = NULL);
1281 
1282 #if HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK
1283 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(xnu_soft_traps_desc,
1284     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_TELEMETRY,
1285     .base                = XNU_SOFT_TRAP_START,
1286     .max                 = XNU_SOFT_TRAP_END,
1287     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_RECOVERABLE | KERNEL_BRK_CORE_ANALYTICS,
1288     .handle_breakpoint   = xnu_soft_trap_handle_breakpoint);
1289 #endif /* HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK */
1290 
1291 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(xnu_hard_traps_desc,
1292     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_XNU,
1293     .base                = XNU_HARD_TRAP_START,
1294     .max                 = XNU_HARD_TRAP_END,
1295     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_UNRECOVERABLE,
1296     .handle_breakpoint   = xnu_hard_trap_handle_breakpoint);
1297 
1298 static void
1299 #if !HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK
1300 __attribute__((noreturn))
1301 #endif
handle_kernel_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)1302 handle_kernel_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
1303 {
1304 	uint16_t comment = ISS_BRK_COMMENT(esr);
1305 	const struct kernel_brk_descriptor *desc;
1306 
1307 #define MSG_FMT "Break 0x%04X instruction exception from kernel. Panic (by design)"
1308 	char msg[strlen(MSG_FMT) - strlen("0x%04X") + strlen("0xFFFF") + 1];
1309 
1310 	desc = find_brk_descriptor_by_comment(comment);
1311 
1312 	if (!desc) {
1313 		goto brk_out;
1314 	}
1315 
1316 #if HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK
1317 	if (desc->options & KERNEL_BRK_TELEMETRY_OPTIONS) {
1318 		telemetry_kernel_brk(desc->type, desc->options, (void *)state, comment);
1319 	}
1320 #endif
1321 
1322 	if (desc->handle_breakpoint) {
1323 		desc->handle_breakpoint(state, comment); /* May trigger panic */
1324 	}
1325 
1326 #if HAS_TELEMETRY_KERNEL_BRK
1327 	/* Still alive? Check if we should recover. */
1328 	if (desc->options & KERNEL_BRK_RECOVERABLE) {
1329 		add_saved_state_pc(state, 4);
1330 		return;
1331 	}
1332 #endif
1333 
1334 brk_out:
1335 	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_FMT, comment);
1336 
1337 	panic_with_thread_kernel_state(msg, state);
1338 	__builtin_unreachable();
1339 #undef MSG_FMT
1340 }
1341 
1342 static void
handle_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr __unused)1343 handle_breakpoint(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr __unused)
1344 {
1345 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BREAKPOINT;
1346 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_BREAKPOINT};
1347 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
1348 
1349 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1350 	if (ESR_EC(esr) == ESR_EC_BRK_AARCH64 &&
1351 	    brk_comment_is_ptrauth(ISS_BRK_COMMENT(esr))) {
1352 		exception |= EXC_PTRAUTH_BIT;
1353 	}
1354 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1355 
1356 	codes[1] = get_saved_state_pc(state);
1357 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
1358 	__builtin_unreachable();
1359 }
1360 
1361 static void
handle_watchpoint(vm_offset_t fault_addr)1362 handle_watchpoint(vm_offset_t fault_addr)
1363 {
1364 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BREAKPOINT;
1365 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_DA_DEBUG};
1366 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
1367 
1368 	codes[1] = fault_addr;
1369 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
1370 	__builtin_unreachable();
1371 }
1372 
1373 static void
handle_abort(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t fault_addr,abort_inspector_t inspect_abort,abort_handler_t handler,expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)1374 handle_abort(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t fault_addr,
1375     abort_inspector_t inspect_abort, abort_handler_t handler, expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)
1376 {
1377 	fault_status_t fault_code;
1378 	vm_prot_t      fault_type;
1379 
1380 	inspect_abort(ESR_ISS(esr), &fault_code, &fault_type);
1381 	handler(state, esr, fault_addr, fault_code, fault_type, expected_fault_handler);
1382 }
1383 
1384 static void
inspect_instruction_abort(uint32_t iss,fault_status_t * fault_code,vm_prot_t * fault_type)1385 inspect_instruction_abort(uint32_t iss, fault_status_t *fault_code, vm_prot_t *fault_type)
1386 {
1387 	getCpuDatap()->cpu_stat.instr_ex_cnt++;
1388 	*fault_code = ISS_IA_FSC(iss);
1389 	*fault_type = (VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE);
1390 }
1391 
1392 static void
inspect_data_abort(uint32_t iss,fault_status_t * fault_code,vm_prot_t * fault_type)1393 inspect_data_abort(uint32_t iss, fault_status_t *fault_code, vm_prot_t *fault_type)
1394 {
1395 	getCpuDatap()->cpu_stat.data_ex_cnt++;
1396 	*fault_code = ISS_DA_FSC(iss);
1397 
1398 	/*
1399 	 * Cache maintenance operations always report faults as write access.
1400 	 * Change these to read access, unless they report a permission fault.
1401 	 * Only certain cache maintenance operations (e.g. 'dc ivac') require write
1402 	 * access to the mapping, but if a cache maintenance operation that only requires
1403 	 * read access generates a permission fault, then we will not be able to handle
1404 	 * the fault regardless of whether we treat it as a read or write fault.
1405 	 */
1406 	if ((iss & ISS_DA_WNR) && (!(iss & ISS_DA_CM) || is_permission_fault(*fault_code))) {
1407 		*fault_type = (VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE);
1408 	} else {
1409 		*fault_type = (VM_PROT_READ);
1410 	}
1411 }
1412 
1413 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1414 static inline uint64_t
fault_addr_bitmask(unsigned int bit_from,unsigned int bit_to)1415 fault_addr_bitmask(unsigned int bit_from, unsigned int bit_to)
1416 {
1417 	return ((1ULL << (bit_to - bit_from + 1)) - 1) << bit_from;
1418 }
1419 
1420 static inline bool
fault_addr_bit(vm_offset_t fault_addr,unsigned int bit)1421 fault_addr_bit(vm_offset_t fault_addr, unsigned int bit)
1422 {
1423 	return (bool)((fault_addr >> bit) & 1);
1424 }
1425 
1426 extern int gARM_FEAT_PAuth2;
1427 
1428 /**
1429  * Determines whether a fault address taken at EL0 contains a PAC error code
1430  * corresponding to the specified kind of ptrauth key.
1431  */
1432 static bool
user_fault_addr_matches_pac_error_code(vm_offset_t fault_addr,bool data_key)1433 user_fault_addr_matches_pac_error_code(vm_offset_t fault_addr, bool data_key)
1434 {
1435 	bool instruction_tbi = !(get_tcr() & TCR_TBID0_TBI_DATA_ONLY);
1436 	bool tbi = data_key || __improbable(instruction_tbi);
1437 
1438 	if (gARM_FEAT_PAuth2) {
1439 		/*
1440 		 * EnhancedPAC2 CPUs don't encode error codes at fixed positions, so
1441 		 * treat all non-canonical address bits like potential poison bits.
1442 		 */
1443 		uint64_t mask = fault_addr_bitmask(64 - T0SZ_BOOT, 54);
1444 		if (!tbi) {
1445 			mask |= fault_addr_bitmask(56, 63);
1446 		}
1447 		return (fault_addr & mask) != 0;
1448 	} else {
1449 		unsigned int poison_shift;
1450 		if (tbi) {
1451 			poison_shift = 53;
1452 		} else {
1453 			poison_shift = 61;
1454 		}
1455 
1456 		/* PAC error codes are always in the form key_number:NOT(key_number) */
1457 		bool poison_bit_1 = fault_addr_bit(fault_addr, poison_shift);
1458 		bool poison_bit_2 = fault_addr_bit(fault_addr, poison_shift + 1);
1459 		return poison_bit_1 != poison_bit_2;
1460 	}
1461 }
1462 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1463 
1464 /**
1465  * Determines whether the userland thread has a JIT region in RW mode, TPRO
1466  * in RW mode, or JCTL_EL0 in pointer signing mode.  A fault in any of these trusted
1467  * code paths may indicate an attack on WebKit.  Rather than letting a
1468  * potentially-compromised process try to handle the exception, it will be killed
1469  * by the kernel and a crash report will be generated.
1470  */
1471 static bool
user_fault_in_self_restrict_mode(thread_t thread __unused)1472 user_fault_in_self_restrict_mode(thread_t thread __unused)
1473 {
1474 
1475 	return false;
1476 }
1477 
1478 static void
handle_pc_align(arm_saved_state_t * ss)1479 handle_pc_align(arm_saved_state_t *ss)
1480 {
1481 	exception_type_t exc;
1482 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1483 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1484 
1485 	if (!PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(ss))) {
1486 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("PC alignment exception from kernel.", ss);
1487 	}
1488 
1489 	exc = EXC_BAD_ACCESS;
1490 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1491 	if (user_fault_addr_matches_pac_error_code(get_saved_state_pc(ss), false)) {
1492 		exc |= EXC_PTRAUTH_BIT;
1493 	}
1494 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1495 
1496 	codes[0] = EXC_ARM_DA_ALIGN;
1497 	codes[1] = get_saved_state_pc(ss);
1498 
1499 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1500 	__builtin_unreachable();
1501 }
1502 
1503 static void
handle_sp_align(arm_saved_state_t * ss)1504 handle_sp_align(arm_saved_state_t *ss)
1505 {
1506 	exception_type_t exc;
1507 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1508 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1509 
1510 	if (!PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(ss))) {
1511 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("SP alignment exception from kernel.", ss);
1512 	}
1513 
1514 	exc = EXC_BAD_ACCESS;
1515 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1516 	if (user_fault_addr_matches_pac_error_code(get_saved_state_sp(ss), true)) {
1517 		exc |= EXC_PTRAUTH_BIT;
1518 	}
1519 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1520 
1521 	codes[0] = EXC_ARM_SP_ALIGN;
1522 	codes[1] = get_saved_state_sp(ss);
1523 
1524 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1525 	__builtin_unreachable();
1526 }
1527 
1528 static void
handle_wf_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state)1529 handle_wf_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state)
1530 {
1531 	exception_type_t exc;
1532 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1533 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1534 	uint32_t instr = 0;
1535 
1536 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
1537 
1538 	exc = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
1539 	codes[0] = EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED;
1540 	codes[1] = instr;
1541 
1542 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1543 	__builtin_unreachable();
1544 }
1545 
1546 static void
handle_fp_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)1547 handle_fp_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
1548 {
1549 	exception_type_t exc = EXC_ARITHMETIC;
1550 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1551 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1552 	uint32_t instr = 0;
1553 
1554 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1555 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Floating point exception from kernel", state);
1556 	}
1557 
1558 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
1559 	codes[1] = instr;
1560 
1561 	/* The floating point trap flags are only valid if TFV is set. */
1562 	if (!fp_exceptions_enabled) {
1563 		exc = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
1564 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED;
1565 	} else if (!(esr & ISS_FP_TFV)) {
1566 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_UNDEFINED;
1567 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_UFF) {
1568 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_UF;
1569 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_OFF) {
1570 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_OF;
1571 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_IOF) {
1572 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_IO;
1573 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_DZF) {
1574 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_DZ;
1575 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_IDF) {
1576 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_ID;
1577 	} else if (esr & ISS_FP_IXF) {
1578 		codes[0] = EXC_ARM_FP_IX;
1579 	} else {
1580 		panic("Unrecognized floating point exception, state=%p, esr=%#llx", state, esr);
1581 	}
1582 
1583 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1584 	__builtin_unreachable();
1585 }
1586 
1587 
1588 
1589 /*
1590  * handle_alignment_fault_from_user:
1591  *   state: Saved state
1592  *
1593  * Attempts to deal with an alignment fault from userspace (possibly by
1594  * emulating the faulting instruction).  If emulation failed due to an
1595  * unservicable fault, the ESR for that fault will be stored in the
1596  * recovery_esr field of the thread by the exception code.
1597  *
1598  * Returns:
1599  *   -1:     Emulation failed (emulation of state/instr not supported)
1600  *   0:      Successfully emulated the instruction
1601  *   EFAULT: Emulation failed (probably due to permissions)
1602  *   EINVAL: Emulation failed (probably due to a bad address)
1603  */
1604 
1605 
1606 static int
handle_alignment_fault_from_user(arm_saved_state_t * state,kern_return_t * vmfr)1607 handle_alignment_fault_from_user(arm_saved_state_t *state, kern_return_t *vmfr)
1608 {
1609 	int ret = -1;
1610 
1611 #pragma unused (state)
1612 #pragma unused (vmfr)
1613 
1614 	return ret;
1615 }
1616 
1617 
1618 
1619 #if HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME
1620 static void
handle_sme_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)1621 handle_sme_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
1622 {
1623 	exception_type_t exc = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
1624 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2] = {EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED};
1625 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1626 
1627 	if (!PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1628 		panic("SME exception from kernel, state=%p, esr=%#llx", state, esr);
1629 	}
1630 	if (!arm_sme_version()) {
1631 		/*
1632 		 * If SME is disabled in software but userspace executes an SME
1633 		 * instruction anyway, then the CPU will still raise an
1634 		 * SME-specific trap.  Triage it as if the CPU raised an
1635 		 * undefined-instruction trap.
1636 		 */
1637 		exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1638 		__builtin_unreachable();
1639 	}
1640 
1641 	if (ISS_SME_SMTC(ESR_ISS(esr)) == ISS_SME_SMTC_CAPCR) {
1642 		thread_t thread = current_thread();
1643 		switch (machine_thread_sme_state_alloc(thread)) {
1644 		case KERN_SUCCESS:
1645 			return;
1646 
1647 
1648 		default:
1649 			panic("Failed to allocate SME state for thread %p", thread);
1650 		}
1651 	}
1652 
1653 	uint32_t instr;
1654 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
1655 	codes[1] = instr;
1656 
1657 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1658 	__builtin_unreachable();
1659 }
1660 #endif /* HAS_ARM_FEAT_SME */
1661 
1662 static void
handle_sw_step_debug(arm_saved_state_t * state)1663 handle_sw_step_debug(arm_saved_state_t *state)
1664 {
1665 	thread_t thread = current_thread();
1666 	exception_type_t exc;
1667 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1668 	mach_msg_type_number_t numcodes = 2;
1669 
1670 	if (!PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
1671 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("SW_STEP_DEBUG exception from kernel.", state);
1672 	}
1673 
1674 	// Disable single step and unmask interrupts (in the saved state, anticipating next exception return)
1675 	if (thread->machine.DebugData != NULL) {
1676 		thread->machine.DebugData->uds.ds64.mdscr_el1 &= ~0x1;
1677 	} else {
1678 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("SW_STEP_DEBUG exception thread DebugData is NULL.", state);
1679 	}
1680 
1681 	mask_user_saved_state_cpsr(thread->machine.upcb, 0, PSR64_SS | DAIF_ALL);
1682 
1683 	// Special encoding for gdb single step event on ARM
1684 	exc = EXC_BREAKPOINT;
1685 	codes[0] = 1;
1686 	codes[1] = 0;
1687 
1688 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1689 	__builtin_unreachable();
1690 }
1691 
1692 #if MACH_ASSERT
1693 TUNABLE_WRITEABLE(int, panic_on_jit_guard, "panic_on_jit_guard", 0);
1694 #endif /* MACH_ASSERT */
1695 
1696 static void
handle_user_abort(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t fault_addr,fault_status_t fault_code,vm_prot_t fault_type,expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)1697 handle_user_abort(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t fault_addr,
1698     fault_status_t fault_code, vm_prot_t fault_type, expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)
1699 {
1700 	exception_type_t           exc      = EXC_BAD_ACCESS;
1701 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2];
1702 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes = 2;
1703 	thread_t                   thread   = current_thread();
1704 
1705 	(void)expected_fault_handler;
1706 
1707 	if (__improbable(!SPSR_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED(get_saved_state_cpsr(state)))) {
1708 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("User abort from non-interruptible context", state);
1709 	}
1710 
1711 	thread->iotier_override = THROTTLE_LEVEL_NONE; /* Reset IO tier override before handling abort from userspace */
1712 
1713 	if (!is_servicible_fault(fault_code, esr) &&
1714 	    thread->t_rr_state.trr_fault_state != TRR_FAULT_NONE) {
1715 		thread_reset_pcs_done_faulting(thread);
1716 	}
1717 
1718 	if (is_vm_fault(fault_code)) {
1719 		vm_map_t        map = thread->map;
1720 		vm_offset_t     vm_fault_addr = fault_addr;
1721 		kern_return_t   result = KERN_FAILURE;
1722 
1723 		assert(map != kernel_map);
1724 
1725 		if (!(fault_type & VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) {
1726 			vm_fault_addr = VM_USER_STRIP_TBI(fault_addr);
1727 		}
1728 
1729 		/* check to see if it is just a pmap ref/modify fault */
1730 		if (!is_translation_fault(fault_code)) {
1731 			result = arm_fast_fault(map->pmap,
1732 			    vm_fault_addr,
1733 			    fault_type, (fault_code == FSC_ACCESS_FLAG_FAULT_L3), TRUE);
1734 		}
1735 		if (result != KERN_SUCCESS) {
1736 
1737 			{
1738 				/* We have to fault the page in */
1739 				result = vm_fault(map, vm_fault_addr, fault_type,
1740 				    /* change_wiring */ FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE, THREAD_ABORTSAFE,
1741 				    /* caller_pmap */ NULL, /* caller_pmap_addr */ 0);
1742 			}
1743 		}
1744 		if (thread->t_rr_state.trr_fault_state != TRR_FAULT_NONE) {
1745 			thread_reset_pcs_done_faulting(thread);
1746 		}
1747 		if (result == KERN_SUCCESS || result == KERN_ABORTED) {
1748 			return;
1749 		}
1750 
1751 		/*
1752 		 * vm_fault() should never return KERN_FAILURE for page faults from user space.
1753 		 * If it does, we're leaking preemption disables somewhere in the kernel.
1754 		 */
1755 		if (__improbable(result == KERN_FAILURE)) {
1756 			panic("vm_fault() KERN_FAILURE from user fault on thread %p", thread);
1757 		}
1758 
1759 		codes[0] = result;
1760 	} else if (is_alignment_fault(fault_code)) {
1761 		kern_return_t vmfkr = KERN_SUCCESS;
1762 		thread->machine.recover_esr = 0;
1763 		thread->machine.recover_far = 0;
1764 		int result = handle_alignment_fault_from_user(state, &vmfkr);
1765 		if (result == 0) {
1766 			/* Successfully emulated, or instruction
1767 			 * copyin() for decode/emulation failed.
1768 			 * Continue, or redrive instruction.
1769 			 */
1770 			thread_exception_return();
1771 		} else if (((result == EFAULT) || (result == EINVAL)) &&
1772 		    (thread->machine.recover_esr == 0)) {
1773 			/*
1774 			 * If we didn't actually take a fault, but got one of
1775 			 * these errors, then we failed basic sanity checks of
1776 			 * the fault address.  Treat this as an invalid
1777 			 * address.
1778 			 */
1779 			codes[0] = KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS;
1780 		} else if ((result == EFAULT) &&
1781 		    (thread->machine.recover_esr)) {
1782 			/*
1783 			 * Since alignment aborts are prioritized
1784 			 * ahead of translation aborts, the misaligned
1785 			 * atomic emulation flow may have triggered a
1786 			 * VM pagefault, which the VM could not resolve.
1787 			 * Report the VM fault error in codes[]
1788 			 */
1789 
1790 			codes[0] = vmfkr;
1791 			assertf(vmfkr != KERN_SUCCESS, "Unexpected vmfkr 0x%x", vmfkr);
1792 			/* Cause ESR_EC to reflect an EL0 abort */
1793 			thread->machine.recover_esr &= ~ESR_EC_MASK;
1794 			thread->machine.recover_esr |= (ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0 << ESR_EC_SHIFT);
1795 			set_saved_state_esr(thread->machine.upcb, thread->machine.recover_esr);
1796 			set_saved_state_far(thread->machine.upcb, thread->machine.recover_far);
1797 			fault_addr = thread->machine.recover_far;
1798 		} else {
1799 			/* This was just an unsupported alignment
1800 			 * exception. Misaligned atomic emulation
1801 			 * timeouts fall in this category.
1802 			 */
1803 			codes[0] = EXC_ARM_DA_ALIGN;
1804 		}
1805 	} else if (is_parity_error(fault_code)) {
1806 #if defined(APPLE_ARM64_ARCH_FAMILY)
1807 		/*
1808 		 * Platform errors are handled in sleh_sync before interrupts are enabled.
1809 		 */
1810 #else
1811 		panic("User parity error.");
1812 #endif
1813 	} else {
1814 		codes[0] = KERN_FAILURE;
1815 	}
1816 
1817 #if CODE_SIGNING_MONITOR
1818 	/*
1819 	 * If the code reaches here, it means we weren't able to resolve the fault and we're
1820 	 * going to be sending the task an exception. On systems which have the code signing
1821 	 * monitor enabled, an execute fault which cannot be handled must result in sending
1822 	 * a SIGKILL to the task.
1823 	 */
1824 	if (is_vm_fault(fault_code) && (fault_type & VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) {
1825 		csm_code_signing_violation(current_proc(), fault_addr);
1826 	}
1827 #endif
1828 
1829 	codes[1] = fault_addr;
1830 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
1831 	bool is_data_abort = (ESR_EC(esr) == ESR_EC_DABORT_EL0);
1832 	if (user_fault_addr_matches_pac_error_code(fault_addr, is_data_abort)) {
1833 		exc |= EXC_PTRAUTH_BIT;
1834 	}
1835 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
1836 
1837 	if (user_fault_in_self_restrict_mode(thread) &&
1838 	    task_is_jit_exception_fatal(get_threadtask(thread))) {
1839 		int flags = PX_KTRIAGE;
1840 		exception_info_t info = {
1841 			.os_reason = OS_REASON_SELF_RESTRICT,
1842 			.exception_type = exc,
1843 			.mx_code = codes[0],
1844 			.mx_subcode = codes[1]
1845 		};
1846 
1847 #if MACH_ASSERT
1848 		printf("\nGUARD_REASON_JIT exc %d codes=<0x%llx,0x%llx> syscalls %d task %p thread %p va 0x%lx code 0x%x type 0x%x esr 0x%llx\n",
1849 		    exc, codes[0], codes[1], thread->syscalls_unix, current_task(), thread, fault_addr, fault_code, fault_type, esr);
1850 		if (panic_on_jit_guard &&
1851 		    current_task()->thread_count == 1 &&
1852 		    thread->syscalls_unix < 24) {
1853 			panic("GUARD_REASON_JIT exc %d codes=<0x%llx,0x%llx> syscalls %d task %p thread %p va 0x%lx code 0x%x type 0x%x esr 0x%llx state %p j %d t %d s user 0x%llx (0x%llx) jb 0x%llx (0x%llx)",
1854 			    exc, codes[0], codes[1], thread->syscalls_unix, current_task(), thread, fault_addr, fault_code, fault_type, esr, state,
1855 			    0, 0, 0ull, 0ull,
1856 			    0ull, 0ull
1857 			    );
1858 		}
1859 #endif /* MACH_ASSERT */
1860 
1861 		exit_with_mach_exception(current_proc(), info, flags);
1862 	}
1863 
1864 	exception_triage(exc, codes, numcodes);
1865 	__builtin_unreachable();
1866 }
1867 
1868 /**
1869  * Panic because the kernel abort handler tried to apply a recovery handler that
1870  * isn't inside copyio_recover_table[].
1871  *
1872  * @param state original saved-state
1873  * @param recover invalid recovery handler
1874  */
1875 __attribute__((noreturn, used))
1876 static void
panic_on_invalid_recovery_handler(arm_saved_state_t * state,struct copyio_recovery_entry * recover)1877 panic_on_invalid_recovery_handler(arm_saved_state_t *state, struct copyio_recovery_entry *recover)
1878 {
1879 	panic("attempt to set invalid recovery handler %p on kernel saved-state %p", recover, state);
1880 }
1881 
1882 static void
handle_kernel_abort_recover(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t fault_addr,thread_t thread,struct copyio_recovery_entry * _Nonnull recover)1883 handle_kernel_abort_recover(
1884 	arm_saved_state_t              *state,
1885 	uint64_t                        esr,
1886 	vm_offset_t                     fault_addr,
1887 	thread_t                        thread,
1888 	struct copyio_recovery_entry   *_Nonnull recover)
1889 {
1890 	thread->machine.recover_esr = esr;
1891 	thread->machine.recover_far = fault_addr;
1892 #if defined(HAS_APPLE_PAC)
1893 	MANIPULATE_SIGNED_THREAD_STATE(state,
1894 	    "adrp	x6, _copyio_recover_table_end@page		\n"
1895 	    "add	x6, x6, _copyio_recover_table_end@pageoff	\n"
1896 	    "cmp	%[recover], x6					\n"
1897 	    "b.lt	1f						\n"
1898 	    "bl		_panic_on_invalid_recovery_handler		\n"
1899 	    "brk	#0						\n"
1900 	    "1:								\n"
1901 	    "adrp	x6, _copyio_recover_table@page			\n"
1902 	    "add	x6, x6, _copyio_recover_table@pageoff		\n"
1903 	    "cmp	%[recover], x6					\n"
1904 	    "b.ge	1f						\n"
1905 	    "bl		_panic_on_invalid_recovery_handler		\n"
1906 	    "brk	#0						\n"
1907 	    "1:								\n"
1908 	    "ldr	x1, [%[recover], %[CRE_RECOVERY]]		\n"
1909 	    "add	x1, x1, x6					\n"
1910 	    "str	x1, [x0, %[SS64_PC]]				\n",
1911 	    [recover] "r"(recover),
1912 	    [CRE_RECOVERY] "i"(offsetof(struct copyio_recovery_entry, cre_recovery))
1913 	    );
1914 #else
1915 	if ((uintptr_t)recover < (uintptr_t)copyio_recover_table ||
1916 	    (uintptr_t)recover >= (uintptr_t)copyio_recover_table_end) {
1917 		panic_on_invalid_recovery_handler(state, recover);
1918 	}
1919 	saved_state64(state)->pc = copyio_recovery_addr(recover->cre_recovery);
1920 #endif
1921 }
1922 
1923 static void
handle_kernel_abort(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t fault_addr,fault_status_t fault_code,vm_prot_t fault_type,expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)1924 handle_kernel_abort(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t fault_addr,
1925     fault_status_t fault_code, vm_prot_t fault_type, expected_fault_handler_t expected_fault_handler)
1926 {
1927 	thread_t thread = current_thread();
1928 	struct copyio_recovery_entry *recover = find_copyio_recovery_entry(state);
1929 
1930 #ifndef CONFIG_XNUPOST
1931 	(void)expected_fault_handler;
1932 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
1933 
1934 #if CONFIG_DTRACE
1935 	if (is_vm_fault(fault_code) && thread->t_dtrace_inprobe) { /* Executing under dtrace_probe? */
1936 		if (dtrace_tally_fault(fault_addr)) { /* Should a fault under dtrace be ignored? */
1937 			/*
1938 			 * Point to next instruction, or recovery handler if set.
1939 			 */
1940 			if (recover) {
1941 				handle_kernel_abort_recover(state, esr, VM_USER_STRIP_PTR(fault_addr), thread, recover);
1942 			} else {
1943 				add_saved_state_pc(state, 4);
1944 			}
1945 			return;
1946 		} else {
1947 			panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Unexpected page fault under dtrace_probe", state);
1948 		}
1949 	}
1950 #endif
1951 
1952 	if (is_vm_fault(fault_code)) {
1953 		kern_return_t result = KERN_FAILURE;
1954 		vm_map_t      map;
1955 		int           interruptible;
1956 
1957 		/*
1958 		 * Ensure no faults in the physical aperture. This could happen if
1959 		 * a page table is incorrectly allocated from the read only region
1960 		 * when running with KTRR.
1961 		 */
1962 
1963 #ifdef CONFIG_XNUPOST
1964 		if (expected_fault_handler && expected_fault_handler(state)) {
1965 			return;
1966 		}
1967 #endif /* CONFIG_XNUPOST */
1968 
1969 		if (fault_addr >= gVirtBase && fault_addr < static_memory_end) {
1970 			panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Unexpected fault in kernel static region\n", state);
1971 		}
1972 
1973 		if (VM_KERNEL_ADDRESS(fault_addr) || thread == THREAD_NULL || recover == 0) {
1974 			/*
1975 			 * If no recovery handler is supplied, always drive the fault against
1976 			 * the kernel map.  If the fault was taken against a userspace VA, indicating
1977 			 * an unprotected access to user address space, vm_fault() should fail and
1978 			 * ultimately lead to a panic here.
1979 			 */
1980 			map = kernel_map;
1981 			interruptible = THREAD_UNINT;
1982 
1983 #if CONFIG_KERNEL_TAGGING
1984 			/*
1985 			 * If kernel tagging is enabled, canonicalize the address here, so that we have a
1986 			 * chance to find it in the VM ranges. Do not mess with exec fault cases.
1987 			 */
1988 			if (!((fault_type) & VM_PROT_EXECUTE)) {
1989 				fault_addr = vm_memtag_canonicalize_address(fault_addr);
1990 			}
1991 #endif /* CONFIG_KERNEL_TAGGING */
1992 		} else {
1993 			map = thread->map;
1994 
1995 			/**
1996 			 * In the case that the recovery handler is set (e.g., during copyio
1997 			 * and dtrace probes), we don't want the vm_fault() operation to be
1998 			 * aborted early. Those code paths can't handle restarting the
1999 			 * vm_fault() operation so don't allow it to return early without
2000 			 * creating the wanted mapping.
2001 			 */
2002 			interruptible = (recover) ? THREAD_UNINT : THREAD_ABORTSAFE;
2003 
2004 		}
2005 
2006 		if (fault_addr >= gVirtBase && fault_addr < static_memory_end) {
2007 			panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Unexpected fault in kernel static region\n", state);
2008 		}
2009 
2010 		/* check to see if it is just a pmap ref/modify fault */
2011 		if (!is_translation_fault(fault_code)) {
2012 			result = arm_fast_fault(map->pmap,
2013 			    fault_addr,
2014 			    fault_type, (fault_code == FSC_ACCESS_FLAG_FAULT_L3), FALSE);
2015 			if (result == KERN_SUCCESS) {
2016 				return;
2017 			}
2018 		}
2019 
2020 		/**
2021 		 * vm_fault() can be called with preemption disabled (and indeed this is expected for
2022 		 * certain copyio() scenarios), but can't safely be called with interrupts disabled once
2023 		 * the system has gone multi-threaded.  Other than some early-boot situations such as
2024 		 * startup kext loading, kernel paging operations should never be triggered by
2025 		 * non-interruptible code in the first place, so a fault from such a context will
2026 		 * ultimately produce a kernel data abort panic anyway.  In these cases, skip calling
2027 		 * vm_fault() to avoid masking the real kernel panic with a failed VM locking assertion.
2028 		 */
2029 		if (__probable(SPSR_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED(get_saved_state_cpsr(state)) ||
2030 		    startup_phase < STARTUP_SUB_EARLY_BOOT ||
2031 		    current_cpu_datap()->cpu_hibernate)) {
2032 			if (result != KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE) {
2033 				// VM will query this property when deciding to throttle this fault, we don't want to
2034 				// throttle kernel faults for copyio faults. The presence of a recovery entry is used as a
2035 				// proxy for being in copyio code.
2036 				bool const was_recover = thread->recover;
2037 				thread->recover = was_recover || recover;
2038 
2039 				/*
2040 				 *  We have to "fault" the page in.
2041 				 */
2042 				result = vm_fault(map, fault_addr, fault_type,
2043 				    /* change_wiring */ FALSE, VM_KERN_MEMORY_NONE, interruptible,
2044 				    /* caller_pmap */ NULL, /* caller_pmap_addr */ 0);
2045 
2046 				thread->recover = was_recover;
2047 			}
2048 
2049 			if (result == KERN_SUCCESS) {
2050 				return;
2051 			}
2052 		}
2053 
2054 		/*
2055 		 *  If we have a recover handler, invoke it now.
2056 		 */
2057 		if (recover) {
2058 			handle_kernel_abort_recover(state, esr, fault_addr, thread, recover);
2059 			return;
2060 		}
2061 
2062 		panic_fault_address = fault_addr;
2063 	} else if (is_alignment_fault(fault_code)) {
2064 		if (recover) {
2065 			handle_kernel_abort_recover(state, esr, fault_addr, thread, recover);
2066 			return;
2067 		}
2068 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Unaligned kernel data abort.", state);
2069 	} else if (is_parity_error(fault_code)) {
2070 #if defined(APPLE_ARM64_ARCH_FAMILY)
2071 		/*
2072 		 * Platform errors are handled in sleh_sync before interrupts are enabled.
2073 		 */
2074 #else
2075 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Kernel parity error.", state);
2076 #endif
2077 	} else {
2078 		kprintf("Unclassified kernel abort (fault_code=0x%x)\n", fault_code);
2079 	}
2080 
2081 	panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Kernel data abort.", state);
2082 }
2083 
2084 extern void syscall_trace(struct arm_saved_state * regs);
2085 
2086 static void
handle_svc(arm_saved_state_t * state)2087 handle_svc(arm_saved_state_t *state)
2088 {
2089 	int      trap_no = get_saved_state_svc_number(state);
2090 	thread_t thread  = current_thread();
2091 	struct   proc *p;
2092 
2093 #define handle_svc_kprintf(x...) /* kprintf("handle_svc: " x) */
2094 
2095 #define TRACE_SYSCALL 1
2096 #if TRACE_SYSCALL
2097 	syscall_trace(state);
2098 #endif
2099 
2100 	thread->iotier_override = THROTTLE_LEVEL_NONE; /* Reset IO tier override before handling SVC from userspace */
2101 
2102 	if (trap_no == (int)PLATFORM_SYSCALL_TRAP_NO) {
2103 		platform_syscall(state);
2104 		panic("Returned from platform_syscall()?");
2105 	}
2106 
2107 	current_cached_proc_cred_update();
2108 
2109 	if (trap_no < 0) {
2110 		switch (trap_no) {
2111 		case MACH_ARM_TRAP_ABSTIME:
2112 			handle_mach_absolute_time_trap(state);
2113 			return;
2114 		case MACH_ARM_TRAP_CONTTIME:
2115 			handle_mach_continuous_time_trap(state);
2116 			return;
2117 		}
2118 
2119 		/* Counting perhaps better in the handler, but this is how it's been done */
2120 		thread->syscalls_mach++;
2121 		mach_syscall(state);
2122 	} else {
2123 		/* Counting perhaps better in the handler, but this is how it's been done */
2124 		thread->syscalls_unix++;
2125 		p = get_bsdthreadtask_info(thread);
2126 
2127 		assert(p);
2128 
2129 		unix_syscall(state, thread, p);
2130 	}
2131 }
2132 
2133 static void
handle_mach_absolute_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state)2134 handle_mach_absolute_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state)
2135 {
2136 	uint64_t now = mach_absolute_time();
2137 	saved_state64(state)->x[0] = now;
2138 }
2139 
2140 static void
handle_mach_continuous_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state)2141 handle_mach_continuous_time_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state)
2142 {
2143 	uint64_t now = mach_continuous_time();
2144 	saved_state64(state)->x[0] = now;
2145 }
2146 
2147 
2148 __attribute__((noreturn))
2149 static void
handle_msr_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)2150 handle_msr_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
2151 {
2152 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
2153 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED};
2154 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
2155 	uint32_t                   instr     = 0;
2156 
2157 	if (!is_saved_state64(state)) {
2158 		panic("MSR/MRS trap (ESR 0x%llx) from 32-bit state", esr);
2159 	}
2160 
2161 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2162 		panic("MSR/MRS trap (ESR 0x%llx) from kernel", esr);
2163 	}
2164 
2165 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
2166 	codes[1] = instr;
2167 
2168 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
2169 	__builtin_unreachable();
2170 }
2171 
2172 #if __has_feature(ptrauth_calls)
2173 static void
stringify_gpr(unsigned int r,char reg[4])2174 stringify_gpr(unsigned int r, char reg[4])
2175 {
2176 	switch (r) {
2177 	case 29:
2178 		strncpy(reg, "fp", 4);
2179 		return;
2180 
2181 	case 30:
2182 		strncpy(reg, "lr", 4);
2183 		return;
2184 
2185 	case 31:
2186 		strncpy(reg, "xzr", 4);
2187 		return;
2188 
2189 	default:
2190 		snprintf(reg, 4, "x%u", r);
2191 		return;
2192 	}
2193 }
2194 
2195 static void
autxx_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr,char reg[4])2196 autxx_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr, char reg[4])
2197 {
2198 	unsigned int rd = ARM64_INSTR_AUTxx_RD_GET(instr);
2199 	stringify_gpr(rd, reg);
2200 }
2201 
2202 static const char *
autix_system_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr)2203 autix_system_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr)
2204 {
2205 	unsigned int crm_op2 = ARM64_INSTR_AUTIx_SYSTEM_CRM_OP2_GET(instr);
2206 	if (crm_op2 == ARM64_INSTR_AUTIx_SYSTEM_CRM_OP2_AUTIA1716 ||
2207 	    crm_op2 == ARM64_INSTR_AUTIx_SYSTEM_CRM_OP2_AUTIB1716) {
2208 		return "x17";
2209 	} else {
2210 		return "lr";
2211 	}
2212 }
2213 
2214 static void
bxrax_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr,char reg[4])2215 bxrax_instruction_extract_reg(uint32_t instr, char reg[4])
2216 {
2217 	unsigned int rn = ARM64_INSTR_BxRAx_RN_GET(instr);
2218 	stringify_gpr(rn, reg);
2219 }
2220 
2221 static void
handle_pac_fail(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)2222 handle_pac_fail(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
2223 {
2224 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BAD_ACCESS | EXC_PTRAUTH_BIT;
2225 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_PAC_FAIL};
2226 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
2227 	uint32_t                   instr     = 0;
2228 
2229 	if (!is_saved_state64(state)) {
2230 		panic("PAC failure (ESR 0x%llx) from 32-bit state", esr);
2231 	}
2232 
2233 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
2234 
2235 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2236 #define GENERIC_PAC_FAILURE_MSG_FMT "PAC failure from kernel with %s key"
2237 #define AUTXX_MSG_FMT GENERIC_PAC_FAILURE_MSG_FMT " while authing %s"
2238 #define BXRAX_MSG_FMT GENERIC_PAC_FAILURE_MSG_FMT " while branching to %s"
2239 #define RETAX_MSG_FMT GENERIC_PAC_FAILURE_MSG_FMT " while returning"
2240 #define GENERIC_MSG_FMT GENERIC_PAC_FAILURE_MSG_FMT
2241 #define MAX_PAC_MSG_FMT BXRAX_MSG_FMT
2242 
2243 		char msg[strlen(MAX_PAC_MSG_FMT)
2244 		- strlen("%s") + strlen("IA")
2245 		- strlen("%s") + strlen("xzr")
2246 		+ 1];
2247 		ptrauth_key key = (ptrauth_key)(esr & 0x3);
2248 		const char *key_str = ptrauth_key_to_string(key);
2249 
2250 		if (ARM64_INSTR_IS_AUTxx(instr)) {
2251 			char reg[4];
2252 			autxx_instruction_extract_reg(instr, reg);
2253 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), AUTXX_MSG_FMT, key_str, reg);
2254 		} else if (ARM64_INSTR_IS_AUTIx_SYSTEM(instr)) {
2255 			const char *reg = autix_system_instruction_extract_reg(instr);
2256 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), AUTXX_MSG_FMT, key_str, reg);
2257 		} else if (ARM64_INSTR_IS_BxRAx(instr)) {
2258 			char reg[4];
2259 			bxrax_instruction_extract_reg(instr, reg);
2260 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), BXRAX_MSG_FMT, key_str, reg);
2261 		} else if (ARM64_INSTR_IS_RETAx(instr)) {
2262 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), RETAX_MSG_FMT, key_str);
2263 		} else {
2264 			snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), GENERIC_MSG_FMT, key_str);
2265 		}
2266 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state(msg, state);
2267 	}
2268 
2269 	codes[1] = instr;
2270 
2271 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
2272 	__builtin_unreachable();
2273 }
2274 #endif /* __has_feature(ptrauth_calls) */
2275 
2276 __attribute__((noreturn))
2277 static void
handle_bti_fail(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)2278 handle_bti_fail(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
2279 {
2280 	uint32_t btype = (uint32_t) esr & ISS_BTI_BTYPE_MASK;
2281 
2282 	if (!is_saved_state64(state)) {
2283 		/* BTI is an ARMv8 feature, this should not be possible */
2284 		panic("BTI failure for 32-bit state? (ESR=0x%llx)", esr);
2285 	}
2286 
2287 	/*
2288 	 * We currently only expect BTI to be enabled for kernel pages, so panic if
2289 	 * we detect otherwise.
2290 	 */
2291 	if (!PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2292 		panic("Unexpected non-kernel BTI failure? (ESR=0x%llx)", esr);
2293 	}
2294 
2295 #define BTI_FAIL_PTR_FMT "%04x"
2296 #define BTI_FAIL_MSG_FMT "Kernel BTI failure (BTYPE=0x" BTI_FAIL_PTR_FMT ")"
2297 	/* Replace the pointer format with the length of the pointer message+NULL */
2298 	char msg[strlen(BTI_FAIL_MSG_FMT) - strlen(BTI_FAIL_PTR_FMT) + 8 + 1];
2299 	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), BTI_FAIL_MSG_FMT, btype);
2300 	panic_with_thread_kernel_state(msg, state);
2301 	__builtin_unreachable();
2302 }
2303 
2304 static void
handle_user_trapped_instruction32(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)2305 handle_user_trapped_instruction32(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
2306 {
2307 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
2308 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED};
2309 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
2310 	uint32_t                   instr;
2311 
2312 	if (is_saved_state64(state)) {
2313 		panic("ESR (0x%llx) for instruction trapped from U32, but saved state is 64-bit.", esr);
2314 	}
2315 
2316 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2317 		panic("ESR (0x%llx) for instruction trapped from U32, actually came from kernel?", esr);
2318 	}
2319 
2320 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
2321 	codes[1] = instr;
2322 
2323 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
2324 	__builtin_unreachable();
2325 }
2326 
2327 static void
handle_simd_trap(arm_saved_state_t * state,uint64_t esr)2328 handle_simd_trap(arm_saved_state_t *state, uint64_t esr)
2329 {
2330 	exception_type_t           exception = EXC_BAD_INSTRUCTION;
2331 	mach_exception_data_type_t codes[2]  = {EXC_ARM_UNDEFINED};
2332 	mach_msg_type_number_t     numcodes  = 2;
2333 	uint32_t                   instr     = 0;
2334 
2335 	if (PSR64_IS_KERNEL(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2336 		panic("ESR (0x%llx) for SIMD trap from userland, actually came from kernel?", esr);
2337 	}
2338 
2339 	COPYIN(get_saved_state_pc(state), (char *)&instr, sizeof(instr));
2340 	codes[1] = instr;
2341 
2342 	exception_triage(exception, codes, numcodes);
2343 	__builtin_unreachable();
2344 }
2345 
2346 void
sleh_irq(arm_saved_state_t * state)2347 sleh_irq(arm_saved_state_t *state)
2348 {
2349 	cpu_data_t * cdp __unused             = getCpuDatap();
2350 #if MACH_ASSERT
2351 	int preemption_level = sleh_get_preemption_level();
2352 #endif
2353 
2354 
2355 	sleh_interrupt_handler_prologue(state, DBG_INTR_TYPE_OTHER);
2356 
2357 #if USE_APPLEARMSMP
2358 	PE_handle_ext_interrupt();
2359 #else
2360 	/* Run the registered interrupt handler. */
2361 	cdp->interrupt_handler(cdp->interrupt_target,
2362 	    cdp->interrupt_refCon,
2363 	    cdp->interrupt_nub,
2364 	    cdp->interrupt_source);
2365 #endif
2366 
2367 	entropy_collect();
2368 
2369 
2370 	sleh_interrupt_handler_epilogue();
2371 #if MACH_ASSERT
2372 	if (preemption_level != sleh_get_preemption_level()) {
2373 		panic("irq handler %p changed preemption level from %d to %d", cdp->interrupt_handler, preemption_level, sleh_get_preemption_level());
2374 	}
2375 #endif
2376 }
2377 
2378 void
sleh_fiq(arm_saved_state_t * state)2379 sleh_fiq(arm_saved_state_t *state)
2380 {
2381 	unsigned int type   = DBG_INTR_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
2382 #if MACH_ASSERT
2383 	int preemption_level = sleh_get_preemption_level();
2384 #endif
2385 
2386 #if MONOTONIC_FIQ
2387 	uint64_t pmcr0 = 0, upmsr = 0;
2388 #endif /* MONOTONIC_FIQ */
2389 
2390 #if defined(HAS_IPI)
2391 	boolean_t    is_ipi = FALSE;
2392 	uint64_t     ipi_sr = 0;
2393 
2394 	if (gFastIPI) {
2395 		MRS(ipi_sr, "S3_5_C15_C1_1");
2396 
2397 		if (ipi_sr & ARM64_IPISR_IPI_PENDING) {
2398 			is_ipi = TRUE;
2399 		}
2400 	}
2401 
2402 	if (is_ipi) {
2403 		type = DBG_INTR_TYPE_IPI;
2404 	} else
2405 #endif /* defined(HAS_IPI) */
2406 	if (ml_get_timer_pending()) {
2407 		type = DBG_INTR_TYPE_TIMER;
2408 	}
2409 #if MONOTONIC_FIQ
2410 	/* Consult the PMI sysregs last, after IPI/timer
2411 	 * classification.
2412 	 */
2413 	else if (mt_pmi_pending(&pmcr0, &upmsr)) {
2414 		type = DBG_INTR_TYPE_PMI;
2415 	}
2416 #endif /* MONOTONIC_FIQ */
2417 
2418 	sleh_interrupt_handler_prologue(state, type);
2419 
2420 #if APPLEVIRTUALPLATFORM
2421 	uint64_t iar = __builtin_arm_rsr64("ICC_IAR0_EL1");
2422 #endif
2423 
2424 #if defined(HAS_IPI)
2425 	if (type == DBG_INTR_TYPE_IPI) {
2426 		/*
2427 		 * Order is important here: we must ack the IPI by writing IPI_SR
2428 		 * before we call cpu_signal_handler().  Otherwise, there will be
2429 		 * a window between the completion of pending-signal processing in
2430 		 * cpu_signal_handler() and the ack during which a newly-issued
2431 		 * IPI to this CPU may be lost.  ISB is required to ensure the msr
2432 		 * is retired before execution of cpu_signal_handler().
2433 		 */
2434 		MSR("S3_5_C15_C1_1", ARM64_IPISR_IPI_PENDING);
2435 		__builtin_arm_isb(ISB_SY);
2436 		cpu_signal_handler();
2437 	} else
2438 #endif /* defined(HAS_IPI) */
2439 #if MONOTONIC_FIQ
2440 	if (type == DBG_INTR_TYPE_PMI) {
2441 		INTERRUPT_MASKED_DEBUG_START(mt_fiq, DBG_INTR_TYPE_PMI);
2442 		mt_fiq(getCpuDatap(), pmcr0, upmsr);
2443 		INTERRUPT_MASKED_DEBUG_END();
2444 	} else
2445 #endif /* MONOTONIC_FIQ */
2446 	{
2447 		/*
2448 		 * We don't know that this is a timer, but we don't have insight into
2449 		 * the other interrupts that go down this path.
2450 		 */
2451 
2452 		cpu_data_t *cdp = getCpuDatap();
2453 
2454 		cdp->cpu_decrementer = -1; /* Large */
2455 
2456 		/*
2457 		 * ARM64_TODO: whether we're coming from userland is ignored right now.
2458 		 * We can easily thread it through, but not bothering for the
2459 		 * moment (AArch32 doesn't either).
2460 		 */
2461 		INTERRUPT_MASKED_DEBUG_START(rtclock_intr, DBG_INTR_TYPE_TIMER);
2462 		rtclock_intr(TRUE);
2463 		INTERRUPT_MASKED_DEBUG_END();
2464 	}
2465 
2466 #if APPLEVIRTUALPLATFORM
2467 	if (iar != GIC_SPURIOUS_IRQ) {
2468 		__builtin_arm_wsr64("ICC_EOIR0_EL1", iar);
2469 		__builtin_arm_isb(ISB_SY);
2470 	}
2471 #endif
2472 
2473 	sleh_interrupt_handler_epilogue();
2474 #if MACH_ASSERT
2475 	if (preemption_level != sleh_get_preemption_level()) {
2476 		panic("fiq type %u changed preemption level from %d to %d", type, preemption_level, sleh_get_preemption_level());
2477 	}
2478 #endif
2479 }
2480 
2481 void
sleh_serror(arm_context_t * context,uint64_t esr,vm_offset_t far)2482 sleh_serror(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr, vm_offset_t far)
2483 {
2484 	task_vtimer_check(current_thread());
2485 
2486 	KDBG_RELEASE(MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SERR_ARM, 0) | DBG_FUNC_START,
2487 	    esr, VM_KERNEL_ADDRHIDE(far));
2488 	arm_saved_state_t *state = &context->ss;
2489 #if MACH_ASSERT
2490 	int preemption_level = sleh_get_preemption_level();
2491 #endif
2492 
2493 	if (PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(state))) {
2494 		/* Sanitize FAR (only if we came from userspace) */
2495 		saved_state64(state)->far = 0;
2496 	}
2497 
2498 	ASSERT_CONTEXT_SANITY(context);
2499 	arm64_platform_error(state, esr, far, PLAT_ERR_SRC_ASYNC);
2500 #if MACH_ASSERT
2501 	if (preemption_level != sleh_get_preemption_level()) {
2502 		panic("serror changed preemption level from %d to %d", preemption_level, sleh_get_preemption_level());
2503 	}
2504 #endif
2505 	KDBG_RELEASE(MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SERR_ARM, 0) | DBG_FUNC_END,
2506 	    esr, VM_KERNEL_ADDRHIDE(far));
2507 }
2508 
2509 void
mach_syscall_trace_exit(unsigned int retval,unsigned int call_number)2510 mach_syscall_trace_exit(unsigned int retval,
2511     unsigned int call_number)
2512 {
2513 	KERNEL_DEBUG_CONSTANT_IST(KDEBUG_TRACE,
2514 	    MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_SC, (call_number)) |
2515 	    DBG_FUNC_END, retval, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2516 }
2517 
2518 __attribute__((noreturn))
2519 void
thread_syscall_return(kern_return_t error)2520 thread_syscall_return(kern_return_t error)
2521 {
2522 	thread_t thread;
2523 	struct arm_saved_state *state;
2524 
2525 	thread = current_thread();
2526 	state = get_user_regs(thread);
2527 
2528 	assert(is_saved_state64(state));
2529 	saved_state64(state)->x[0] = error;
2530 
2531 #if MACH_ASSERT
2532 	kern_allocation_name_t
2533 	prior __assert_only = thread_get_kernel_state(thread)->allocation_name;
2534 	assertf(prior == NULL, "thread_set_allocation_name(\"%s\") not cleared", kern_allocation_get_name(prior));
2535 #endif /* MACH_ASSERT */
2536 
2537 	if (kdebug_enable) {
2538 		/* Invert syscall number (negative for a mach syscall) */
2539 		mach_syscall_trace_exit(error, (-1) * get_saved_state_svc_number(state));
2540 	}
2541 
2542 	thread_exception_return();
2543 }
2544 
2545 void
syscall_trace(struct arm_saved_state * regs __unused)2546 syscall_trace(
2547 	struct arm_saved_state * regs __unused)
2548 {
2549 	/* kprintf("syscall: %d\n", saved_state64(regs)->x[16]);  */
2550 }
2551 
2552 static void
sleh_interrupt_handler_prologue(arm_saved_state_t * state,unsigned int type)2553 sleh_interrupt_handler_prologue(arm_saved_state_t *state, unsigned int type)
2554 {
2555 	const bool is_user = PSR64_IS_USER(get_saved_state_cpsr(state));
2556 
2557 	if (is_user == true) {
2558 		/* Sanitize FAR (only if the interrupt occurred while the CPU was in usermode) */
2559 		saved_state64(state)->far = 0;
2560 	}
2561 
2562 	recount_enter_interrupt();
2563 
2564 	task_vtimer_check(current_thread());
2565 
2566 	uint64_t pc = is_user ? get_saved_state_pc(state) :
2567 	    VM_KERNEL_UNSLIDE(get_saved_state_pc(state));
2568 
2569 	KDBG_RELEASE(MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_INTR, 0) | DBG_FUNC_START,
2570 	    0, pc, is_user, type);
2571 
2572 #if CONFIG_TELEMETRY
2573 	if (telemetry_needs_record) {
2574 		telemetry_mark_curthread(is_user, FALSE);
2575 	}
2576 #endif /* CONFIG_TELEMETRY */
2577 }
2578 
2579 static void
sleh_interrupt_handler_epilogue(void)2580 sleh_interrupt_handler_epilogue(void)
2581 {
2582 #if KPERF
2583 	kperf_interrupt();
2584 #endif /* KPERF */
2585 	KDBG_RELEASE(MACHDBG_CODE(DBG_MACH_EXCP_INTR, 0) | DBG_FUNC_END);
2586 	recount_leave_interrupt();
2587 }
2588 
2589 void
sleh_invalid_stack(arm_context_t * context,uint64_t esr __unused,vm_offset_t far __unused)2590 sleh_invalid_stack(arm_context_t *context, uint64_t esr __unused, vm_offset_t far __unused)
2591 {
2592 	thread_t thread = current_thread();
2593 	vm_offset_t kernel_stack_bottom, sp;
2594 
2595 	sp = get_saved_state_sp(&context->ss);
2596 	vm_offset_t kstackptr = (vm_offset_t)thread->machine.kstackptr;
2597 	kernel_stack_bottom = round_page(kstackptr) - KERNEL_STACK_SIZE;
2598 
2599 	if ((sp < kernel_stack_bottom) && (sp >= (kernel_stack_bottom - PAGE_SIZE))) {
2600 		panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Invalid kernel stack pointer (probable overflow).", &context->ss);
2601 	}
2602 
2603 	panic_with_thread_kernel_state("Invalid kernel stack pointer (probable corruption).", &context->ss);
2604 }
2605 
2606 
2607 #if MACH_ASSERT
2608 static int trap_handled;
2609 static void
handle_recoverable_kernel_trap(__unused void * tstate,uint16_t comment)2610 handle_recoverable_kernel_trap(
2611 	__unused void     *tstate,
2612 	uint16_t          comment)
2613 {
2614 	assert(comment == TEST_RECOVERABLE_SOFT_TRAP);
2615 
2616 	printf("Recoverable trap handled.\n");
2617 	trap_handled = 1;
2618 }
2619 
2620 KERNEL_BRK_DESCRIPTOR_DEFINE(test_desc,
2621     .type                = KERNEL_BRK_TYPE_TEST,
2622     .base                = TEST_RECOVERABLE_SOFT_TRAP,
2623     .max                 = TEST_RECOVERABLE_SOFT_TRAP,
2624     .options             = KERNEL_BRK_RECOVERABLE,
2625     .handle_breakpoint   = handle_recoverable_kernel_trap);
2626 
2627 static int
recoverable_kernel_trap_test(__unused int64_t in,int64_t * out)2628 recoverable_kernel_trap_test(__unused int64_t in, int64_t *out)
2629 {
2630 	ml_recoverable_trap(TEST_RECOVERABLE_SOFT_TRAP);
2631 
2632 	*out = trap_handled;
2633 	return 0;
2634 }
2635 
2636 SYSCTL_TEST_REGISTER(recoverable_kernel_trap, recoverable_kernel_trap_test);
2637 
2638 #endif
2639